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Chapter One 
State Capitalism and 
Mass Mobilization 
Richard Couto coined the phrase "political silence" to characterize 
the political behavior of the impoverished masses in Appalachia. 1 The 
point that Couto emphasized is that these people have every reason 
not to remain silent in the face of environmental destruction, inade-
quate public services, extreme concentration of land ownership, re-
gressive taxation, and lack of economic opportunity.2 The focus of 
this study is also on political silence-the silence exhibited by indus-
trial workers in the state-capitalist regimes of Mexico and Venezuela. 
The study will show that workers in these two countries also have 
every reason not to remain politically silent yet tend to do so. The 
consequences of political silence in Latin America are much the same 
as in Appalachia-the perpetuation of social injustice and inequity. 
It is hoped that this study will contribute to a greater understanding 
of why the lower classes in Latin America remain politically silent 
though not necessarily inactive. 3 
Before examining in more depth the major theoretical issues to 
be addressed in this study, let us discuss why political silence is det-
rimental to the interests of the lower classes in the late industrializing 
countries of Latin America, though functional for state-capitalist eco-
nomic development in these countries. 
Most late industrializing nations in contemporary Latin America 
have opted for a strategy of economic development that has been 
labeled dependent state capitalism. The term dependent indicates the cru-
cial role that foreign investment and multinational corporations have 
come to play in the economic development of the capitalist nations 
of the third world. These links to the outside world sometimes imply 
constraints on developmental possibilities.4 For that reason devel-
opment is construed as "dependent" rather than "autonomous." The 
latter term, state capitalism, underscores the vital role that the state 
has come to play in capitalist expansion in late industrializing na-
tions. 5 This strategy is predicated on the state promoting an attractive 
climate for private investment, both domestic and foreign. In addition 
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to various direct incentives to private economic activity, such as cheap 
credit, subsidies, regressive taxation, and infrastructural develop-
ment, public authorities often support public policies that sacrifice 
immediate improvements in living standards and in the social welfare 
of the working population in order to maximize long-term economic 
growth. Wayne Cornelius has described very aptly the public policy 
choices that political elites in late industrializing countries often make 
in order to promote dependent capitalist development. Referring to 
the policy debate over allocation of Mexico's petroleum revenues in 
the late seventies, he writes: 
The basic operating premise of Mexican government policy seems to be that 
the country's employment problems can only be solved in the long run (i.e., 
in the next generation), and only as a result of urban-industrial development. 
The overriding goal, in the medium-to-long run, is to turn today' s peasants, 
and their offspring, into factory operatives with more secure, better-paid em-
ployment. In this policy context, the "oil bonanza" must not be squandered 
on temporary make-work projects, income transfer programs, and other kinds 
of "welfare schemes" (subsidios a la miseria) for the rural and urban poor. 
Rather, the revenues must be used to build up a much larger base of per-
manent employment in the urban-industrial sector. Thus, massive, short-term 
job creating programs are not in the cards. 6 
Comprehensive socioeconomic reforms that seek to bring about 
widespread immediate improvement in mass living standards are in-
consistent with the economic logic and priorities of dependent capi-
talist development. 7 Reforms such as higher minimum wage laws, 
increased public sector employment, progressive taxation, or social 
welfare programs pose a potential threat to capital formation as scarce 
resources are diverted from investment into consumption. Addition-
ally, the increased purchasing power of the popular sector generated 
by such policies raises the specter of runaway inflation. A plethora 
of economic reforms could also lead to capital flight if investors, fearful 
of the need to tax to support new social welfare programs, decide to 
move their funds to safer markets. For these reasons political elites 
committed to conventional capitalist development8 often shy away 
from economic reform unless there is a compelling political logic to 
do otherwise. In that case their response to pressures for reform is 
often little more than rhetoric, limited to preemptive reforms designed 
to regenerate popular support. 9 
Alain de Janvry' s analysis of the relationship between capital ac-
cumulation in late industrializing countries and restricted internal 
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consumer markets provides further insight into structural pressures 
on political elites to limit redistributive socioeconomic reforms. 10 In 
the "socially disarticulated economies" of the third world, capital ac-
cumulation depends on (1) the containment of labor costs and the 
extraction of oligopolistic rents and (2) the expansion of exports and 
of luxury goods for a restricted internal market. By contrast, capitalists 
in the "socially articulated economies" of early industrializing coun-
tries profit when internal markets expand via the growth of real wages 
and social benefits for workers. Socioeconomic reform is, therefore, 
consistent with logic of capital accumulation in early industrializing 
countries; it is inconsistent with capital accumulation in the "socially 
disarticulated" economies of the late industrializing nations. 
"Socially disarticulated economies" clearly "reflect the imposition 
of the values and interests of some groups to the exclusion of oth-
ers."11 Those with investable capital stand to benefit far more than 
do those who must sell their labor and only hope for a trickle-down 
effect. As James Malloy puts it, "The latter (labor) literally pay the 
costs of development, simply because they are forced to do so."12 
The social costs can be further exacerbated during periodic crises re-
lated to recession in the world capitalist economy, inflation, inter-
national debt, trade imbalances and currency devaluations, and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) austerity programs. In these cir-
cumstances the working classes have often been asked to absorb cuts 
in real wages and in access to public services as a way to regenerate 
and to stabilize economic growth. 13 
The allocation of social costs to the working class would seem to 
be sufficient incentive for political mobilization. Only by organizing 
for political activity could workers hope to shift the social costs of 
development policies to privileged classes and to obtain a more eq-
uitable distribution of economic and political resources. However, 
working-class mobilization represents a potential threat to the income 
and control rights of capital and thus to the underlying logic of capital 
accumulation in "socially disarticulated" economies. 14 Therefore, po-
litical elites in state-capitalist regimes often seek to limit working-class 
mobilization that might challenge existing developmental policies. 
One solution to working-class mobilization that has been tried in 
Latin America is political exclusion of the lower classes. To use Charles 
Anderson's terminology, 15 power contenders linked to the lower classes 
who had previously gained entry into the political arena are formally 
excluded. This technique has typically been tried in the bureaucratic-
authoritarian regimes16 of the sixties and seventies that sought to 
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deactivate the popular sector. The early eighties, however, have seen 
many of these regimes unravel because of their failure to deliver on 
the promises of economic stabilization and superior growth rates. 
Their legitimacy eroded since military or authoritarian elites could not 
deliver on their promises. Other bases of legitimacy such as a revo-
lutionary ideology or popular consent were simply not available. 17 
Not all state-capitalist regimes in Latin America opted for a 
bureaucratic-authoritarian solution during the turbulent sixties and 
seventies. Countries such as Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and 
Mexico maintained inclusionary political systems while experiencing 
severe economic crises and massive social problems linked to delayed 
dependent development and to crises in the international economy. 18 
In these countries formal exclusion of lower-class organizations and 
political parties from the political arena has not been attempted in 
recent times. The reason is simply that elites perceived no threat to 
long-term goals of capital accumulation and political stability from 
mass mobilization. Lower-class mobilization has served neither to 
strengthen significantly the left nor to increase alarmingly the inci-
dence of destabilizing, unconventional participation. 
The point is well illustrated by the 1983 presidential race in Ven-
ezuela where the two ruling centrist parties (Acci6n Democnitica [AD] 
and the Christian Democratic Party [coPEI]) gained 91.3 percent of 
the vote19 or by the 1982 presidential race in Mexico where the win-
ning candidate of the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) 
received 71.6 percent of the vote.20 These totals were gained during 
a time of severe economic crisis in both countries. In both countries 
parties on the political left have failed to harvest great electoral sup-
port, nor have there been any serious threats to the long-term political 
stability of either regime. 
In both Mexico and Venezuela, hegemonic parties that dominate 
the electoral arena have emerged. In Mexico's semicompetitive elec-
toral system, the PRI has never lost a gubernatorial or presidential 
election nor control of the national or state legislatures since its in-
ception in 1928 until the legislative elections of 1985. By contrast, a 
two-party system emerged in Venezuela-with AD and coPEI becom-
ing the dominant parties. In the last three presidential races (1973, 
1978, and 1983), they have managed to gamer over 80 percent of the 
vote, while minor parties on the right and left combined have not 
gained over 15 percent of the vote. 21 
A fundamental objective of this study is to explore how these 
parties in Mexico and Venezuela have managed to secure working-
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class electoral support. To understand this phenomenon, the com-
mitment of these hegemonic parties not only to state-capitalist 
development but also to populism must be examined. As Malloy 
states, "An explicit assumption of all populist approaches has been 
that regimes could simultaneously spur development, incorporate 
many sectors of the society in the political system, and broadly dis-
tribute the surplus.'122 Chapter 3 will examine more closely how hege-
monic parties in Venezuela and Mexico have sought to achieve these 
diverse objectives. Some of the general features of populism in these 
two countries will be noted here. 
First, incorporation of any given sector is achieved through either 
ties with hegemonic parties or ties with the bureaucratic state. In both 
cases incorporation is based on explicit or implicit bargains (or pacts) 
by which the state or party agrees to provide economic benefits or 
other privileges in exchange for political support. Generally, goods 
and services are distributed through patron-client networks. 23 The 
nature of the bargain negotiated by various grou~s depends on its 
political power and control over investable capital. 4 More privileged 
groups can negotiate with the state more favorable bargains than the 
less privileged. In the case of the lower classes, blue-collar workers 
in the urban industrial sector generally fare better than either the 
peasants or the urban workers in the informal sector. 25 
Second, the resource scarcity and recurring economic crises that 
dependent capitalist countries confront create difficulties in achieving 
simultaneously continuing economic growth and a large surplus that 
can be distributed broadly to all sectors of society. The petroleum 
bonanza of the seventies gave both Mexico and Venezuela a brief 
respite from this dilemma. Still, elites in both countries have con-
fronted difficult choices between investment and consumption goals 
and between the interests of labor and capital. As noted, elites gen-
erally side with the interests of capital hoping that sustained economic 
growth might eventually expand the surplus available for distribution 
to incorporated groups. 
Third, the long-term political stability of these two inclusionary 
regimes, Venezuela and Mexico, depends on the continuing capacity 
of hegemonic parties to retain lower-class support. Consider the al-
ternative. If the lower classes were to switch their loyalty to parties 
of the left, as found in many Western European countries,26 such 
parties might then challenge the hegemony of the ruling populist 
parties. The state-capitalist model of economic development could 
then be put in jeopardy with the consequence of unraveling the social 
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pacts with more privileged groups. Furthermore, if lower-class ties 
to hegemonic parties were to break down, then more radical socio-
political movements could recruit more effectively among the lower 
classes. Such social fissions could conceivably generate the climate 
for a military coup or a regime breakdown, similar to what has oc-
curred in other Latin American countries. 
This study examines why the urban working class in Mexico and 
Venezuela has generally supported hegemonic parties and remained 
politically silent. Subsequent chapters explore how these behavioral 
patterns are shaped by mechanisms of political control. The data 
analysis utilizes national samples of around 500 blue-collar workers 
who were interviewed in 1979 and 1980. The focus of the study is the 
most privileged stratum of the lower class in Mexico and Venezuela, 
workers employed in the urban formal sector of the economy.27 
The focus on urban labor is significant for two reasons. While this 
sector of the working class is less numerous than the peasant or in-
formal sector, it is a potentially more powerful actor in the political 
arena. It is likely to be less atomized socially and thereby more capable 
of resorting to collective action. Furthermore, this sector of the work-
ing class is more likely to be organized by labor unions. Thus, the 
industrial work force possesses a greater potential to challenge gov-
ernment priorities than do either unorganized peasants or urban 
workers in the informal sector. 
An empirical study of industrial workers in Mexico and Venezuela 
is useful because of the paucity of survey data on this sector of the 
Latin American working class. Most previous survey research con-
ducted in Latin America has focused on either the rural peasantry or 
the urban informal sector. 28 While industrial workers and labor unions 
in Latin America have received considerable attention recently from 
scholars, 29 there has been relatively little systematic investigation of 
working-class political attitudes and behavior. 30 The survey data set 
used for this study should allow for a more systematic assessment of 
the capacity of industrial workers in Venezuela and Mexico to mobilize 
politically. 
Before proceeding to a discussion of the major theoretical issues 
to be addressed, one thing must be emphasized. The purpose here 
is not to advance another "lap dog" interpretation of industrial labor 
in Latin America. 31 Noting quiescent behavioral patterns or relative 
political inactivity does not necessarily imply that workers are either 
necessarily content with state-capitalist development or too politically 
immature for active mobilization. Even though the working class has 
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generally remained quiescent, there have been pockets of lower-class 
resistance to the prevailing sociopolitical system in both countries 
throughout the postwar period. Control of working-class mobilization 
has proved to be problematic for elites in both Mexico and Venezuela 
and has not always come easily.32 The recent Coordinadora movement 
in Mexico and the nuevo sindicalismo in Venezuela during the eighties 
illustrate how pockets of working-class resistance develop in both 
countries. 33 To examine modal patterns of restrained political mobi-
lization does not imply that exceptions to these patterns are not to 
be found. 
Alternative patterns of working-class political mobilization can now be 
examined. First, it should be noted that mobilizational patterns ex-
hibited by lower-class populations are not permanently fixed. Work-
ers may be prone to quiescence and to support for hegemonic parties 
at time "x" but not necessarily at time "y."34 Furthermore, variation 
in lower-class mobilizational patterns can be found across different 
contexts. Cornelius, for example, found significant variation in par-
ticipant activity across different squatter settlements in Mexico City. 35 
Patterns of differential mobilization can be observed from a cross-
national perspective as well. 36 It is useful, therefore, to construct a 
typology of alternative patterns of political mobilization that a work-
ing-class population might exhibit. 
It is important to note that ideal types of mobilization patterns 
are being identified. In the real world, there is not likely to be a perfect 
fit with any of the types identified. Also, a definition of political mo-
bilization needs to be provided. It has been defined "as the process 
through which subordinate groups increase their capacity to pursue 
collective goals."37 This definition suggests three possible types of 
working-class mobilization: (1) autonomous political mobilization, (2) 
demobilization, and (3) controlled mobilization. These patterns are 
defined by certain behavioral and attitudinal syndromes that working-
class populations might exhibit. Each one of the above-mentioned 
mobilizational patterns will be considered, focusing first on autono-
mous mobilization. 
Autonomous mobilization occurs (1) when subordinate groups come 
to define their collective interests as being in conflict with those of 
other groups or with the state and (2) when such groups actively 
pursue their collective interests as they have so defined them. Au-
tonomous political mobilization is most likely to occur in state-
capitalist regimes when opportunities to exercise political influence 
are widely available. In those contexts in which the working class is 
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extended ample opportunities to pursue collective interests, one 
would expect to find a relatively high awareness of conflicting class 
interest (concientizaci6n) and psychological involvement in politics. 
That is, workers acquire participatory motivations that equip them 
for self-directed political participation. Furthermore, autonomously 
mobilized workers should be prone to support left-wing, working-
class parties and to be politically active beyond periodic voting. 
Karen Remmer' s discussion of mass political mobilization in Chile 
before 1973 illustrates these patterns of autonomous mobilization. 
Prior to 1973 Chile experienced an exceptionally rapid process of political 
mobilization. In fact, Henry A. Landsberger and Tim McDaniel have char-
acterized the growth in political awareness and activity, which was initiated 
during the Christian Democratic government of Eduardo Frei and accelerated 
under the Allende administration as "hypermobilization." 
... On a comparative basis, the process of political mobilization was not 
only rapid; it produced an exceptionally high level of subordinate group or-
ganization and participation in politics .... The estimated level of union or-
ganization in Chile by the end of the Allende period compared favorably even 
with that of Argentina, whose trade union movement is typically regarded 
as the largest and most powerful in Latin America. Taking into account as 
well participation in political parties and the proliferation of non-union lower 
class organization, for which no comparative data are available, the level of 
popular involvement in politics by 1973 probably exceeded that of any country 
in Latin America, with the possible exception of Cuba . 
. . . Most evidence does suggest that lower class organization and po-
litical consciousness in Chile were strong by Latin American and Mediter-
ranean standards. First, Chile had a relatively lengthy tradition of lower class 
organization and militancy. The labor movement developed comparatively 
early and was historically organized under Marxist leadership. In contrast to 
countries such as Argentina, Spain, Brazil, and Mexico, the union movement 
also achieved a relatively high degree of autonomy from state control and, 
particularly after 1953, an unusual level of unity with the formation of the 
Communist dominated national trade union central, the Central Unica de Tra-
bajadores (cUT). 38 
Certainly, the case of the working class in Chile during the Frei 
and Allende years does not provide the optimal illustration of au-
tonomous political mobilization. 39 As chapter 5 will show, working-
class political mobilization in Chile during this era was more controlled 
than in certain Western European countries. Still, the case of the 
working class in Chile as well as the cases of Jamaica during the 
Manley years (1972-80)40 and, to a lesser extent, Brazil during the 
Goulart years (1960-64)41 illustrate far more autonomous political mo-
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bilization than what this study found among workers in Venezuela 
and Mexico. The point to be emphasized is that working-class popu-
lations in Latin America do not exhibit uniform levels and styles of 
political mobilization. One can find significant variation in the political 
mobilization patterns manifested by lower-class populations in Latin 
America. Before 1973 Chile illustrates relatively autonomous mobili-
zation; the other extreme is represented by the suppressed mobili-
zation patterns found in bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. 
Autonomous working-class mobilization poses a potential threat 
to the hegemony of populist parties as well as to social pacts with 
privileged groups. While such mobilization patterns undoubtedly 
tend to create more equitable distributional patterns, they can also 
generate social fissions and strains on existing distributive mecha-
nisms as the aforementioned case of Chile illustrates. It is this type 
of mobilization that the politically stable regimes of Latin America 
suppress or contain, though generally at the cost of a more equitable 
development strategy. 
Demobilization represents the opposite end of the spectrum from 
autonomous mobilization. In this case opportunities for political mo-
bilization by subordinate groups are effectively eliminated. Political 
activity, if at all, is limited to particularized contacting for specific 
benefits and public goods and perhaps to problem-solving action 
within local communities. Such activities did occur in various 
bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of the southern cone.42 A primary 
goal of these regimes was to demobilize various sectors of the popu-
lation-that is, to exclude them altogether from the political arena so 
that political decision making could become a monopoly of selected 
military officers and technocrats. 43 These regimes came into existence 
largely to contain the threat of autonomous political mobilization by 
the popular sector. 44 
In the case of controlled mobilization, subordinate groups are not 
demobilized, but rather their capacity to pursue collective goals is 
limited by effective political controls. Political control can be asserted 
through either structural or cultural mechanisms that limit the mo-
bilizational capacity of a group. If political control is effectively as-
serted, targeted groups are likely to disengage from politics except 
for periodic voting as directed by hegemonic parties. If there is ef-
fective control over political mobilization of a given working-class 
population, one should find (1) a high level of electoral support for 
hegemonic parties, (2) a low level of support for leftist and other 
system-challenging parties, (3) a low level of psychological involve-
ment in politics and of awareness of conflicting class interests (con-
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cientizaci6n), and (4) a low level of political activity except for periodic 
voting. 
Moreover, controlled mobilization is likely to be characterized by 
externally mobilized rather than by self-directed political participa-
tion. Self-directed as opposed to externally directed mobilization re-
quires that individuals acquire some knowledge of the political 
process as well as motivations to participate. In the absence of such 
motivations and knowledge, workers are likely to lack the capacity 
for political activism unless externally mobilized by political parties 
or interest groups. 45 As Ronald Inglehart notes, external mobilization 
"may not reflect the translation of public preferences into elite deci-
sion, so much as the effective mobilization of the public by elites, in 
pursuit of goals largely chosen by the latter."46 External or elite-
directed mobilization, Inglehart also points out, produces "only a 
relatively low qualitative level of participation-generally not going 
much beyond mere voting."47 Such transient, vertically directed mo-
bilization clearly favors ruling parties that have a larger base of sup-
porters to mobilize than do opposition parties. 
The concept of controlled mobilization implies that the partici-
patory motivations as well as choices of individuals can be system-
atically manipulated. Control mechanisms allow elites to influence 
the participatory motivations and decisions of individual citizens. For 
example, the capacity of a hegemonic party to control the flow of 
economic benefits might discourage workers from voting for the left. 
Similarly, the dispossessed in American society are often discouraged 
from radical political action because of a pervasive "individualist 
ethos" in the American political culture.48 In both cases controls (cul-
tural in the latter, structural in the former) serve to limit and to dis-
courage political mobilization. Thus, controlled political mobilization 
in the case of the working class protects elite autonomy in decision 
making and social pacts with more privileged societal actors. 
We now turn to a theoretical discussion of alternative mechanisms 
that might be utilized to control political mobilization. 
Unfortunately, data are not available on a wide array of political 
systems that would provide cross-systemic variation in patterns of 
political mobilization. If such data were available, it would be possible 
to assess the relationship between alternative system-level controls 
and patterns of political mobilization. Within the limitations imposed 
by a two-country sample, it is still possible to assess how various 
structural and cultural controls affect the capacity of industrial work-
ers for political mobilization. Additionally, useful comparisons be-
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tween Mexican and Venezuelan workers can be drawn as control 
structures are more fully developed in Mexico than in Venezuela (see 
chapter 4). The intent of the data analysis in chapters 6 to 8 is to gain 
a better understanding of how control mechanisms affect working-
class mobilization in Venezuela and Mexico. The purpose is to de-
termine which structural or cultural control mechanisms best account 
for observed patterns of controlled mobilization. 
Let us now examine four possible structural control mechanisms 
beginning with corporatist interest intermediation. 
As defined by Philippe Schmitter, corporatism is a system of in-
terest intermediation in which "constituent units are organized into 
a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierar-
chically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized 
or licensed ... by the state and granted a deliberate representational 
monopoly ... in exchange for observing certain controls on their se-
lection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports."49 
Schmitter separates corporatist systems of interest intermediation 
into two subtypes: state corporatism and societal corporatism, corre-
sponding essentially to a distinction between forms of "guided" in-
termediation imposed from above versus forms of "self-limited" 
intermediation that evolve from below. It is state-corporatist arrange-
ments that tend to characterize interest intermediation in Latin 
America. 
Unlike in the early industrializing nations where political parties 
developed out of preexisting socioeconomic, ethnic, and religious 
cleavages, 50 multiclass political parties in Latin America were some-
times formed by elites to preempt the emergence of societal cleavages. 
The labor movement was often initiated or preempted by political 
parties and consequently became dependent on sponsoring political 
parties. To use Kay Lawson's typology of party-interest group link-
ages, the ties established between political parties and the union 
movement are often "directive" rather than "participatory" or 
"policy-responsive."51 The nature of "directive" or state-corporatist 
linkages is well illustrated in John Corbett's discussion of how interest 
groups relate to the PRI in Mexico. 
There is a strong tendency in the conceptual literature on political parties to 
emphasize linkage upward through the system, from masses to elites or from 
the grass roots to upper echelons. Such a notion is implicit in the idea of 
parties as "specialized aggregation structures" or sometimes explicit as "the 
organization called the party is expected to organize public opinion and to 
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communicate demands to the center of governmental power and decision." 
But in the Mexican context the emphasis on mobilizing support for the status 
quo suggests that attention should be directed to the downward linkages or 
to those aspects of the party system that facilitate communication and control 
from the top down. 52 
Kevin Middlebrook has shown that corporatism is generally in-
stitutionalized in two ways by Latin American states: (1) through 
"social corporatist organizations" by which interest groups are linked 
to political parties and (2) through "state administrative structures," 
which are "those governmental administrative mechanisms that rep-
resent the formal integration of societal interests and the state."53 In 
this study the focus is on social corporatist organizations. The point 
is to assess whether workers belonging to labor unions affiliated with 
dominant parties exhibit different patterns of political mobilization 
than do workers belonging to unions that have achieved a degree of 
autonomy from control by dominant parties. The former type of union 
will be referred to as an incorporated union; the latter type as an au-
tonomous union. The former type of union presumably operates as a 
mechanism to control working-class political mobilization, while the 
latter type of union might facilitate more autonomous political mo-
bilization on the part of the working class. 
The literature on corporatism and clientelism helps one to un-
derstand why incorporated unions might be effective devices for con-
trolling working-class political mobilization. Like hegemonic parties, 
incorporated unions can utilize patronage resources to mobilize clients 
for political activities. On the other hand, autonomous unions, like 
leftist parties, frequently lack patronage resources because of lack of 
control over public sector distributional systems. Hence, they must 
rely more on symbol manipulation as a device for external mobili-
zation. Particularly in the case of the poor and the working class, 
symbol manipulation is not likely to be as powerful a resource as the 
distribution of material goods. Hence, hegemonic parties can utilize 
their control over incorporated unions to thwart efforts by the left or 
other opposition parties to make inroads among the working class. 
Furthermore, patronage resources can be used to discourage large-
scale political activation on the part of the working class. As Robert 
Kaufman notes, the intent of corporatism is to "coopt new social forces 
and defuse their revolutionary potential."54 
If corporatist interest intermediation in Mexico and Venezuela 
provides an effective control over working-class mobilization, one 
should find (1) that the level of psychological involvement in politics 
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and concientizaci6n should be lower among workers in incorporated 
unions than among other workers; (2) that the level of electoral sup-
port for hegemonic parties should be greater among workers in in-
corporated unions; (3) that electoral support for the left and other 
opposition parties should be less among workers in incorporated 
unions; and (4) that incorporated unions should exhibit a greater ca-
pacity to tum out voters than do autonomous unions. 
Limitation of partisan competition is the second control mechanism. 
First, one should note that electoral systems, in general, provide a 
mechanism not only for popular expression but also for control of 
political mobilization. As Benjamin Ginsberg explains: 
The fundamental difference between voting and rioting is that voting is a 
socialized and institutionalized form of mass political expression. The peasant 
uprising or urban riot is usually a spontaneous affair, sparked by some par-
ticular event or grievance. Though riots may have been commonplace, each 
was itself a unique event. ... Voting, however, is far from spontaneous. 
Elections provide routine institutional channels for the expression of demands 
and grievances. They thus transmute what might otherwise take the form of 
sporadic, citizen-initiated activity into a routine public function. When, 
where, who, and how individuals participate in elections are matters of public 
policy rather than questions of spontaneous public choice .... By establish-
ing an institutional channel of political activity and habituating citizens to its 
use, governments reduced the danger that mass political action posed to the 
established political and social order. Elections contain and channel away 
potentially violent and disruptive activities and protect the regime's stability. 55 
Still, alternative electoral systems vary in their capacity to limit 
system-challenging mobilization by opposition parties. Representa-
tional multiparty systems reflect one extreme in which there is vir-
tually no disincentive to partisan mobilization by opposition parties. 
Exclusionary authoritarian systems represent the other extreme in 
which all opposition partisan activity is repressed. In a two-party 
aggregative system as found in Venezuela or an inclusionary au-
thoritarian system as found in Mexico, partisan opposition is per-
mitted, but the "mobilization of bias" favors dominant parties or what 
will be referred to as hegemonic parties. The hegemony of dominant 
parties is protected both by the "rules of the game" that political elites 
determine and by their quasi-monopoly of power resources. 
The nature of the party system determines in fact whose interests 
will prevail in the electoral arena. If parties favoring development 
strategies other than state capitalism are put at a competitive disad-
vantage to the dominant parties, electoral challenges to the dominant 
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pattern of development are less likely. As we shall see in Chapter 4, 
the political left in Mexico and Venezuela find themselves in this 
situation. However, as that chapter will show, leftist parties have 
greater opportunities to gain power in Venezuela than in Mexico. 
Furthermore, the incumbent party is periodically defeated in national 
elections in Venezuela, unlike in Mexico. Thus, the Venezuelan and 
Mexican regimes provide a useful contrast in the degree of partisan 
competition. This contrast provides an opportunity to assess how 
restricted partisan competition contributes to controlled political mo-
bilization. 
Restricted partisan competition might affect the acquisition of par-
ticipatory motivations and subsequent capacity for self-directed par-
ticipation as well as the electoral choice. Self-directed participation 
depends on citizens acquiring participatory motivations that might be 
difficult to acquire under conditions of restricted competition. Re-
stricted partisan competition might impede workers from becoming 
attentive to politics and from developing a critical consciousness of 
the existing sociopolitical order. (The nature of these two participatory 
motivations will be examined more closely in chapter 6.) 
Under conditions of restricted partisan competition, a hegemonic 
party (or incorporated unions) ought to be better able to suppress 
active attentiveness to politics on the part of their working-class sup-
porters, while leftist parties (or autonomous unions) might confront 
difficulty in sustaining attentiveness. The reason is that workers, like 
other citizens, are likely to face difficulty in sustaining interest in 
politics when election results are predictable. Restricted competition 
might also facilitate the he~emonic party or incorporated unions in 
suppressing concientizaci6n5 among their followers by allowing them 
to propagandize more effectively among working-class supporters. 
By contrast, hegemonic parties or unions in a less restrictive electoral 
system might not be able to propagandize effectively because of com-
peting messages from rival parties. Restricted competition might also 
lead opposition leaders to conclude that there is little to be gained by 
radicalizing their base of working-class supporters since the ruling 
party is not going to be dislodged from power. By contrast, opposition 
leaders in a more competitive electoral system might see more utility 
in promoting a more radicalized base of working-class support if they 
believe that they can share or win political power. In sum, workers 
in a more restricted electoral system might be less prone to acquire 
participatory motivations that facilitate self-directed political partici-
pation. Thus, hegemonic parties and incorporated unions might be 
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able to guide electoral mobilization more easily in a context where 
partisan competition is more restricted. 
Restricted partisan competition might also affect electoral choice. 
Weak partisan competition should decrease the "floating" vote that 
is created by long-term partisans of the ruling party switching their 
vote to opposition parties. The only "floating" voters in the context 
of restricted partisan competition should be long-term partisans of 
opposition parties who decide to vote for the ruling party. Rational 
choice theory suggests why the floating vote in the context of one-
party dominations should tend to gravitate toward the ruling party 
rather than toward opposition parties. Opposition parties might be 
viewed as providing no viable option from which to choose. The only 
options might be seen as voting for the ruling party or abstention. 
Therefore, long-term supporters of the ruling party who become dis-
enchanted might abstain rather than vote for opposition parties that 
cannot win. By contrast, such voters in more competitive electoral 
systems should perceive greater utility in voting for opposition parties 
if, in fact, the opposition can gain political power. 
Similarly, leftist parties might better capitalize on working-class 
discontent with incumbent performance if workers believe that the 
left can gain political power. Conversely, if workers believe that the 
left cannot realistically gain power, then they might eliminate the left 
as a viable electoral option. Thus, a past history of failure on the part 
of the left might well lead discontented workers to turn away from 
the left even though sympathetic to its message. Therefore, the less 
the opportunity for the left to win power, the less discontented work-
ers ought to vote for leftist parties. 
In like manner, restricted partisan competition might limit the 
capacity of autonomous labor unions to influence the voting behavior 
of workers. Leaders of incorporated unions might find the task of 
persuading workers to vote for a hegemonic party to be easier if there 
is no meaningful competition. Similarly, leaders of autonomous 
unions might be better able to convince workers to support opposi-
tion parties if such parties have a realistic chance of gaining power. 
Therefore, the capacity of labor unions to influence voting behavior 
might be related to the degree of partisan competition. Weak compe-
tition should facilitate the task of incorporated unions and weaken 
the capacity of autonomous unions to promote the left. Conversely, 
meaningful electoral competition should enhance the capacity of au-
tonomous unions to promote leftist voting. 
In sum, if restricted partisan competition accounts for controlled 
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political mobilization, one would expect to find the following differ-
ences between Venezuelan and Mexican workers: (1) Mexican work-
ers identifying with the PRI or belonging to an incorporated union 
ought to exhibit less attentiveness to politics than Venezuelan workers 
identifying with COPEI or AD or belonging to such a union; leftist 
workers or members of autonomous unions in Venezuela ought to 
exhibit greater attentiveness to politics than their counterparts in 
Mexico; (2) leftist parties and autonomous unions are more likely to 
foster concientizaci6n among their supporters in Venezuela than in 
Mexico; (3) incorporated unions and hegemonic parties can more ef-
fectively mobilize electoral participation among Mexican workers than 
among Venezuelan workers; (4) self-directed electoral participation is 
more likely to occur among Venezuelan workers than among Mexican 
workers; (5) deviations from long-term loyalty to a hegemonic party 
are more likely to occur among Venezuelan workers than among Mexi-
can workers; (6) conversely, loyalists of opposition parties are more 
likely to deviate and vote for a hegemonic party in Mexico than in 
Venezuela; (7) discontent with the performance of hegemonic parties 
is more likely to be converted into electoral support for the left among 
Venezuelan workers than among Mexican workers; (8) incorporated 
unions are more likely to influence the electoral choice of workers in 
Mexico than in Venezuela; (9) autonomous unions are more likely to 
influence the electoral choice of workers in Venezuela than in Mexico. 
The third control mechanism rests in the capacity of a regime to 
generate satisfaction with performance. As noted, state-capitalist regimes 
in the third world are generally willing to sacrifice the short- or in-
termediate-term interests of the lower classes to improve capital for-
mation. This condition does not necessarily mean that these regimes 
cannot generate short-term satisfactions for the lower classes. Periods 
of sustained economic expansion may permit the real wages of labor 
to increase even if not at the rate of management and technicians. 57 
Such periods of expansion might also enable elites to extend public 
services to marginal populations and, thereby, to solidify pacts with 
these elements of the population. 58 
Industrial workers in contemporary state-capitalist systems are 
likely to acquire far better wages, benefits, and job security than are 
peasants or workers in the urban informal sector.59 For this reason 
some scholars have suggested the "labor aristocracy thesis" to explain 
why industrial workers in late developing countries tend to exhibit 
patterns of controlled political mobilization. Such workers are pre-
sumably coopted and are not likely to be attracted to backing oppo-
sition parties or movements. To the contrary, their relative affluence 
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allows them to enter the consumer society and even the privatistic 
world of the middle class. Thus, the 'labor aristocracy thesis' provides 
a plausible explanation for patterns of controlled political mobilization 
observed among industrial workers in Mexico and Venezuela. Privi-
leged workers might see little reason to give attention to the world 
of politics or to engage in opposition politics against a sociopolitical 
order that has served them reasonably well. 60 
If performance satisfaction explains how political elites in Mexico 
and Venezuela have maintained political control over working-class 
mobilization, one would expect to find (1) that levels of satisfaction 
with government performance are relatively high among workers who 
were interviewed for this study and (2) that performance satisfaction 
accounts for patterns of controlled mobilization. Specifically, one 
would expect to find that performance satisfaction leads to lower psy-
chological involvement in politics and concientizaci6n, less self-directed 
electoral participation, and greater electoral support for hegemonic 
parties. 
The discussion thus far has considered how structural constraints 
might limit the capacity of workers to pursue collective goals. The 
next point to examine is how a cultural control might limit the capacity 
of workers to mobilize. According to the working-class culture thesis, 
the political culture of workers weakens their capacity for self-directed 
mobilization. Presumably maladaptive for "participant citizenship," 
lower-class political culture is often characterized as "subject" or 
"parochial" rather than as "participant."61 It leaves workers ill-pre-
pared for self-directed participation; therefore, they must depend on 
cues from external organizations in order to participate in politics. 
Working-class culture, thus, provides a possible explanation for 
low psychological involvement in politics and receptivity to external 
guidance by hegemonic parties and incorporated unions. Also, it pro-
vides an explanation as to why a lower-class population might not 
be attracted to leftist or working-class parties. Such parties rely on 
ideological appeals that may not be comprehended by the politically 
unsophisticated lower classes.62 Similarly, a lack of political sophis-
tication could contribute to low concientizaci6n. 
Finally, the fourth control mechanism consists of vertical patterns 
of political decision making. Susan Purcell has described how decision-
making processes differ in democratic and authoritarian systems. 
"The authority flow in an authoritarian system is the reverse of what 
supposedly characterizes democratic politics. Instead of responding 
to and reflecting demands, pressures, and initiatives that originate at 
lower levels, the executive in an authoritarian regime shapes and 
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manipulates demands emanating from below while enjoying sub-
stantial leeway in the determination of the goals that the regime will 
pursue."63 Purcell's characterization suggests that elites in democratic 
regimes confront far more constraints from below in decision making 
than do elites in authoritarian regimes. Conversely, elites in authori-
tarian regimes are more insulated from popular pressures and de-
mands than their counterparts in democratic regimes. Closure of 
political decision-making processes from linkages with the masses 
creates disincentives for mass political mobilization. While the masses 
in more authoritarian regimes may be able to "pursue their collective 
goals," they have less assurance that they can obtain goals. Corpo-
ratism and limited party competition contribute to elite insulation 
from below. As chapter 4 will show, the powerlessness of repre-
sentative institutions, elite consensus, and high repressive capability 
can also increase elite autonomy in decision making. 
Unfortunately, the impact of elite autonomy in decision making 
on political mobilization cannot be directly assessed. However, it can 
be shown that elite autonomy is more fully developed in Mexico's 
semiauthoritarian regime than in Venezuela's competitive democracy. 
This factor ought to be taken into account in explaining differences 
in mobilizational patterns found between Mexican and Venezuelan 
workers. 
Data for this study were collected in two phases. The first phase 
involved interviewing of Venezuelan and Mexican workers in late 
1979 and early 1980. These surveys were conducted by marketing 
research firms with previous experience in social scientific research. 64 
In the spring of 1981, interviews were conducted with leaders from 
the unions from which workers were sampled. 65 
The research design is intended to move the study of lower-class 
political behavior in Latin America and elsewhere in the third world 
beyond the modernization paradigm to a focus on variant political 
environments as determinants of political behavior. Severe criticism 
has been leveled against the modernization paradigm on both theo-
retical and empirical grounds for its near-exclusive focus on cultural 
and socioeconomic determinants of behavior. 66 A primary objective 
of the research design, therefore, is to facilitate comparison of the 
political behavior of workers situated in variant political environ-
ments. This study seeks to determine how differing political locations, 
or structural settings, affect working-class political mobilization. Spe-
cifically, cases were selected so as to assess the effects of four varia-
tions in structural settings: (1) unionization versus nonunionization; 
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Table 1. Original Sampling Design and Final Sample Sizes 
Nonstrategic Industries Strategic Industries 
Non-union Incorp. Auto. Incorp. Auto. 
Type of polity Workers Unions Unions Unions Unions 
More competitive 
regime- n = 100 n = 100 n = 100 n = 100 n = 100 
Venezuela (BW (128) (99) (72) (100) 
Less competitive 
regime- n = 100 n = 100 n = 100 n = 100 n = 100 
Mexico (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) 
•for some analyses an additional 35 cases of nonunionized workers in unionized 
plants are employed. Those cited above are nonunionized workers employed in small 
shops in nonstrategic industries. 
(2) membership in incorporated unions versus membership in au-
tonomous unions; (3) employment in industries strategically impor-
tant to national economic life versus employment in industries that 
are less important to national economic life; and (4) type of political 
system, that is, competitive versus semicompetitive polity. 
Variation in type of union membership and type of party system 
enables one to examine corporatist interest intermediation and limited 
partisan competition as control mechanisms. The other two structural 
variables-unionization and strategic location in the economy-might 
also help in explaining patterns of controlled mobilization. For ex-
ample, it may be that unions, whether incorporated or not, provide 
an effective mechanism of control. In like manner, it may be that 
incorporated unions only in strategically important industries affect 
political participation. Thus, these latter two variables may help to 
refine further the explanations as to how political control is asserted 
over working political mobilization in Mexico and Venezuela. 
The original intention was to select subsamples of 100 Venezuelan 
and Mexican workers located in the following work settings: (1) non-
unionized industries, (2) incorporated unions in nonstrategic indus-
tries, (3) incorporated unions in strategic industries, (4) autonomous 
unions in nonstrategic industries, and (5) autonomous unions in stra-
tegic industries. That would have produced national samples of 500 
workers in each country. The original sampling design and final sam-
ple sizes are shown in table 1. 
It would have been ideal to draw random samples from all work-
ers in both Mexico and Venezuela situated in each structural setting. 
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Unfortunately, problems of cost and access often preclude using the 
most scientifically ideal sampling procedure in survey research. In 
lieu of using representative national samples of workers located in 
each structural setting, particular unions that provided specific macro-
characteristics were selected for the study. 
The logic of case selection was to select workers who were clearly 
exposed to variant structural settings. Therefore, the selection of these 
unions was done only after careful consultation with experts in the 
field. The goal was to guarantee that structural settings did vary. 
Follow-up interviews were conducted in 1981 with the leadership in 
each union so as to collect further information on the nature of each 
work setting. While it cannot be said with certainty that workers in 
each structural setting are "representative" of a generic type on a 
national scale, it can be asserted that the samples contain workers 
who are indeed exposed to differing structural environments. Those 
characteristics of the structural setting that differentiate one setting 
from another can be identified. Thus, it is possible to assess whether 
different structural settings affect working-class political behavior and 
opinion formation. 
In analyzing the data, one also needs to remove confoundin~ 
variation introduced by compositional differences in the samples. 6 
To do so, certain demographic traits can be held constant. Some po-
tential compositional differences in the samples were eliminated by 
decisions made about whom to sample. The sample is comprised 
almost entirely of male, 68 blue-collar employees. Hence, gender and 
type of employment are held constant. 
Other variables are "held constant" via statistical manipulation 
of the data. As the study will demonstrate, differences between na-
tional samples on key socioeconomic and personal characteristics are 
minimal. There is variation in these characteristics across work set-
tings within both national samples, but that variation is theoretically 
comprehensible. Nonetheless, where appropriate, statistical controls 
have been used to minimize the confounding effects of these personal 
variables. Thus, it is possible to assess more accurately the effects of 
key structural variables on dependent variables. 
Where it was possible to obtain accurate lists of workers, random 
samples drawn from the union membership were used. Often, access 
to lists could not be obtained. In some cases the tabulador69 was used 
to approximate representative samples. In other cases information on 
number of workers in each section of the plant was obtained and then 
used to approximate representative samples. In a few cases, such 
information was not available. Again, it is important to emphasize 
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representative samples of the unions are not necessary to assess the 
effects of exposure to structural variables. What must occur is that 
sampling must guarantee that workers confront variant structures. 
Analysis can focus directly on the consequences of such "exposure" 
while holding constant other confounding sources of variation in the 
dependent variable. 
The next chapter will provide profiles of the unions used for this 
study and descriptive data on the workers who were interviewed. 
The following chapters (chapters 3 and 4) provide useful background 
for understanding working-class politics in Mexico and Venezuela. 
In chapter 3 the historical emergence of an industrial working class 
in these countries and its incorporation into the political system are 
discussed. Chapter 4 discusses the Venezuelan and Mexican regimes 
as systems of control designed to limit the power and political influ-
ence of the lower classes. Chapter 5 begins the data analysis with 
descriptive data to show evidence of controlled political mobilization 
among Venezuelan and Mexican workers who were interviewed. 
Chapter 6 examines how previously discussed control mechanisms 
affect the level of psychological involvement in politics as well as the 
level of concientizaci6n exhibited by workers. This analysis will enable 
one to probe how working-class motivations to participate are con-
trolled in the Mexican and Venezuelan regimes. Chapter 7 focuses on 
how voter turnout is controlled, and chapter 8 looks at how electoral 
choice is manipulated. Chapter 9 provides a general overview of the 
findings and returns to the question of labor's role in societal devel-
opment. 
Chapter Two 
Demographic Characteristics 
of Unions 
In this chapter the reader is introduced to profiles of the work settings 
from which samples of workers were drawn and provided an over-
view of the personal and socioeconomic characteristics of workers 
who were interviewed. In addition to its intrinsic interest, this infor-
mation on the immediate context and characteristics of workers in the 
sample is vital for interpretation of results. Workers as a class do not 
respond uniformly to political stimuli. Factors such as age, region, or 
intraclass variation in socioeconomic status can account in part for 
differences in political attitudes and behavior among workers. 1 Fur-
thermore, there is evidence to suggest that the everyday context in 
which workers live out their lives affects political attitudes and be-
havior.2 This chapter provides profiles of each work setting from 
which workers were sampled and then characteristics of the workers 
who were interviewed. 
Ayotla Textiles, a parastatal enterprise that employed about 1,850 
workers in late 1979, provides the setting for an incorporated union 
in a nonstrategic industry. One of the largest textile firms in Mexico,3 
Ayotla Textiles was not always a state-owned enterprise. Founded in 
1946 with private capital, the company could not survive the death 
of the original owner in 1949 and passed into state ownership at that 
time. From 400 workers in 1949, the company's labor force expanded 
considerably in 1956 and 1957 and grew slowly thereafter, until con-
tractions began in the early eighties. The Mexican textile industry no 
longer plays a major role in the Mexican manufacturing sector. It now 
employs less than 10 percent of the industrial workers and produces 
less than 6.5 percent of the value added in manufacturing. 4 Conse-
quently, it is no longer a strategic industry capable of eliciting the 
attention of state elites. 
The labor history of Ayotla Textiles has always been troubled. 
Formally, the Ayotla sections (Sections 11 and 38) of the Union of 
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Textile and Similar Workers from which workers were sampled were 
affiliated with the official Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) at 
the time of interviewing (1979-80). This affiliation is reflected by the 
fact that the infrequent meetings of Sections 11 and 38 are held at No. 
8 Vallarta Street in Mexico City, the national headquarters of the CTM; 
the Ayotla workers must be bused to Mexico City, where they meet 
in imposing surroundings not conducive to rebellion. Rebellion, none-
theless, has occurred over the years. In 1970 600 workers were dis-
missed as they supported a union leader who wanted to take Sections 
11 and 38 out of the CTM. Police "protection" was provided in a bitter 
twenty-three-day strike that ultimately was resolved by the secretary 
of labor, who authorized dismissing the strikers and the reimposition 
of strong control by the officialist CTM. Such tactics continued up to 
and beyond the time of interviewing; a unit comprising 300 workers 
was closed in 1980, ostensibly to protect the safety of the workers. 
However, it is more likely that the introduction of labor-saving (and 
conflict-saving) machinery was the real motivation of management. 
The secretary-general of Section 11 and another member of the union 
directorate were among those dismissed. No alternative employment 
was found for these individuals. It is quite plausible to assume that 
these dismissals were politically motivated. 
The "Antonio M. Amor" Refinery is located at the eastern edge 
of the pleasant provincial city of Salamanca. It provides the setting 
of the incorporated union in a strategic industry. The location is con-
venient, for the Salamanca refinery can supply not only Mexico City 
but also various rapidly growing industrial cities of the North Central 
Zone. A small city of 100,000, Salamanca is dominated by the refinery 
that employs at least 5,450 workers, a significant portion of whom 
live in small but pleasant private dwellings in a residential area near 
the refinery. Rarely do as many workers from a single Mexican plant 
live as well as do those of the petroleum refinery at Salamanca. These 
workers have acquired their small, single-family dwellings by virtue 
not only of the high salaries they receive but also by the intervention 
of union leaders with credit-granting agencies to provide low-interest 
loans to the workers. The import of working in petroleum does not 
end with the personal dwellings, however. Nestled among the private 
dwellings are (1) an imposing building with a large auditorium (used 
for such things as community concerts and films) that contains the 
offices of Section 24 of the Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleras de la 
Republica Mexicana (STPRM); (2) a cooperative market where subsi-
dized foodstuffs are sold; (3) a recreational complex encompassing a 
24 Working-Class Mobilization 
swimming pool, bowling alley, and nightclub; and (4) an" Article 123" 
public school bearing the legend that this educational facility was a 
gift of Petroleos Mexicanos. All this is pleasant and, given the stan-
dards of Mexican working-class communities, very well maintained. 
To be a petroleum worker living in this zone is to be a privileged 
Mexican worker. Yet it is to be a worker, for in a fenced-off area closer 
to the refinery live the Pemex managers. In this zone the homes rival 
those of a North American suburb, complete with a golf course. 
Being treated well is one reason that Section 24 of the STPRM has 
never gone out on strike. However, that is not the only reason. Section 
24 is run by a well-oiled political machine that is intimately linked 
with the CTM national headquarters and the regional PRI apparatus. 
Section 24 does no negotiation of contracts on its own; all contract 
negotiations are handled by the national staff of the STPRM, to whom 
the Section only sends a delegate. The atmosphere at union head-
quarters was secretive and defensive. Perhaps, this was because an 
individual described by other members of the executive committee of 
the local union5 as "the spiritual leader" of Section 24, Ram6n L6pez 
Diaz, had recently been accused of having killed a twenty-two-year-
old female worker in a predawn drunken orgy at union headquarters. 6 
Whatever the depths of degradation to which leaders of this section 
had fallen, union proceedings in Section 24 are far from democratic. 
The Grupo Unificador Mayoritario (GuM) dominates union affairs, 
compiling the slate of candidates that is always elected in union elec-
tions. The fact that the union elections employ raised-hand voting 
procedures in an open assembly probably discourages most workers 
from being bold enough to buck the tide. Not surprisingly, turnout 
at union elections is modest. But the "bodyguards" whom L6pez Diaz 
maintains on Pemex payrolls at an alleged cost of two million pesos 
a month (roughly U.S. $90,000 in 1980) also dissuade those inclined 
to rebel. 7 
A political machine exists not only in Section 24 of the STPRM at 
Salamanca but up to the highest levels of the union. 8 The machine 
blends the very effective distribution of material benefits and the oc-
casional use of violence so as to create a docile work force dedicated 
to keeping the refined petroleum flowing. Since there is so much to 
lose, were one expelled from the union via the clausula de exclusion, 9 
most workers at Salamanca "go along" with their leaders so as per-
sonally to "get along." 
Recent studies of Mexican labor have emphasized the varying 
degrees of external control over incorporated unions. Uniformly strict 
Demographic Characteristics of Unions 25 
control is not imposed over all unions incorporated into the CTM or 
other PRI-dominated labor confederations. Clearly, the PRI can live 
with internal democracy and industrial military in some unions but 
not in others. 10 
Section 24 of the STPRM at Salamanca and the textile union at 
Ayotla provide examples of contrasting degrees of external control. 
A degree of internal democracy is tolerated in the Ayotla union, al-
though it is limited as seen by the fact that unions could not freely 
choose to exit from the CTM. Strikes have occurred as well as rebellion 
from below against the CTM. By contrast, there is no internal democ-
racy in the STPRM oil workers' union, and strikes have never occurred. 
It represents the essence of controlled unionism in Mexico. 
The next work setting is an autonomous union in a nonstrategic 
industry. For over a century, the shoes that most Mexicans wear have 
been made in Leon, Guanajuato. Located between the highly fertile 
agricultural area of the Bajio and the more arid cattle-raising zones of 
northern Mexico, Leon is well located to acquire the leather needed 
for shoe production. The 3,500 business establishments in this city of 
700,000 encompass a striking array of work settings, most of which 
pertain to leather and shoes but which range from the automated 
modem factories that "use up and discard" workers by age forty to 
the picas (small shops) that assemble portions of shoes on a piece-rate 
basis. The picas utilize the nonunionized labor of children, home-
bound females, the elderly, and the discarded factory workers. Often 
hidden away from the streets to avoid inspectors from the Department 
of Labor, the picas allow evasion of the national labor laws and lower 
cost of shoe production for the large distributors that market products 
of the picas under their own brand names. Botas Doble Equis, 11 the 
plant sampled for this research, began as a family-operated pica em-
ploying 5 artisans in 1950 and expanded to factory status with an 
assembly line in 1962. The current owner, a college-educated son of 
the founder, is a Mexican citizen who has acquired two other shoe 
factories in Leon. Unionization at Botas Doble Equis came easily, com-
pared to other instances in Leon. A collective contract was signed in 
1964 with the autonomous Frente Autentico de Trabajo (FAT) confed-
eration, after little resistance by the owner. 
Most other unions of leather workers in Leon are affiliated with 
the CTM (11 out of 14 in 1978). In 1978 only three unions were affiliated 
with FAT; only 11 percent of the total unionized work force belonged 
to the independent confederations. Efforts by the FAT to organize large 
shoe factories in the sixties had generally failed because of direct CTM 
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intervention.12 Thus, FAT unions in Leon, few in number, operate in 
a precarious, hostile environment, not particularly receptive to unioni-
zation by independent confederations. 
The FAT is affiliated with the Central Latinoamericana de Traba-
jadores (CLAT) that seeks to promote a Christian Democratic ideology 
among workers in Latin America. The leadership of FAT seeks to pro-
mote not only greater union democracy and autonomy but also greater 
concientizaci6n of workers consistent with Christian Democratic ide-
ology. It advocates alliances with other progressive organizations and 
greater worker participation in economic and political decisions that 
affect the welfare of workers. 13 The union makes available to workers 
various pamphlets and other materials on labor relations and also 
conducts training sessions on union rights under the Federal Labor 
Law.l4 But it does not encourage political action by the labor force. 
The "5 de Mayo" Union seems to bargain well on behalf of the 
workers at Doble Equis. Contract renewals occur every two years; 
strikes were undertaken in 1974, 1976, and 1978, but none have been 
especially bitter. No strike has lasted more than a week; indeed, the 
factory owner has been known to carry coffee to the workers while 
the strike is going on. Violence has never occurred in these strikes. 
The internal life of the union seems highly democratic with frequent 
meetings, rotation occurring in the leadership positions and compe-
tition between slates being the norm in union elections. 
The owner of Doble Equis resists unionization of two other plants 
and threatens routinely in each contract negotiation to close Doble 
Equis, moving his operations to the other plants. There seems to be 
an implicit bargain here: the PRI-linked public authorities will not 
repress the "independent" FAT local as long as it does not press to 
make dramatic inroads in organizing other workers in Leon. The fac-
tory owner will play ball with "5 de Mayo" as long as the other plants 
are left undisturbed. For its part "5 de Mayo" leaders report having 
received offers of support from opposition political parties but reject 
such offers, saying that "to politicize labor relations can only harm 
the workers." Such is the degree of union "autonomy" that is tolerable 
in Leon. However, even this modest degree of autonomy is unavail-
able to most unionized workers in Leon. 
The other autonomous union in Mexico used for this study is 
located in a strategic industry. It is found in historic Cuautla, where 
Emiliano Zapata once led the agraristas during the Mexican Revolu-
tion. A centerpiece of a modern industrial park is the Nissan Motors 
plant, where Datsuns have been assembled since 1965. Beginning as 
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a union affiliated with the CTM, the auto workers at Cuernavaca suc-
cessfully disaffiliated in 1972 from the official CTM confederation. Or-
ganized factions developed around workers sympathetic to the locally 
more militant FAT and around workers sympathetic to the Unidad 
Obrera Independiente (u01). In addition, a minority conservative fac-
tion sympathetic to the CTM still existed. These three factions have 
since structured union politics in this plant. 15 
In 1976 the Nissan workers went on a long and bitter strike. The 
more militant FAT faction controlled the executive committee at the 
time. Management as well as the more conservative factions used the 
opportunity to discredit the militants in the eyes of the rank-and-file 
workers. Consequently, the executive committee was recalled, and 
the UOI soon gained control of the executive committee. These events 
led to "the implantation of firm UOI control within the union lead-
ership."16 
The Unidad Obrera Independiente, Mexico's largest independent 
labor confederation, is headed by a controversial labor lawyer, Juan 
Ortega Arenas. The UOI accepts the rules of the game in Mexico's 
authoritarian politics and is very careful to stay within permissible 
limits. 17 Rabidly anticommunist, the u01 accepts the existing state-
capitalist economy and is primarily concerned with maximizing la-
bor's share of profits. 18 The confederation eschews all partisan 
involvement and tries to remain apolitical. 19 Nevertheless, it advo-
cates greater union democracy, although the UOI leadership has been 
known to use available repressive mechanisms to limit opposition 
once it gains control of a union. 20 Eight tumultuous years of uOI 
control ensued in which competitive union elections produced fre-
quent turnover in union leadership, as well as the midterm destitution 
of others. Ultimately, the workers at the Nissan factory withdrew from 
the uOI and continued to reject affiliation with either the CTM or the 
FAT. This rejection of all existing major confederations may reflect, 
curiously, the lack of consensus among organized factions within the 
union. Autonomy from all national confederations may not have been 
desired by a majority of the autoworkers in Cuernavaca, yet it seems 
to have emerged as a way to keep political peace among factions that 
would prefer different affiliations. 
With that kind of intraunion fragmentation, it is conceivable that 
union leaders would have produced little for their members. But the 
troubled Cuernavaca sindicato has indeed generated material benefits; 
in 1980 wages at the Datsun factory were the highest paid to manual 
laborers in Cuernavaca. An impressive series of fringe benefits was 
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made available to workers, including a life insurance policy that was 
respectable by Mexican working-class standards. 21 Payments were 
also made to all unionized workers for work clothes, transportation, 
and the noon meal, with payment of a traditional"thirteenth month" 
(the aguinaldo) and "profit sharing" (an additional ten workdays' 
worth of pay) guaranteed by contract. Some workers received a one-
time payment for getting married, scholarships for the education of 
their children, bonuses for punctuality and attendance, while others 
were "lucky winners" of household appliances donated by the com-
pany to a union raffle. Collectively, the enterprise contributed U.S. 
$1,300 for a Christmas party, as well as the use of a union headquarters 
building and U.S. $670 a month for union operations. 
These gains, while modest by external standards, were attained 
at least in part because of union combativeness. The Nissan workers 
went out on a twenty-day strike in 1974 and on a forty-seven-day 
strike in 1976, not to mention the turbulence of 1972 surrounding the 
decision to exit from the CTM. The union leaders noted with pride 
that in the late seventies they had succeeded in negotiating contracts 
that surpassed the wage guidelines preferred by labor authorities in 
Mexico City. However, the Nissan workers retained the vulnerability 
of an isolated union; they had no external patrons and in conflict 
situations found themselves exposed to repression by public authori-
ties operating on behalf of the Nissan management, which is pre-
sumably Mexicanized. 22 
So union autonomy was, once again, a mixed blessing. As the 
automobile workers were among the most highly paid workers in 
Mexico, the Mexican state did not have to devote extensive public 
resources to coopting them. As long as they were not coherently 
unionized across the whole industry, the state would permit an ele-
ment of autonomy to workers at selected plants. That autonomy could 
be used to negotiate better contracts, even to affiliate with opposition 
labor confederations, but not to challenge the structure of Mexican 
state capitalism. Thus, the Nissan union often exhibited militance in 
negotiating with management but remained officially apolitical and 
avoided all partisan affiliation. 23 
In sum, these two autonomous unions appeared to be rather typi-
cal of most other autonomous unions in Mexico that have forged no 
ties with leftist parties. 24 They affiliated with independent labor con-
federations that avoided direct and formal ties with political parties 
and remained strictly nonpartisan and apolitical. A voidance of par-
tisan politics may be a price that they had to pay for their autonomy. 
Autonomy had at least brought a high degree of internal democracy 
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and effective collective bargaining as evidenced by the prestaciones 
(benefits) that these unions had acquired for their workers. 
Last, nonunionized workers used for this study are described. 
The southern rim of the central zone of Mexico's capital city contains 
a series of colonias (neighborhoods) of working-class character. Some 
are oriented toward the production of goods and services of a func-
tionally specific nature, such as automobile parts, body work, and 
repairs. Others include small shops providing different kinds of ser-
vices, but most contain some poorly capitalized, labor-intensive pro-
duction facilities. The working-class nature of such neighborhoods is 
apparent in a variety of ways, from the quality of the (generally ill-
maintained) dwellings to the type of Spanish spoken, to the nature 
of the nightclubs and bars that dot the streets. A total of 100 workers 
from five such colonias were interviewed: Tepito, Obrera, Asturias, 
Doctores, and "El Centro."25 Filter questions were employed to select 
only nonunionized employees of small shops (up to 20 employees) 
or manual laborers who participate as members of small work teams. 
The workers so chosen tend to be employed, for example, as electri-
cians, automobile mechanics, machinists, carpenters in small furni-
ture factories, body repairmen, plumbers, and painters. 
These nonunionized workers may well be considered as indi-
viduals experiencing an unmitigated "state of nature" in a developing-
country market economy. Their relations with their employers are 
unmediated by the protection of any union, be it corrupt or honest, 
militant or passive. The most important consequence of the absence 
of unions is a more complete exposure to expansion and contraction 
of the economy, as those who employ workers will respond to the 
logic of the market, expanding production and the use of wage labor 
when demand is high but restricting production and the use of wage 
labor when demand is low. The non unionized workers are highly 
subject to insecurity of employment, having no unions interceding to 
protect jobs. If the nonunionized workers do not lose jobs in economic 
recessions, they may suffer a diminution of the number of hours of 
salaried employment they can find, or, if employed on a piece-rate 
basis, they may find that they have to work more hours to produce 
equivalent or lower income. The nonunionized workers tend to look 
favorably on unions. 26 These are not atomistic, wholly self-centered 
individuals incapable of participating in union organizations. Rather 
they are individuals located in a sector of the economy where small 
enterprises operate with rather fixed, marginal technologies, gen-
erating very small economic surpluses. Such economic activities tend 
not to expand but rather to survive. Unionization of such small shops 
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is further impeded by the legal requirement of twenty members be-
fore a union can be officially registered. 
In Venezuela workers living in a smaller but essentially compa-
rable range of cities were sampled. The important sampling criterion 
was not city-size; instead, the criteria of industry type (strategic ver-
sus nonstrategic) and degree of "union incorporation" (autonomous 
versus incorporated) were invoked. In Venezuela certain obstacles to 
access led to selectin~ multiple unions representative of a single struc-
tural environment.2 In the strategic petroleum industry, however, 
all workers studied came from two major refineries in Punta Fijo, 
even though six separate unions were sampled. 
The sample of workers in incorporated unions of nonstrategic 
industries came from AD- or CO PEl-dominated unions in Barquisimeto. 
Venezuela's fourth largest city, Barquisimeto is the center of econo-
mic growth in the west-central area of Venezuela. 28 Capital of the 
state of Lara and center of population reception for cityward migrants, 
the population growth rate of 5.7 percent annum experienced by Bar-
quisimeto between 1950 and 1971 made it one of the fastest growing 
cities in the country. By the mid-seventies it was calculated that 
roughly 60 percent of the sizable yearly population increases (25,000 
per year) were coming from migrants to Barquisimeto. By the time of 
the fieldwork in 1979 through 1981, the po~ulation of Barquisimeto 
was officially 542,000, perhaps even higher. 9 Typical of cities receiv-
ing such an influx of population, few workers were absorbed in in-
dustry, in spite of a government plan to foment industrial de-
centralization. In 1976, for example, demographers associated with 
the Municipal Planning Office estimated that 72.6 percent of total 
employment was in the service sector, while 12.2 percent was in 
manufacturing. By early 1980 the percentage of industrial employ-
ment may have crept upward by a few percentage points, but the 
dominance of service sector activity would have remained. Much of 
that (1976) service sector activity was in commerce and banking (34.2 
percent). Excluding construction firms, Barquisimeto had a total of 
756 industrial establishments in 1977, which would have meant that 
most were very small, averaging 20 workers each. These small in-
dustries were often in traditional areas, such as food processing 
plants, leather goods, and paper firms. However, some larger manu-
facturing firms began to locate in a new industrial park to the west 
of the city in the late seventies. 
The incorporated unions included a small textile firm (n = 24 
workers sampled of 80 unionized workers) where AD and coPEI jointly 
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control the union directorate, a dairy where 47 workers were inter-
viewed (of 150 unionized workers in a COPEI-dominated union), a 
metalworkers' union where another 47 workers were interviewed 
(again controlled jointly by AD and COPEI, plant size circa 400), and 
two smaller plants (a bottler and a graphic arts shop) where very few 
workers were sampled (n = 6 and n = 4, respectively). The former 
was an "apolitical" white union, and the latter was an AD-dominated 
union. 
The leaders of these unions tend to accept a social democratic 
bargain of peace between labor and management and to play down 
the ideological rhetoric. One such leader (of a graphic arts union) 
went to the heart of this viewpoint when asked to define the meaning 
he ascribed to the phrase "class conflict." He said, "We simply don't 
use this phrase; it is a hollow expression." Other leaders of incor-
porated unions in Barquisimeto defined the phrase in terms of the 
struggle to achieve immediate economic benefits for workers. Illus-
trative of the temper of incorporated unions in Barquisimeto is the 
fact that three of these unions had not been out on strike in the past 
decade. A fourth had experienced two one-day strikes. The graphic 
artists had experienced a two-week strike but could not in any sense 
be considered a radical union since their focus had been on enterprise-
level grievances. 
For the sample of workers belonging to incorporated unions of 
strategic industries, we interviewed petroleum workers living in the 
port city of Punto Fijo in the state of Falcon. There are two major 
refineries there. The first refinery was established by Creole Petroleum 
in 1949. Since the nationalization of the oil industry in 1976, it has 
been operated as the state company, Lagoven. The other refinery was 
established by Royal Dutch Shell. Since 1976 it has been operated 
under the aegis of Maraven. Were it not for its two major petroleum 
refineries, Punto Fijo would be a small port city, not the growing 
metropolis that it has become. But because of petroleum, population 
growth in the sixties and seventies was substantial. Based on a popu-
lation of 34,457 in 1961 and 55,583 in 1971, estimates were that the 
population might reach 120,000 in the seventies. The petroleum boom 
did create some jobs directly in the refineries themselves but created 
more jobs indirectly through the infusion of money that petroleum 
implied for the local economy. Somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000 
workers were employed by the two refineries, but in 1979 another 
2,000 or 3,000 were employed in a construction project for an asso-
ciated petrochemical facility. 30 
Workers belonging to two COPEI unions and two unions that were 
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affiliated with the Union Republicana Democratica (uRo)were inter-
viewed. The URD that cooperated with AD and COPEI in setting up a 
competitive democracy in Venezuela in 1958 is a minor, pro-system 
political party (see chapter 3). The two coPEI unions used for this 
study illustrate a pattern of asymmetrical control that has dampened 
union militance. In one coPEI union, SINTRAPETROL, 31 there had been 
no strike activity since 1970. The other coPEI union, STOPPs,32 joined 
with several other unions in a brief strike in 1972 over alleged mis-
treatment of workers by North American supervisors. But from 1972 
to 1981, the union did not engage in another strike. COPEI exercises 
tight control over both unions, allowing limited internal democracy. 
The same secretary-general of SINTRAPETROL has been elected every 
two years since the founding of the union in 1971. An opposition slate 
has never been put up to run against the official COPEI slate for seats 
on the executive committee. In the case of STOPPS, the previous COPEI 
secretary-general had been reelected every two years from 1968 to 
1979. The then current COPEI incumbent was elected in 1979. In this 
union the only opposition slate emerged during the 1978 national 
elections when a rival COPEI slate refused to support the candidacy 
of Luis Herrera Campins. 
In the two URD unions, STIP and OSMPM,33 the same pattern of 
asymmetrical control can be observed. In the case of STIP, there has 
been a biannual turnover of the secretary-general. However, the new 
secretary-general has been affiliated with URD ever since the party 
gained control of the union and has not been officially challenged by 
another candidate. The official URD slate for the executive committee 
also never loses. In the osMPM union, the same incumbent secretary-
general has been reelected unanimously by the executive committee 
three times. Generally, union members are offered only a single URD 
slate (la plancha unitaria) to ratify for members of the union directorate. 
In general, Venezuelan petroleum workers are very well paid by 
standards of the Venezuelan work force. 34 Union contracts for 1980 
to 1983 provided for a daily wage between approximately U.S. $20 
and $30. The benefits and services extended to Venezuelan oil work-
ers, however, do not appear to be as generous as those extended to 
Mexican petroleras. Furthermore, union leaders in Venezuela ex-
pressed much dissatisfaction with some services, especially housing, 
medical care, and public education. 35 However, even though the sam-
ples are not representative of each national petroleum industry, it can 
still be noted that Venezuelan petroleras, like Mexican petroleum work-
ers, live well compared to other workers. 
To summarize this overview of the Venezuelan incorporated 
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unions studied, varying degrees of external control by political parties 
were found. As with Mexico, control was most strict in the case of 
unions located in the strategic petroleum industry. As a general rule, 
the union leadership in all cases was primarily concerned with im-
mediate benefits and salaries of workers. However, they tended to 
avoid frequent strike activity, preferring instead cooperation with 
management. As chapter 8 will show, political activity was a second-
ary concern to all of the union leaders who were interviewed. Their 
attention was focused primarily at the plant level, not on national 
politics. 
Two autonomous unions in a nonstrategic industrial setting were 
selected for this study. One union was the Sindicato de Trabajadores 
de la Industria de Bebidas (Union of Beverage Industry Workers) lo-
cated at Licorerias Unidas in La Miel. Of the 233 unionized workers 
at Licorerias Unidas, 46 were sampled for the current study. While 
geographic mobility has been a major feature of the life experience of 
many Venezuelans,36 some Venezuelan workers have experienced 
changes of a rather dramatic sort in the very communities where they 
were born. 37 Such was the case at La Miel, a small town outside the 
provincial capital of Barquisimeto, where a sugarcane-producing ha-
cienda was transformed in 1960 by the construction of a distillery for 
the production of rum, whiskey, and a local drink called cocuy. The 
regimentation of factory life became a reality for many workers who 
did not leave rural homes to experience industrial life. 
The early secretaries-general of this union were either politically 
independent or affiliated with COPEI. After 1966, however, the left-
wing AD forces, which abandoned the party in the 1968 electoral cam-
paign, came to be ascendant at La Miel. All secretaries-general since 
1966 have been affiliated with the leftist Movimiento Electoral del 
Pueblo (MEP), a nominally socialist group. The union has struck three 
times since 1970, but each strike was brief. 
The union at La Miel is characterized by competitive internal elec-
tions, 38 by the apparent ideological sophistication of senior union 
leaders, 39 by a high sense of solidarity among union members, and 
by the frequency of membership participation in union activities. 
Comparatively speaking, however, the workers at La Miel do well. 
Their wages are higher, on balance, than those of other Venezuelan 
workers sampled in nonstrategic industries. They are housed reason-
ably well and enjoy a considerable array of fringe benefits. Few have 
experienced a desire to be rid of their union (15 percent), and even 
fewer (5 percent) have considered leaving La Miel. The degree of 
union "autonomy" attained in La Miel from the democratic state-
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capitalist regime is considerable but mitigated by the decision to re-
main within the framework of the AD-dominated Confederation of 
Venezuelan Workers (CTV). Those who argue that the state ought to 
be transformed are able to come to power in this local union and to 
generate a highly participatory organization that produces results. 
However, that very degree of "success" may, in subtle ways, erode 
the conviction that it is necessary to transform the state. No evidence 
was uncovered that leaders at La Miel had engaged in any political 
activity designed to strengthen MEP or any other socialist party. 
The last group of workers in an autonomous union in a nonstra-
tegic industry (n = 26) consisted of workers at a small plastics manu-
facturing firm with approximately 50 total laborers in which the 
Communists and other leftists controlled the executive committee. 
This union was affiliated with the Unitary Confederation of Vene-
zuelan Workers (cuTv), the Marxist labor confederation created in the 
early sixties. This particular plant was organized in 1976 by the CUTV-
affiliated Plastic Workers Union soon after the plant opened produc-
tion in Phase II of the Barquisimeto Industrial Park. As in the case of 
the other leftist union in a nonstrategic industry (La Miel), attendance 
at union meetings was high and was encouraged by union leaders. 
The leaders of this union employed conventional Marxist terminology 
with greater coherence than did other union leaders, interpreting the 
concept of "class struggle" both in immediate and abstract terms. The 
apparent degree of militance in the union was not matched by be-
havior, however, for no strikes had been undertaken by the union 
since its creation. There seemed to be a disjunction in the conscious-
ness of the union leaders who foresaw the transformation of the state 
but had no clear plan in mind for how their local union could be used 
as an instrument of class struggle leading toward a transition to so-
cialism. 
Two autonomous unions in the petroleum industry in Punto Fijo 
were used as representative of autonomous unions in a strategic in-
dustry. One union, suoEP, 40 was controlled by a leftist coalition of 
five MEPistas, one MIRista, and one MAsista.41 Three adecos also sat 
on the executive committee of the union in 1981. The secretary-
generalship of the union has been dominated by MEP since 1968 ex-
cept for a brief interlude in which AD gained control. The coalitional 
composition of the executive committee demonstrates the high degree 
of internal union democracy. Unlike the incorporated unions used for 
this study, the secretary-general position is routinely contested. 
The other union, UNMPM,42 was also dominated by MEP. In this 
union both AD and MEP were actively organized and offered opposing 
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slates for all union elections. At the time of interviewing union leaders 
in 1981, five of seven positions on the executive committee were held 
by MEPistas. The secretary-general at the time was also a MEPista, but 
AD had held the position in the sixties when it dominated the union. 
Like suoEP this union was characterized by a high degree of internal 
democracy. 
The leadership of both autonomous unions employed leftist ideo-
logical rhetoric during the course of personal interviews and identified 
themselves with the leftist struggle for system transformation. Never-
theless, these unions were not highly disposed to strike, as these two 
unions together had only engaged in three strikes since 1970, none 
of which lasted more than two days. Perhaps, these unions realize 
the possible repressive response that prolonged strikes in Venezuela's 
most strategic industry might provoke. Also, they might not wish to 
jeopardize the relatively high wages of oil workers that the Vene-
zuelan state has been willing to grant. This avoidance of work-place 
militancy in both incorporated and autonomous unions in the petro-
leum industry is interesting, given that leaders were not generally 
satisfied with the public services and benefits previously obtained. A 
few leaders also expressed ~en dissatisfaction with the most recent 
contract negotiated in 1980. 
In summary, autonomous unions in Venezuela are characterized 
by a high degree of internal democracy. Indeed, without the existence 
of internal democracy, it is unlikely that leftist parties could have 
captured control of the executive committees of these unions. Even 
though the left has gained control of these unions, there does 
not appear to be any marked increase in labor militance or union-
sponsored political activity. The rhetoric of the leadership changes 
without any significant change in behavior as seen by the low strike 
frequency in these unions. Leftist union factions, like leftist parties 
in general, seem to accept the rules of the game that emphasize ac-
commodation of diverse interest and moderation in demand mak-
ing.44 
Eighty-five nonunionized workers were interviewed in Barquisi-
meto. As in Mexico these individuals worked in a variety of small 
shop settings, ranging from furniture manufacturing to automobile 
repair work. Like their Mexican counterparts, these workers also ex-
perienced an unmitigated "state of nature" in a third-world market 
economy. They were entirely at the mercy of the market and the 
goodwill of their employers. As with nonunionized workers in Mexi-
co, this group constitutes a type of control group with which to com-
pare the effects of union membership. 
36 Working-Class Mobilization 
Table 2. Socioeconomic Characteristics of National Samples 
Mexico Venezuela Eta 
Mean a Mean3 Correlationsb 
Years of formal 7.0 6.9 .02 
education (2.1) (2.4) 
Weekly family 4.3 4.4 .03 
incomec (1.5) (1.8) 
Standardized .10 -.04 .07 
SES scaled (.99) (1.05) 
Respondent ranking of social .12 
class on 1-10 self-anchoring 4.1 3.8 
scale (1.3) (1.3) 
N of persons living in house 6.0 6.9 .16 
(2.5) (3.3) 
Age 31.0 32.1 .06 
(8.3) (11.2) 
astandard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
bThe reported Eta correlations measure the degree of association between country 
(Mexico vs. Venezuela) and each characteristic. 
cThe weekly income scale was formed by collapsing reported incomes from both 
national samples into nine ordinal categories in which the range in U.S. dollars is 
approximately $23. In terms of early 1980 rates with U.S. dollars, these income ranges 
were approximately (1) 0-$23; (2) $24-$46; (3) $47-69; (4) $70-$92; (5) $93-$115; (6) $116-
$138; (7) $139-$162; (8) $163-$185; (9) $186 and up. Above, the grouped mean is reported. 
dFactor scale using weekly income, education, and an ordinal measure of job skill. 
Individuals interviewed for this study generally belong to the 
upper strata of the blue-collar work force. While there is significant 
socioeconomic variation within the two national samples, unionized 
workers who were interviewed tend to be privileged by third-world 
standards. These workers generally have far better incomes and access 
to public services than do urban workers in the tertiary sector of the 
economy.45 While these workers are not "penny capitalists" who 
must daily struggle for survival, neither do they enjoy the standard 
of living of workers in the industrialized West. They stand on the 
margins of the consumer society, lacking many of the amenities and 
comforts associated with a middle-class life-style. 
Table 2 shows various mean scores for both national samples. In 
the aggregate these are young workers (mean = 31 for Mexico; mean 
= 32.1 for Venezuela) with an elementary school education and a 
weekly income in 1979 between U.S. $70 and $92.46 The mean per 
capita annual income of working-class families sampled in Mexico 
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Table 3. Availability of Household Goods and Neighborhood 
Services 
Percentage having 
Electricity 
Piped water 
Sewerage 
Paved streets 
Street lights 
Neighborhood public schools 
Medical services 
Garbage collection 
Telephone 
Family car 
Refrigerator 
Mexico 
99.0 
97.8 
95.4 
82.8 
98.8 
94.2 
85.0 
94.6 
19.8 
27.6 
88.4 
Venezuela 
98.8 
98.7 
80.5 
91.5 
96.3 
97.1 
86.7 
89.8 
9.1 
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falls in the category of U.S. $560 to $735.84. These figures are some-
what higher than the mean category for Venezuelan working-class 
families, U.S. $486.95 to $640.47 Table 2 shows that workers in both 
countries tend to identify with the lower-middle class (that is, both 
means are slightly below the midpoint on a ten-point self-anchoring 
scale of social position). Thus, these workers appear to be aware of 
the social distance between themselves and los humildes ("the humble 
ones"), as well as between themselves and the social strata above 
them. 
There are marginal differences between the national samples, but 
in general the samples are quite similar. Mexican workers have a 
slightly higher per capita income, as was noted. There is virtually no 
difference in formal educational level (table 2) and very little difference 
in reported rankings of social class or in age. A multidimensional 
indicator of socioeconomic status varies across nations, but insignifi-
cantly (Eta = .07, see table 2). 
Table 3 shows the availability of neighborhood services and a few 
household goods to workers in this sample. These workers have ac-
cess to a wide array of public services and generally do not live in 
neighborhoods typified by urban squatter settlements. 48 Greater ac-
cessibility to public services is a major characteristic differentiating 
the urban industrial work force from the burgeoning tertiary sector. 
However, far fewer workers in this sample have access to such con-
sumer goods as a telephone or a family car, goods almost always 
found in professional middle-class homes in each country. 
Let us now examine patterns of variation across work settings in 
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Table 4. Socioeconomic Characteristics of Venezuelan Job Settings 
Incorporated Union Autonomous Union 
Nonstrategic Strategic Nonstrategic Strategic 
Mean Nonunion Industry Industry Industry Industry 
Years of 6.5 6.4 7.6 6.0 7.4 
formal (2.8) (2.5) (3.3) (2.1) (3.3) 
education 
Weekly 3.6 4.0 5.9 3.3 5.9 
family (1.6) (1.2) (1.5) (1.2) (1.5) 
income• 
Respondent 3.6 3.3 4.5 3.5 4.3 
ranking of (1.3) (1.4) (1.2) (1.4) (1.2) 
N of persons 6.5 7.5 (3.4) (3.5) (2.9) 
living in (2.7) (3.5) (3.4) (3.5) (2.9) 
house 
Age 28.9 28.5 38.4 29.5 37.3 
(10.2) (8.0) (12.3) (9.7) (11.6) 
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
•The weekly income scale was formed by collapsing reported incomes frorn both 
national samples into nine ordinal categories in which the range in U.S. dollars is 
approximately $23. In terms of early 1980 exchange rates with the U.S. dollar, these 
income ranges were approximately (1) 0-$23; (2) $24-$46; (3) $47-$69; (4) $70-$92; (5) 
$93-$115; (6) $116-$138; (7) $139-$162; (8) $163-$185; (9) $186 and up. Above, the grouped 
mean is reported. 
each country. In both national samples, weekly income tends to be 
highest in the strategic industries (tables 4 and 5). This finding holds 
up when per capita income is also calculated (table 6). On rankings 
of perceived social class and years of formal education, there is rela-
tively little variation across subsamples. On the average these workers 
consider themselves lower-middle class (that is, they rank themselves 
generally in the 3-4 category on a ten-point self-anchoring scale of 
social status) and have generally completed between six and seven 
years of formal education. 
While extreme caution must be exercised in generalizing from the 
data to the national work force, it is interesting to note that variation 
in per capita income (table 6) is far better predicted by strategic location 
than by unionization. In both countries workers in strategic industries 
have per capita incomes significantly higher than do workers in non-
strategic industries (compare columns 3 and 5 with columns 1, 2, and 
4). Unionized workers outside of strategic industries either make mar-
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Table 5. Socioeconomic Characteristics of Mexican Job Settings 
Years of 
formal 
education 
Weekly 
family 
income• 
Respondent 
ranking of 
social class 
on 1-10 self-
anchoring 
scale 
N of 
persons 
living in 
house 
Age 
Incorporated Union 
Nonstrategic Strategic 
Nonunion Industry Industry 
X SD X SD X SD 
7.0 2.4 7.5 1.8 7.5 1.9 
3.6 1.3 4.3 1.1 5.4 1.1 
4.2 1.4 4.1 0.9 4.2 1.1 
Autonomous Union 
Nonstrategic 
Industry 
X SD 
5.0 2.1 
3.3 0.8 
3.9 1.2 
Strategic 
Industry 
X SD 
7.5 2.4 
5.1 1.8 
4.2 1.0 
5. 9 2. 7 5.8 1. 9 2.2 7.1 3.2 5.4 1.5 
31.5 8.7 33.9 10.4 29.6 6.1 27.2 7.8 32.9 5.8 
3 The weekly income scale was formed by collapsing reported incomes from both 
national samples into nine ordinal categories in which the range in U.S. dollars is 
approximately $23. In terms of early 1980 exchange rates with the U.S. $47-$69; (4) $70-
$92; (5) $93-$115; (6) $116-#$138; (7) $139-$162; (8) $163-$185; (9) $186 and up. Above, 
the grouped mean is reported. 
X = mean; SD = standard deviation. 
ginally more than do non unionized workers in nonstrategic industries 
(compare column 2 with column 1 for Mexico) or else make less (com-
pare column 4 with column 1 for Mexico and compare colummns 2 
and 4 with column 1 for Venezuela). 
It is also interesting to note that union autonomy is associated 
with higher wage levels in strategic industries (compare column 5 
with column 3) but much more so in Venequela than in Mexico.49 
Notice, however, that the reverse pattern is observable among non-
strategic industries for both countries. Incorporated union workers 
fare better than do autonomous union workers (table 6) in industries 
that are not crucial to the national economy. 5° This may suggest that 
in strategic industries union autonomy captures the attention of those 
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Table 6. Mean Range of Annual per Capita Family Income for 
Mexican and Venezuelan Subsamples 
Incorporated Union Autonomous Union 
Mean Range Nonunion Non- Strategic Non- Strategic 
of per Workers/ strategic strategic 
Capita Nonstrategic 
Income Industries 
Mexico $569.49- $579.31- $811.63- $317.75- $826.67-
Sample 748.47 761.38 1003.64 466.48 1022.22 
Venezuela $516.92- $448.00- $795.43- $313.33- $928.00-
Sample 679.38 588.80 932.57 460.00 1088.00 
Note: The weekly income scale was formed by collapsing reported incomes from both 
national samples into nine ordinal categories in which the range in U.S. dollars is 
approximately $23. In terms of early 1980 exchange rats with the U.S. dollar, these 
income ranges were approximately (1) 0-$23; (2) $24-$46; (3) $47-$69; (4) $70-$92; (5) 
$93-$115; (6) $116-$138; (7) $139-/4162; (8) $163-$185; (9) $186 and up. Above, the 
grouped mean is reported. 
public authorities who supervise bargaining between labor and man-
agement, thereby yielding favorable results. 51 When the industry is 
not so important tot he national economy, the way to "get along is 
to go along"; hence, incorporated unions seem to fare better. While 
such an interpretaiton of the data is plausible, it is also probable that 
other factors are involved in determining relative salary levels within 
comparable industries. 
This chapter has sought to provide an overview of the types of 
workers who were interviewed and their immediate work environ-
ment. It is now time to tum more fully to data analysis, but first the 
history of industrialization in these two countries and of incorporation 
of the lower classes into the political system will be explored. 
Chapter Three 
Social Transformation 
and Political Incorporation 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader a historical over-
view of twentieth-century transformations in Mexico and Venezuela 
that have shaped the role of urban labor in the politics of these coun-
tries. Rapid import-substitution industrialization necessitated a strong 
state that could (1) maintain political stability and (2) assume an active 
role in promoting economic development. These goals could not be 
achieved unless the work force was kept politically quiescent. To 
achieve this objective, elites turned to incorporation of the lower 
classes into the political system rather than to exclusion. Social pacts 
were designed to incorporate the lower classes without threatening 
the power and privileges of traditional power contenders (chapter 1). 
This chapter first shows why the traditional state in Venezuela 
and Mexico was incapable of providing political stability, incorpo-
rating emerging power contenders, and promoting rapid import-
substitution industrialization. Then it reviews how social pacts were 
negotiated for the construction of more stable political systems ade-
quate to the task of supervising state-sponsored industrialization. 
Last, an overview of import-substitution industrialization in both 
Mexico and Venezuela is presented. 
The abdication of the Americas by the Spanish in 1820 and the 
failure of Bolivar's efforts at federation created a void of centralized 
authority in the emergent nation-states of Latin America. Into this 
void moved regional strongmen or caudillos who sought to gain control 
over the state by eliminating rival caudillos, usually by force. Conse-
quently, caudillismo introduced a high level of political instability into 
the region. Nineteenth-century Venezuela and Mexico were racked 
by the extreme political instability. On occasion, a caudillo would im-
pose a dictatorship that would eliminate potential rivals. Only pro-
longed dictatorship in postindependence Venezuela and Mexico 
This chapter was coauthored with Professor Kenneth M. Coleman of the University 
of Kentucky. 
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provided periods of political stability in which economic development 
could proceed. In effect, political stability depended on effective ex-
clusion of rival caudillos from the political arena. No formula for in-
stitutionalized inclusion was ever found. These periods of extended 
economic development and political stability were generally the ex-
ceptions in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Venezuela and 
Mexico. Economic transformation was often delayed by pervasive po-
litical instability. 
Let us now examine more closely the Mexican and Venezuelan 
experience with caudillismo1 in the nineteenth and in portions of the 
twentieth century. 
The result of caudillo politics for Venezuela was a great deal of 
political instability. It is estimated "that 39 major and 127 minor revolts 
occurred between 1830 and 1900, lasting a total of 8,847 days."2 The 
most serious breakdown of political order occurred during the Federal 
Wars of 1858-63, a protracted civil war between rival caudillos for con-
trol of the Venezuelan state.3 However, there were periods in which 
a strongman would gain ascendancy and use the coercive or cooptive 
resources at his disposal to eliminate or control rivals. Strongman rule 
provided Venezuela with periods of political stability in which eco-
nomic development did proceed. 
Four such strongmen in Venezuela's past should be mentioned: 
Generals Jose Antonio Perez, Antonio Guzman Blanco, Juan Vicente 
Gomez, and Marcos Perez Jimenez. Perez, Venezuela's first president, 
dominated Venezuelan political life during the 1830s and 1840s. It 
was during this period that Venezuela's economy was transformed 
from "the cacao-oriented colonial economy" into "a coffee-producing 
international economy. "4 The next period of strongman rule occurred 
after the Federal Wars with the ascension to power of Guzman Blanco. 
John Lombardi characterizes the period of his rule as follows: "Under 
this remarkable leader, landowners, merchants, intermediaries, and 
perhaps even a few peasants found peace and prosperity, while for-
eign commerce found security for investments, reasonable prices for 
commodities, and attractive profits for manufactured goods. In line 
with this perspective, Antonio Guzman Blanco also instituted a wide-
ranging program of public works and beautification projects, every 
one of which promised the center of the North Atlantic world a more 
efficient Venezuela, providing useful crops and a sophisticated market 
for manufactured goods. " 5 
It was during the brutal dictatorship of Gomez (1908-35) that 
Venezuela was transformed from a coffee export economy to the con-
temporary petroleum-based export economy. North American-based 
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oil companies obtained major concessions to Venezuelan oil reserves 
following the end of World War I, sometimes through graft. 6 Oil soon 
became the country's most important export and provided the re-
sources for the expansion of a strong, centralized state under Gomez. 
However, during his time relatively little money went into infra-
structural development and education. Most resources were ex-
pended on building up the repressive apparatus of the state. 7 Not 
surprisingly, little import-substitution industrialization was under-
taken even though petroleum revenues permitted a dramatic expan-
sion of the internal market for consumer goods. Manufacturing did 
not begin on a large scale in Venezuela until after World War 11. 8 
Another period of protracted political instability followed the 
death of Gomez in 1935. It was during the post-Gomez years that 
Venezuela attempted its first experiment with an institutionalized 
competitive democracy (1945-48). That experiment failed in large mea-
sure because far-reaching policy changes were attempted that tradi-
tional power contenders refused to accept. The growing importance 
of labor was reflected in increases in real wages conceded in exchange 
for a diminution in the frequency of strikes.9 At the end of the trienio 
(three-year period) in 1948, the Venezuelan state was captured by the 
last of the military-type caudillos, Marcos Perez Jimenez. Perez Jimenez 
ruled much as any typical nineteenth-century caudillo, committed in 
large measure to his own self-aggrandizement. The Perez Jimenez era 
did provide a time of sustained economic growth as resources earned 
by petroleum were plowed back into industrial development by the 
state. 
Industrialization during the Perez Jimenez era was characterized 
by (1) its oligopolistic and foreign ownership structure, (2) state own-
ership of many basic industries, (3) a high import component and 
high capital intensity, (4) low employment generation, and (5) high 
income concentration. 10 In short, industrialization during the Perez 
Jimenez years (1948-58) took on many of the characteristics found in 
most other late industrializing countries (see below). As during pre-
vious dictatorships, economic expansion was facilitated by extended 
political stability. Ultimately, however, even private sector industri-
alists came to oppose the Perez Jimenez style of governance, and a 
new agreement had to be negotiated over the functions of the Vene-
zuelan state in promoting development. 
Similar to Venezuela's historical experience, the postindependent 
period in Mexico was characterized by extreme political instability as 
rival caudillos struggled for control of the state. Peter Smith writes of 
this period in Mexico's history. 
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Mexico emerged from a decade of physical destruction during the Wars for 
Independence (1810-21) in a state of disorder and decay. With unemployment 
high, capital scarce, industry in ruins, and roads in near-total disrepair, the 
level of economic integration was exceedingly low. Nor was there a strong 
political center. Between 1821 and 1860 Mexico had no less than 50 separate 
governments, for an average duration of less than one year. The standard 
means of gaining office was the military coup, an instrument employed so 
ably, and mischievously, by Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, who occupied 
the presidency on nine separate occasions between 1832 and 1855. Underlying 
this appearance of anarchy, however, there was a system-caudillismo, or the 
hegemony of transient "bosses" or caudillos whose main purpose was to sack 
the treasury. 11 
Like in Venezuela before 1958, political stability in prerevolution-
ary Mexico depended on extended dictatorship. Such a dictatorship 
was to be provided by Gen. Porfirio Dfaz from 1876 to 1911. While 
repression was widely used, Dfaz relied primarily on bargains with 
regional caudillos to respect each other's respective turf. Dfaz would 
not meddle in the affairs of regional and local caudillos provided that 
they accepted his authority on the national level. 12 The consequent 
political stability provided fertile grounds for economic expansion. As 
Smith explains: 
Development there was. After initial (and unsuccessful) efforts to construct 
railroads with public funds, Diaz gave the concessions to foreign entrepre-
neurs in late 1880. Within four years, the amount of track had grown from 
750 miles to 3,600 miles; by 1910 Mexico had about 12,000 miles of track, most 
of which were taken over by the government-run National Railways in 1907. 
The volume of foreign trade increased nine times between 1877 and 1910. 
Aside from silver and gold, Mexico started exporting other metals (such as 
copper and zinc), fiber and pastoral goods, while the United States became 
the country's leading partner in trade. Industry grew, with notable advances 
in cotton, iron, cement, and consumer goods. And by 1895, the national 
government showed a budget surplus, an unthinkable achievement for earlier 
generations, and the Diaz regime maintained a balanced budget for the re-
mainder of its tenure. As the centennial celebration approached in 1910, Diaz 
could proudly boast that the positivistic slogan "order and progress" had 
become reality in Mexico. 13 
The regime of the Porfirato was to come to an end with the out-
break of the Mexican Revolution in 1910. This revolution was to end 
rule by a supreme caudillo. The latter phases of the revolution were 
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marked by struggle among rival revolutionary chiefs for control of the 
national government. This struggle among revolutionary caudillos was 
in many ways similar to traditional caudillismo. 
During the immediate postrevolutionary era, power was diffused 
among a number of regional strongmen. In this respect, the nature 
of politics during this era changed little from the caudillismo of the 
nineteenth century. A strong, centralized nation-state independent 
of domination by a succession of regional caudillos was not established 
until the presidency of Lazaro Cardenas (1934-40). 
Certain common features of caudillo politics in postindependence 
Venezuela and Mexico can be noted. First, the legitimacy of a given 
government rested primarily on force rather than on popular consent. 
An absence of popular consent posed no problem for system stability 
as long as the masses were politically excluded and acquiescent, as 
was the case during much of this era. However, rivalry among re-
gional and local caudillos led to a great deal of political instability, 
mainly on the elite level. Second, political stability depended on rule 
by a single, powerful caudillo capable of coopting or repressing rivals. 
Third, succession crises were likely to generate periods of extreme 
political disorder. Fourth, economic transformation during this era 
was often hampered by political instability, weak institutionalization 
of political authority, and diversion of potential capital into the cau-
dillo's self-aggrandizement and maintenance of a repressive appara-
tus. Fifth, any large-scale incorporation of the masses into a 
framework of traditional caudillismo held the potential of further ex-
acerbating political instability; hence, the masses were generally ex-
cluded. 
The entrance of Latin American states into the era of industriali-
zation in this century was marked by a growing state role in the 
economy, a role that was incompatible with governance by transient 
caudillos. Hence, as industrialization proceeded, new social pacts were 
often negotiated for the construction of more stable political systems 
adequate to the task of supervising state-sponsored industrialization. 
These pacts and the incorporation of the lower classes into the con-
temporary Mexican and Venezuelan status are now reviewed. 
Late industrialization "requires" a strong public sector role in the 
development process. A strong state presence is needed to develop 
the economic infrastructure, to promote capital formation and tech-
nology transfers, to structure labor relations, and to manage social 
tensions and conflicts that develop.14 State supervision of develop-
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ment efforts and of labor relations also required a modicum of political 
stability. Traditional caudillismo, therefore, needed to be superseded 
by new formulas for governing. The solution sought in both Mexico 
and Venezuela was not to discard caudillismo per se but rather to 
transform and institutionalize it through the negotiation of pacts 
among competing power contenders. As Lorenzo Meyer notes about 
Mexico, "The main difference between the old system and the new 
regime, therefore, lies not in the internal struggle of the elite but in 
the fact that this struggle does not destroy the governing coalition 
and that the divisions created by infighting do not last."15 This same 
difference can be noted between the old system and the post-1958 
democratic regime in Venezuela. 16 This difference leads Meyer to 
conclude that "the Mexican Revolution is not a negation of the past, 
but rather an impressive step forward in the modernization of the 
Mexican authoritarian state."17 Likewise, one can say that the post-
1958 Venezuelan experiment with competitive democracy represents 
a modernization of an earlier experiment with democracy that sur-
vived only three years before being overthrown by the military in 
1948. In the 1945-48 era, power contenders attempted to destroy each 
other; after 1958, buttressed by petroleum revenues, elites have suc-
ceeded in accommodating each other. 18 
The next point to study is how Venezuelan and Mexican elites 
used social pacts to form inclusionary political systems that would 
prove compatible with the goals of rapid import-substitution indus-
trialization and political stability. To accomplish these goals, the foun-
ders of present-day Venezuelan and Mexican states wanted to include 
emergent power contenders but in ways that would not threaten traditional 
power contenders and long-term political stability. 
Old-style caudillo politics in Venezuela ended in 1958 when the 
military forced the dictator, Perez Jimenez, into exile. Unlike the ear-
lier experience with democracy during the trienio (1945-48), a con-
scious attempt was made to accommodate all significant power 
contenders, particularly established economic elites and the military 
that had ended Venezuela's earlier experience with competitive de-
mocracy.19 The bourgeoisie "became convinced it would have to give 
up aspirations for political control in exchange for security." Party 
elites representing Acci6n Democratica (AD), the Christian Democratic 
Party (coPEI), and the Union Republicana Democratica (uRn) were 
willing to accommodate "all social forces with significant economic 
or political resources. . . . This included industry and commerce as well 
as the other political parties, organized labor, and the peasantry."20 
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Additionally, the three major parties agreed via the Pact of Punta Fijo 
to a type of neoconsociational democracy in which electoral results 
would be respected and power shared by contending parties. 21 
Agreement on fundamental economic policy was achieved largely 
through "The Statement of Principles and the Minimum Program of 
Government." Since this pact was signed by the major presidential 
candidates before the first elections were held, the agreements it in-
cluded were effectively removed from challenge within the electoral 
arena. The pact basically ensured that profit making within the private 
sector would be recognized and promoted by the state. "In return for 
their acquiescence to guarantees for foreign and local capital, the po-
litical parties received assurances that they could distribute greater 
benefits for labor, the peasantry, and the middle class." Organized 
labor received assurances of better income distribution, a full em-
ployment economy, a new labor code, and sociallegislation.22 
A pact between labor and management was signed in April1958. 
The Pacta de Avenimiento Obrero-Patronal was signed by both leftist 
as well as Ao/coPEI labor elites. By this pact labor was committed to 
maintaining democratic stability by agreeing to seek conciliation of 
conflicts with management. For its part management agreed to avoid 
layoffs. In effect, organized labor accepted the regime norm of con-
certaci6n or accommodation with management. At the same time, the 
right to strike was seriously compromised as an1:; strike could be por-
trayed as a betrayal of Venezuelan democracy. 3 
As Terry Karl notes, "Industrialization was the 'ideological glue' 
that cemented together the class compromise."24 Oil revenues would 
be used not only to facilitate private capital accumulation but also to 
satisfy the demands of the popular sector. The results were expected 
to be greater social equity within the context of rapid state-capitalist 
industrialization. It was hoped that industrialization would provide 
profits for the rich, jobs for the poor, and consumer goods for every-
one. 
Attention now turns to Mexico. The Mexican state has been de-
fined as" 'a balancing act' because it is based on a constantly renewed 
political bargain among several ruling groups and interests repre-
senting a broad range of ideological tendencies and social bases. To 
a greater degree than in most stable and mature modern states, the 
political bargain is at the forefront of Mexican politics and of the ad-
ministrative decision-making process. The politics of daily renewal 
takes precedence over politics-as-usual. Those who do play politics-
as-usual must be constantly aware of their interest in holding together 
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the fragile association upon which their power is based."25 "The con-
stantly renewed political bargain" had its genesis with the adoption 
of the Constitution of 1917 and the reorganization of the ruling party 
during the Cardenas presidency. Both events represented efforts at 
forming social pacts upon which the legitimacy of the postrevolu-
tionary Mexican state rests. Both the Constitution of 1917 and the 
formation of the sectoral party sought not only to institutionalize "new 
rules of the game" but also to establish goals for future economic 
policy. The state would act simultaneously to meet the economic de-
mands of all sectors of Mexican society-the new commercial agri-
culturalists, the military, the bourgeoisie, organized labor, peasants, 
and other marginal groups. 
The Constitution of 1917 not only set forth a procedural frame-
work of government but also sought to satisfy the substantive de-
mands of various sectors of Mexican society. It provided, for example, 
for land reform (Article 27); similarly, the rights of organized labor to 
collective bargaining were recognized by Article 123. The Constitution 
of 1917, however, sought to satisfy not only the policy demands of 
the agrarians and of organized labor but also the demands of the 
emergent bourgeoisie and urban middle class. 26 
A second decisive event in the formation of a viable social pact 
in Mexico was the creation of a sectoral political party during the 
presidency of Lazaro Cardenas.27 This party, known as the Party of 
the Mexican Revolution (PRM), was to incorporate a labor sector, a 
peasant sector, a popular (middle-class) sector, and the military. The 
party was later to drop the military sector and change its name to the 
current Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI). Thus, these im-
portant sectors were integrated into the new revolutionary state. In-
corporation represented a bargain or pact in which organized interest 
groups representing these sectors were willing to give up a degree of 
autonomy in return for expected benefits and protections. To under-
stand the process of incorporation (that is, the formation of the official 
ruling party), one must look closely at the politics of the postrevo-
lutionary era in Mexico. 
Manuel Camacho has characterized labor relations with the state 
during the twenties as "semi-pluralist."28 The dominant labor con-
federation of the period, the Mexican Regional Labor Confederation 
(cROM), used its support of the presidential candidacies of Alvaro 
Obregon (1920-24) and Plutarco Elias Calles (1924-28) to extract various 
government positions for labor leaders, government support for CROM 
unionization efforts and strikes, and financial subsidies. The rela-
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tionship between CROM and the state is best characterized as one of 
interdependency. The dependency of CROM on the state was shown by 
its rapid decline after 1928 due to the rupture of its close alliances 
with the national political leadership. With the demise of CROM after 
1928, the Mexican labor movement entered a period of extreme frac-
tionalism.29 This period would last until the Cirdenas presidency. 
The Cardenas presidency witnessed the reconsolidation of or-
ganized labor with the creation of the elite-sponsored Confederation 
of Mexican Workers (cTM) in 1936 and the sectoral reorganization of 
the ruling party. Both events must be understood in the context of 
Cardenas's effort to put together a "progressive alliance" to challenge 
the control of the Mexican state by the dominant "conservative alli-
ance." The latter alliance included the Calles faction within the state 
and foreign and national entrepreneurials. 30 This alliance could count 
on support from other groups like the hacendados, old-line labor bosses 
linked to CROM and elements of the military elite.31 
The coalition that Cardenas put together to challenge the con-
servative alliance was comprised of the progressive faction within the 
government along with a mobilized working class and peasantry. To 
mobilize the support of the peasantry, Cardenas undertook the most 
massive land redistribution program of any Mexican president since 
the revolution. To win the support of labor, Cardenas encouraged 
unionization and generally supported strikes. With the support of 
this alliance, Cardenas was able to enact significant reforms in the 
face of opposition from the Callistas and vested economic interests. 32 
More important, Cardenas sought to institutionalize the progres-
sive alliance by creating a sectoral ruling party. New government-
sponsored confederations created to unify the peasant and labor 
movements33 gained control of the peasant and labor sectors of the 
new PRM. The creation of the new PRM, thus, formally incorporated 
lower-class groups into the political process. While the labor and peas-
ant movements realized significant economic and political gains dur-
ing the Cardenas presidency, they also lost much of their autonomy 
through incorporation. Both labor and peasants were in a weakened 
position to challenge the conservative development policies that be-
gan under President Avila Camacho (1940-46) and lasted to Diaz Or-
daz (1964-70).34 Labor relations with the state after incorporation are 
aptly characterized by Camacho as "semi-corporatist."35 
The consequences of incorporation once the state was again cap-
tured by the conservative alliance have been well described by Ham-
ilton. 
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... in contrast to the Cardenas victory, the victory of Avila Camacho marked 
not merely a defeat of the progressive alliance but its virtual elimination as 
an effective force for change. The possibility of an alliance between progres-
sive groups within the state and the working class and peasantry was fore-
closed by the cooptation of the former into the dominant alliance and by the 
loss of autonomy of the latter. The control of the working-class and peas-
ant movements by their leadership and their incorporation into the state-
dominated political party was in fact decisive in enabling the state to control 
class conflict and thus contributed significantly to the strength of the dominant 
coalition. 36 
The social pacts upon which the contemporary Venezuelan and 
Mexican states were established implied a different legitimacy formula 
from those typically found in industrial democracies. The legitimacy 
of the state rested not simply on the compliance with the "rules of 
the game" but on the capacity of the state to satisfy simultaneously 
the demands of multiple power contenders. Thus, the Venezuelan 
and Mexican states have been committed ideologically both to rapid 
capital accumulation and to improvement in the welfare and standard 
of living of the masses. Neither state has possessed the resources to 
achieve both goals simultaneously; hence, a choice between priorities 
has been made. In both countries the main priority over the long term 
has been rapid capital-intensive industrialization at the expense of 
short-term improvement in mass welfare. As noted, the lower classes 
have failed to challenge these priorities. Next, I shall examine how 
the Venezuelan and Mexican states promoted rapid industrialization 
and why this goal has proved to be incompatible with significant 
improvement in mass welfare. 
The earliest manufactured goods produced in the industrial de-
velopment of all countries appear to be basically similar, and Vene-
zuela's experience conforms to this general pattern. These goods 
might be called traditional consumer goods; they include a number of 
manufactured food products, tobacco products, clothing items, 
household furnishings (from heavy furniture to crockery, cutlery, and 
draperies), jewelry, clocks, and watches. 37 In Venezuela, as in most 
of Latin America, such manufactured goods were the dominant fea-
tures of the manufacturing industry up through the beginning of the 
forties. In 1936, for example, fully 79 percent of the industrial work 
force was employed in the production of traditional consumer goods. 
These goods accounted for at least two thirds of the value added in 
the manufacturing process. But shop sizes at this time were very 
small, averaging fewer than ten employees per establishment. 38 These 
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were still relatively labor-intensive industries, with small-scale pro-
duction for relatively local markets and with very low barriers to entry. 
Two other important developments were occurring during this 
period, however. One was that major socioeconomic changes began 
to occur, some of which had substantial consequences for the political 
economy after 1935 when the dictator, Juan Vicente Gomez, died. The 
second was that the state began to assure that basic infrastructural 
investments in transport, communications, and utilities were available 
for nascent industrialists. This was especially true during the trienio 
(1945-48) and after but can be traced to the early post-Gomez regimes 
as well. 
A major change occurring in the world economy as the twentieth 
century unfolded was the growth of demand for petroleum. Vene-
zuela's petroleum industry experienced major expansions from the 
twenties onward, under the guidance of foreign petroleum companies 
(Shell from the Netherlands; Gulf and Standard Oil-New Jersey from 
the United States). Given the ability of the Venezuelan government 
to derive revenues from the petroleum industry via royalties on each 
barrel produced, governmental attention to traditional sources of 
revenue generation began to decline. Between 1920 and 1930, for 
example, the percentage of government revenues derived from pe-
troleum production grew from 1.4 percent to 19.39 percent and con-
tinued to grow by about 2 percent a year throughout the thirties. 39 
As a consequence of the relative ease with which new revenues could 
be generated, the dictatorship began to ignore traditional sources of 
revenue, such as those derived from taxing agricultural exports. 40 
An unintended consequence of such a policy orientation was the 
setting in motion of vast numbers of rural Venezuelans. One analyst 
has noted the "tremendous geographic mobility that has marked re-
cent Venezuelan history," one feature of which has been "a pro-
gressive depopulation of the countryside. " 41 Migration and associated 
changes created an urban labor pool from which Venezuela's own 
industrializers would draw and which would determine some of the 
characteristics of that industrialization. 
The pre-1950 era was marked by the construction of much basic 
infrastructure. Construction of the national highway system was first 
undertaken by Juan Vicente Gomez himself, as much for security 
reasons as for integrating a national economy. Other activities de-
signed to integrate the national economy via creation of basic infra-
structure were undertaken by the succeeding governments of Eleazar 
Lopez Contreras (1936-40) and Isaias Medina Angarita. During the 
first experiment with democracy, known as the trienio (1945-48), these 
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trends continued with "the creation of the Venezuelan Development 
Corporation in 1946 .... Its original interest in agricultural devel-
opment quickly was broadened to include promotion of steel, electric 
power, and private industrial investment. The Development Corpo-
ration received from 2 to 10 percent of the government budget during 
this period. Electric power consumption increased 50 percent from 
1945 to 1948, as did the import-substituting consumer goods indus-
try."42 Thus, the end of the forties found that much basic infrastruc-
ture had been constructed, the state presence in creating attractive 
conditions for capitalist growth had been established as a precedent, 
the ideology of investing petroleum revenues in industrial devel-
opment had already been generated, and an early spurt of import-
substitution industrialization had been attempted in the trienio. 
The further development of a light consumer-goods industry and 
of selected intermediate-goods industries, each of which had begun 
earlier, accelerated in the Venezuela of the fifties. This transformation 
has been called, alternatively, "horizontal import substitution" or the 
"easy phase of ISI." An illustrative case of import substitution in this 
era was the case of Venezuelan cement production, where imports 
declined from 82 percent of national consumption in 1938 to 28 percent 
in 1951, to 1 percent in 1956.43 But similar declines were occurring in 
other products, such as beer (totally national production by 1956) and 
biscuits (totally national by 1955). In addition, initial steps were taken 
in these years toward the next phase of ISI, one in which modem 
consumer durables (such as automobiles) came to play a crucial role. 
Some tire production and initial assembly operations began in this 
era. 
The move from the reformism of the trienio toward the military 
conventionalism of the Perez Jimenez era (1948-58) did not imply an 
attenuation of the role of the state in guiding the development process 
but the redirection of that role. Decreasing emphasis on public in-
vestment in human capital, on land reform, and on regularizing labor 
relations were one side of the reorientation; accelerated public-private 
investment in infrastructure and in the production of intermediate 
goods, such as iron and steel, were the other.44 
By the end of the Perez Jimenez dictatorship in 1958, a number 
of patterns had emerged. A state role in guiding the industrialization 
process was firmly consolidated; the state was to participate jointly 
with the private sector in large projects designed to bring into exis-
tence an intermediate-goods sector, principally iron and steel. Other 
public expenditures on infrastructure were made in such a way that 
private sector entrepreneurs could profit, such as the expansion of 
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the cement industry during the boom of public works construction. 
While long-term trends tended to operate against foreign capital in 
the petroleum industry, foreign investors entered into an incipient 
triple alliance with the Venezuelan state and the Venezuelan bour-
geoisie during the horizontal phase of ISI. That alliance was not to be 
severed in subsequent stages; rather, it was to be systematized and 
reoriented. 
Vertical import-substitution industrialization can be defined as a 
"deepening" by which local production of consumer durables in-
creases, as does local manufacture of capital and intermediate goods 
whose importation has been stimulated by the horizontal stage of 
import substitution. 45 The automobile industry is a classic case of how 
vertical ISI operates. The manufacture of automobiles can eventually 
have backward linkages with other industries in that demand is gen-
erated for a host of products, such as steel, rubber, and glass. Since 
in the earliest stages of auto industries few countries are in a position 
to fabricate many of the component parts, much has to be imported, 
at a cost to the balance of payments. This is the "easy" and horizontal 
stage of ISI; in terms of the auto industry, it is an era of assembly, not 
of the manufacture of automobiles. But ISI is deepened as the industry 
begins to incorporate more and more components produced locally, 
which accelerates when a local capital-goods industry begins to de-
velop. Often the deepening occurs as a result of conscious government 
policy, because governments are seeking to cope with a balance-of-
payments problem that horizontal ISI has only exacerbated. 
In the Venezuelan case, vertical ISI has involved a number of 
developments in the post-1958 era of democratic state capitalism. 
First, a political formula was devised that allowed the containment 
of conflicts unleashed in the trienio. This afforded private investors 
some degree of confidence in the political environment so that the4 
could be induced to commit capital to the economic environment. 6 
Second, continued increases in petroleum revenues were associated 
with further expansion of the state presence in the industrialization 
effort. Third, the characteristic vehicle employed for expanding that 
state presence was the "third sector enterprise," which combined 
public and private activity in a way that is sometimes difficult to 
unravel. Gene Bigler notes that third sector agencies,47 or quasi-
governmental bodies (such as regional development corporations), 
have expanded during this period in waves that were strongly cor-
related with the availability of petroleum revenues. 48 
The post-1958 political formula that guided Venezuelan industri-
alization was one in which the state played a major role in creating 
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the institutional network within which capital accumulation could 
occur in private hands. Certainly, the Venezuelan political authorities 
have been committed to import-substituting industrial growth and 
diversification and the maintenance of a private sector. The movement 
to acquire national control of strategic industries, such as iron/steel 
and petroleum, did not imply a desire to obliterate the private sector. 
But state authorities did desire to direct profits generated in such 
industries toward investment in other sectors of the economy, so as 
better to integrate economic activity into an ongoing network of ex-
change in which more Venezuelans could participate. 
As Venezuela entered the eighties, vertical import substitution 
had made considerable progress. Venezuela produced more auto-
mobiles per capita than were produced in either Mexico or Brazil, for 
example.49 Venezuela's small market (13 plus million in 1978) should 
have precluded such a rapid growth of the industry. However, strong 
state regulation of petroleum prices made vehicle operating costs 
lower in Venezuela, thereby providing an indirect stimulus to market 
expansion. In other branches as well, substantial expansion of in-
dustrial production and employment was occurring. Employment 
grew rapidly in the early seventies in diverse sectors: traditional con-
sumer-goods production (tobacco, + 13 percent a year; textiles and 
wearing apparel, + 10.2 percent a year); quasi-service sector industries 
(printing/publishing, + 10.1 percent a year); intermediate goods 
(chemical products, + 6.2 percent a year; iron and steel, + 12.6 percent 
a year); producers' goods (electrical equipment, + 12.3 percent a year; 
nonelectrical equipment, +31.6 percent a year); and in modern con-
sumer goods (plastics, + 33.1 percent a year). 50 This varied growth 
reflects the deepening of the import-substitution process implied by 
the label of "vertical" ISI. More and more goods were being produced 
inside Venezuela. 
Not surprisingly, major problems remained. First, Venezuela re-
mained dependent on imported goods51 and on foreign capital in a 
number of industrial operations. Second, the capital intensivity of the 
process of ISI did not come close to providing the number of jobs 
needed in Venezuela (see table 7).52 Service sector employment was 
even more extensive in Venezuela (54 percent in 1979) than in Mexico 
(37 percent), as would be expected in a more urban environment (83 
percent urban versus 67 percent urban in Mexico). Starting later in 
ISI than did Mexico, Venezuela achieved a rate of industrial employ-
ment (27 percent) equivalent to that yielded by the "Mexican miracle" 
(26 percent). But since much service sector employment tends to be 
low-wage employment, 53 Venezuela remains troubled with many of 
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Table 7. Sectoral Distribution of Employment: Venezuela and 
Mexico, 1960 and 1979 
Venezuela Mexico 
1960 1970 1960 
% % % 
Agriculture 35 19 55 
Industry 22 27 20 
Services 43 54 25 
55 
1979 
% 
37 
26 
37 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1981 (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
Univ. Press, 1981), 171, 173. 
the same problems of mass poverty that beset Mexico. Venezuela, 
like Mexico, finds that late state-capitalist industrialization does not 
guarantee that poverty will disappear. Even the occurrence of a mid-
seventies petroleum "bonanza" did not suffice to generate the in-
dustrial jobs that would need to be created in order to achieve a 
markedly higher level of national welfare under a state-capitalist re-
gime. In the eighties these problems have been further exacerbated 
by the debt crisis and falling petroleum prices on the world market. 54 
The persistence of income inequality in Venezuela reflects the 
peculiar features of state-capitalist industrialization in the late twen-
tieth century. Even an activist state, blessed with a policy consensus 
around mildly reformist goals and endowed with petroleum reve-
nues, cannot turn industrialization into the motor of immediate abun-
dance. In comparative terms much has been accomplished in the 
Venezuela development effort, but much remains to be done. Vene-
zuela's accomplishments are relative and do not imply a substantial 
qualitative difference from the rest of Latin America. Venezuelan in-
dustrial development seems equally incapable of providing an escape 
from fundamental developmental dilemmas as is the formula devised 
by other late industrializers of Latin America. 
Because of the existence of a sizable market attractive to domestic 
entrepreneurs, public policy favorable to industrialization during the 
dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz, and proximity to sources of capital in 
the United States, Mexican industrialization efforts began a bit earlier 
than those in Venezuela, 55 getting under way in the late 1800s. The 
Mexican Revolution of 1910-17 and the ensuing climate of political 
uncertainty in the twenties, however, slowed down the pace of in-
dustrialization. The percentage of the economically active population 
employed in industry was 17.2 percent at the outbreak of the revo-
lution but declined during the revolution and remained virtually con-
56 Working-Class Mobilization 
stant over the next two decades, reaching 16 percent in 1940.56 
Similarly, manufacturing output constituted 14 percent of Gross Na-
tional Product in 1910 but only 11 percent in 1925, returning to 14.3 
percent in 1935 and 16.7 percent in 1940.57 By 1940, then, Mexico had 
done little more than catch up with its prerevolutionary industrial 
standing. 
During the Cardenas presidency (1934-40), the basis for a state 
partnership with the private sector was laid. Relationships between 
the private sector and the reformist state authorities were troubled, 
but ultimately the operative norms for the Mexican variant of state 
capitalism were established. Those norms involved a substantial state 
presence in the economy. The nationalization of the petroleum in-
dustry in 1938 no doubt troubled private investors in other sectors 
but may have served indirectly to unify the nation. Some authors 
have argued that this act had the consequence of increasing Mexican 
self-confidence to the point that private Mexican capital was thereafter 
more likely to stay in Mexico. 58 Be that the causal mechanism or not, 
after the Cardenas presidency, the role of the Mexican state as pro-
ducer (of electricity, iron and steel, railroad cars, sugar, etc.), as 
cofinancier59 of private development efforts, and as regulator in-
creased steadily, as did profits for private sector entrepreneurs. Mexi-
can state authorities taxed those profits at a very low rate60 but devised 
ways to guarantee that a substantial percentage of these profits were 
available for investment in productive activity via manipulation of 
bank reserve requirements. The Mexican variant of state capitalism, 
then, involved "early emergence" of an activist state operating on 
behalf of the private sector. 
The activism of the Mexican state became even more apparent in 
the era from 1940 to 1954 when the bases for subsequent industrial 
growth were laid. During World War II and later, the state played a 
major role in preserving the opportunity for private sector industri-
alists to acquire the profits to which they became accustomed in the 
war years. One route was via control over the labor movement, 
through the imposition of acquiescent labor leaders for those who 
proved more combative; a second route was through permitting the 
continuation of a substantial discrepancy between urban and rural 
wages, thereby attracting workers to the city in excess of the jobs 
available in industry. The excess urban labor supply kept wages low 
and undermined the bargaining power of the organized labor move-
ment. A third way in which the state put itself at the disposal of the 
industrialists of the forties was via low taxation and concentration of 
public spending on economic-development activities. This pattern 
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was established in the forties and continued through 1970, when first 
halting attempts to reorient the allocation of costs and benefits were 
made by the Echeverria administration. 61 Yet for many years distri-
butional issues remained a low priority. Roger Hansen notes that "no 
other Latin American political system has provided more rewards for 
its new industrial and commercial agricultural elites" while in no other 
Latin American polity "has less been done directly by the government 
for the bottom quarter of society ."62 
On many occasions cooperative arrangements that involved the 
Mexican state, private domestic capital, and foreign investors were 
set up. It was, without doubt, an "alliance for profits," as the ex-
panded role of the state was not redistributive. It was in this era 
between 1940 and 1954 that the Mexican state began forcefully to "take 
on the role of making capitalism work for Mexico ... (by imposing) 
major restrictions on the demands of the lower classes and (by) 
the ... entry of the state into areas of the economy where the private 
sector was unwilling or unable to enter, or had entered and failed." 63 
One scholar argues that during this era the "public sector bore 
the unproductive side of industrialization, receiving only 10 percent 
of GNP for its 50 percent share in total investment."64 Some of the 
public investment consisted of "substantial transfers from the federal 
government to decentralized agencies, transfers that were primarily 
designed to allow them to maintain low prices of essential goods and 
services." The effort to get the industrialization process on track again 
led to substantial growth in the import of capital goods, which in 
combination with the subsidies just mentioned meant that domestic 
budgets were unbalanced, as were international trade accounts. The 
domestic deficits were financed by inflationary monetary policies, 65 
which ultimately led to an overvalued peso. Ultimately, two devalua-
tions from 4.05 to 8.65 (1948) and from 8.65 to 12.5 pesos to the dollar 
(1954) were necessary to allow Mexico to cope with its external dis-
equilibria. By the end of the 1940-54 era, however, considerable pro-
gress had been made in extending the import-substitution process, 
for now only 6 percent of nondurable consumer goods were imported, 
39 percent of intermediate goods, and 68 percent of capital and du-
rable consumer goods. 66 
From 1955 on through the Diaz Ordaz presidency (1964-70), Mexi-
can industry grew apace in an environment that was conducive to 
private sector confidence in a "favorable investment climate."67 One 
element of that climate was the maintenance of price stability, with 
inflation dropping to 2 to 3 percent a year between 1960 and 1970.68 
Another was the continued use of public policy to ensure that profits 
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were attainable in Mexican industries. This was done via a variety of 
policy instruments, such as tax holidays, outright subsidies, licensing, 
and manipulations of tariffs. By 1970, for example, almost 80 percent 
of goods imported to Mexico required a license. If a proposed item 
for import would compete with a domestically produced good, the 
Mexican state would often prohibit importation or impose a high tariff. 
Tariff protection, especially when applied to capital-intensive indus-
tries, was almost purely for the purpose of maintaining high rates of 
profit. 69 Investors responded actively to these opportunities, leading 
to what some enthusiastic boosters called "the Mexican miracle." 
Clark Reynolds, for example, has estimated that the growth of Mexi-
can industry exceeded the "expected level" for an "average develop-
ing country" in twelve out of fifteen basic manufacturing industries 
between 1950 and 1960.7° Continuing expansion occurred in the six-
ties. Industries founded in earlier decades continued to increase pro-
duction, as in the auto industry, a modern consumer durable industry 
with backward linkages to intermediate goods. In 1955 the Mexican 
industry produced only 17,225 vehicles, but by 1970 the total annual 
production was up to 133,218 vehicles. Here the Mexican state fos-
tered backward linkages by negotiating (in 1962) for eventual move-
ment toward a standard of 60 percent of the value of the components 
being produced in Mexico. Just as in automobiles, import substitution 
got under way seriously in other consumer durable/capital goods in-
dustries during this era, with domestic production increasing from 
30 percent to 49 percent of national consumption. Similarly, ISI deep-
ened in the intermediate-goods industries, where domestic produc-
tion now reached 78 percent of national consumption, up from 61 
percent in 1955. 
Four features of this movement toward vertical ISI deserve brief 
comment. First, foreign investment increased considerably in Mexico, 
although most often in combination with domestic public and private 
capital. Mexican state-capitalist industrialization was distinguished by 
the degree to which foreign capital was invited into the country but 
forced into partnership with domestic private capital. 71 Unintention-
ally, this collaboration may ultimately have exacerbated the tenden-
cies for capital to flow outside the country when either foreign 
investors or major domestic capitalists found themselves displeased 
with public policy. A pattern of interaction may have been established 
that regenerated tendencies for Mexican capital to become "psycho-
logically denationalized." 
Second, while many new jobs were created in industry, they were 
insufficient to absorb the labor being driven out of the countryside 
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by the export-oriented agriculture that public policy supported in or-
der to pay the costs of continuing to import much capital equipment. 
Those urbanites who found employment in industry often found rela-
tively remunerative employment. For example, a 1966labor cost sur-
vey of twelve member countries of the Latin American Free Trade 
Association reported that Mexican workers received real wages that 
were 96 percent higher than those of the average worker in all twelve 
countries. 72 Unionized industrial workers were particularly likely to 
be well protected in Mexico, having access not only to higher wages 
but also to collective goods, such as health care via the social security 
system. Urban unionized workers have been estimated as being 
among the top 40 percent of the income distribution during this pe-
riod.73 
However, the third characteristic was the dependence of the new 
industries on a very narrow market of the richest segments of Mexican 
society. David Felix has calculated that in 1968 57 percent of household 
software, 53 percent of household durables, 60 percent of recreational 
equipment, and 95 percent of passenger vehicles and accessories were 
purchased by the richest 20 percent of Mexican households. 74 Once 
that market was saturated, the prospects of further industrial expan-
sion were limited, given the existing degree of income concentration. 
Implicit in the "Mexican miracle" of 1955-70, then, were some dis-
turbing indications that the pace of industrialization and of rapid eco-
nomic growth (which averaged over 3.5 percent per capita a year in 
the sixties) was about to come to an end. 
Fourth, Mexico became increasingly dependent on loans from 
abroad to finance the public sector deficit generated in the attempt to 
stimulate industrialization, while maintaining a stable exchange rate 
and political order. The foreign public debt tripled between 1961 and 
1970, implying that "debt service would reach the level of 22.5 percent 
of current account earnings."75 Eventually, this debt would drive 
Mexico into the hands of the public international lending agencies 
and would have implications for labor policy during the eighties. 
An economic slowdown occurred in 1972, when the aggregate 
growth rate dropped to 3.5 percent annually, from the range of 6.5 
percent in the late sixties. This slowdown was, in fact, planned by 
the Echeverria team, who wished to bring the rising government defi-
cit under control by lowering public spending in 1971. But another 
goal of the Echeverria administration was to attain more balanced 
growth with some degree of income redistribution. These goals 
proved difficult to reconcile. The slowdown of 1972 was greater than 
expected and led to a consequent Keynesian overreaction in 1972, 
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when government spending and public indebtedness began to bal-
loon in an attempt to reactivate the economy. 76 Substantively, public 
investment was reoriented toward human capital expenditures; health 
and welfare expanded rapidly in this era, but some low-priority proj-
ects were also undertaken as well because they could be done quickly. 
The post-1972 spending boom created the need for new revenues, 
which the Echeverria administration first hoped to raise via a tax 
reform. Resistance from the private sector apparently led the presi-
dent to back off, after which point both inflation (circa 20 percent to 
30 percent a year in the late seventies) and continued recurrence on 
foreign loans (foreign debt quadrupled between 1970 and 1976) soared 
upward. Continuing private sector distrust over Echeverria's reform-
ist economic policy led to massive capital flight in 1976, culminating 
in two devaluations of the peso (to a rate of 22.5 to the dollar). 
During the succeeding Lopez Portillo presidency (1976-82), some 
initial success was had in calming the fears of domestic and foreign 
capital, primarily by playing up Mexican petroleum reserves. How-
ever, a downturn in the petroleum market in early 1982 revealed 
Mexico's continuing vulnerability caused by its public foreign debt. 
Capital flight again resumed, and repeated devaluations of the peso 
were stimulated throughout 1982, leading ultimately to the nation-
alization of the banking industry by Jose Lopez Portillo, who began 
his administration as the darling of the private sector and terminated 
it as the bete noir thereof. 
Nonetheless, import-substitution industrialization continued dur-
ing this period. Passenger car and truck production zoomed ahead 
until the mid-seventies, when a temporary downturn occurred. In-
termediate-goods industries were also expanding during the seven-
ties. Iron production was up 52 percent between 1970 and 1976; steel 
production up 35 percent; chemicals up 42 percent; fertilizers up 61 
percent; artificial fibers up 142 percent; and petrochemicals up 93 
percent.77 But of the traditional consumer-goods industries, only tex-
tiles continued to grow rapidly in the seventies (up 139 percent by 
1976). In most areas where industrial expansion was occurring in the 
seventies, state investment played a key role (for example, iron and 
steel, petrochemicals, and fertilizers), often in very large plants. 78 
Much discussion has occurred about the exhaustion of the hori-
zontal stage of import-substitution industrialization and about the 
political consequences that appear to flow from the need to deepen 
this process. 79 The disputed issues do not have to be resolved here, 
but one should note that a political pact between the Mexican private 
sector and state authorities lasted for about thirty-two years before 
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serious disagreements began to surface over Echeverria's 1972 tax 
proposals and over the reformist direction of public policy. A fraying 
of the alliance between the state and private capital did occur as Mexico 
attempted to complete the process of import-substitution industriali-
zation. Given that a Mexican president and the economists advising 
him felt that the task could be accomplished only if a wider market 
were created via income redistribution, the private sector came to 
question whether the state truly existed to serve their needs. Private 
investment declined, and public investment increased to maintain the 
rhythm of growth. The Mexican economy became more statist. Dis-
trust increased, and political conflict sharpened between the state and 
private capital after 1972, even though public policy was not suffi-
ciently reformist to generate enthusiastic support from the working 
classes.80 Mexico's petroleum boom did not provide the means to 
soften such conflict because to exploit it required contracting further 
foreign debt. 81 Hence, Mexican state capitalism was deeply troubled 
as it confronted the tasks of late industrialization in the post-1970 
period. The ability of the state to manage conflict was increasingly 
subject to question. 
The effects of economic development on mass welfare and living 
standards in Venezuela and Mexico have been amply documented 
elsewhere. Suffice it to note here that income distribution in both 
countries has tended to become less equitable, that wage levels of 
both organized and unorganized workers have tended to deteriorate 
in real terms during inflationary periods, and that the wretched living 
conditions of urban marginals and peasants may have improved in 
some cases, but extensive poverty remains. 82 These conditions are 
related to choices made by public officials about how to spend gov-
ernment revenues. Social welfare expenditures declined from 47 per-
cent of total central government expenses in Mexico in 1972 to 39 
percent in 1981. In Venezuela the corresponding decline was from 38 
percent in 1972 to 32 percent in 1981.83 The next chapter will discuss 
the structural constraints in both the Venezuelan and Mexican polities 
that may have precluded organized labor and peasants from mobi-
lizing opposition to the dominant pattern of economic development. 
Chapter Four 
Mechanisms of 
Political Control 
Chapter 1 noted that corporatist interest intermediation, restricted 
partisan competition, weak representative institutions, elite consen-
sus, and the use of repression might facilitate political control. This 
chapter, will examine more closely these facets of control in the Mexi-
can and Venezuelan political systems. 
Corporatist interest intermediation in Mexico is asserted primarily 
through the sectoral organization of the ruling party. In the case of 
organized labor, most large labor federations in Mexico are incorpo-
rated into the labor sector of the ruling Partido Revolucionario Insti-
tutional (PRI) and into the overarching Congreso del Trabajo ( CT). Both 
the labor sector of the PRI and the CT are dominated by the Confed-
eration of Mexican Workers (cTM). This confederation, created by the 
Cirdenas administration in 1936 to unify the labor movement, exer-
cises hegemony over Mexican organized labor by virtue of its sym-
biotic relationship with the state. 1 Headed for the past several decades 
by the indomitable Fidel Velasquez, "the official labor movement can 
be mobilized quickly on a national scale, for everything from mass 
demonstrations in support of government policies to campaign rallies 
and voter registration drives."2 
The Congreso del Trabajo, created by the Diaz Ordaz adminis-
tration in February 1966, is an umbrella organization that in 1978 
"grouped 33 major confederations and industrial and national in-
dustrial unions that represented a total of 7,801 unions and 2,238,287 
workers."3 The CTM is able to dominate the national assembly of the 
CT by virtue of representing a substantial majority of unions in the 
CT (63.9 percent of the total unions). Seats are allocated to confed-
erations on the basis of number of unions, not on the total number 
of union members. It is worth noting that the CTM is not the largest 
confederation in terms of actual members but only in terms of number 
of affiliated unions. 4 
The relationship between the CTM and the Mexican state is not 
one of unilateral state control. It is rather a case of both sides per-
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ceiving their optimal strategy as one of "going along, in order to get 
along." While the CTM has often engaged in rhetorical radicalism, 
especially in response to the growth of independent unionism in the 
seventies, and in response to recent economic crises, 5 it tends, ulti-
mately, to close ranks in support of PRI economic policies even when 
workers' interests seem to be sacrificed by the party. The rules of the 
Mexican political game are generally respected. These norms preclude 
open criticism of the president, limit mobilization, and call for the 
closing of ranks around presidential policy decisions. 6 
In turn, the Mexican state has been willing to go along with many 
of labor's demands. The regime is particularly disposed to satisfy the 
demands of the CTM hierarchy in exchange for demonstrations of 
support and for the imposition of control during crises. The support 
of the CTM for the government during the railroad workers' insurgency 
in 1958 and 1959 led to a substantial increase of seats in the federal 
Chamber of Deputies going to the labor sector. One analyst believes 
the welfare programs of the Echeverria government (1970-76) were in 
part a payoff for CTM support during the student rebellion in 1968.7 
The "get along, go along" perspective of labor elites in the in-
corporated labor movement is buttressed by cooptation and subsidy. 
Cooptation may take forms ranging from external assistance to union 
leadership in putting down dissident movements to rewards of leg-
islative seats. As Mexican legislatures, from the national to the local 
level, are almost totally dominated by the executive, legislative seats 
provide little opportunity for input into policy-making. Rather, leg-
islative seats "supply substantial income, prestige, perquisites, and 
the opportunity to engage in other lucrative endeavors."8 The same 
cooptative purpose is also served by positions in the official party or 
bureaucracy. 
Attempted cooptation extends to rank-and-file union members as 
well. A unionized job itself represents a kind of patronage, since 
wages and benefits obtained are generally far better than what un-
organized labor receives. Additionally, organized workers receive 
"state-subsidized credit, housing, health care, basic commodities, 
technical training and assistance, and participation in enterprise prof-
its."9 Coverage and the range of benefits has expanded rapidly since 
1970.10 As only a relatively small portion of the Mexican work force 
is unionized, 11 unionized workers constitute in one sense a labor 
aristocracy. Whether their relative privilege produces conservative 
attitudes is a separate issue to be analyzed in later chapters. 
Another mechanism of control is economic subsidy. The CTM has 
had a historic problem with collecting dues from its affiliates. Con-
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sequently, it had to depend on direct state subsidies in order to bal-
ance its books. Subsidies are also channeled to state and regional CTM 
federations as well as to other national confederations affiliated with 
the labor sector of the party. Subsidies, therefore, have the effect of 
furthering the dependence of incorporated unions on the Mexican 
state. 12 
Finally, the state can use repression, should other mechanisms 
of control fail. Contemporary Mexican labor history is replete with 
examples of repression of dissident labor movements. Two of the best-
known examples are the forceful suppression of a movement of dis-
sidents in the railroad workers' union in 1959 and the suppression of 
a dissident faction of the Electrical Workers' union during the Eche-
verria administration. 13 
A main repressive mechanism at the rank-and-file level is the 
exclusion clause provision (clausula de exclusion) generally found in 
collective contracts. These provisions set up a closed union shop com-
pelling workers to become union members. In addition, employers 
are required to dismiss any worker who loses his union membership. 
This clause provides union bosses a tool to stamp out insurgency and 
to maintain control. 14 Union bosses can simply take steps to expel 
recalcitrant workers from the union and, thus, from their jobs in order 
to bring them into line. 
How management and the union leadership exert dual control 
over Mexican workers has been explained well by Larissa Lomnitz. 
In the larger private corporations, the management will fire undesirable work-
ers or even close down a plant in the knowledge that any subsequent claims 
will be settled to their satisfaction at a suitable level. In general, individual 
workers have no redress and tend to shy from any action which has not been 
approved by the union leadership. The union in effect controls all jobs in the 
plant. Loyal members are awarded better jobs, less dangerous assignments, 
more pleasant tasks, and better shifts. Such practices encourage the passitivity 
and depoliticization of labor. In the long run, a worker needs the support of 
his section boss to get access even to the fringe benefits he is entitled to.15 
Ian Roxborough takes a somewhat different but compatible po-
sition. He argues that while "union militancy and rank-and-file in-
surgency . . . are an integral part of the dynamic of the (Mexican) 
industrial system ... (nonetheless) Mexican automobile workers en-
gage in predominantly 'economistic' struggles. They do not agitate 
for specifically political demands."16 Perhaps part of the reason for 
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the latter is the existence of the clausula de exclusion, also noted by 
Roxborough. 17 
As in Mexico linkages between dominant parties and the labor 
movement have fostered a vertical pattern of control in Venezuela. 
One of the two dominant parties in Venezuela, Acci6n Democr<itica 
(AD), has been able to dominate the major labor federations and the 
overarching Confederaci6n de Trabajadores Venezolanos (cTv). Dom-
ination has come about through subsidy, cooptation, and less fre-
quent, but still consequential, use of repression. Fusion of union and 
party leadership roles is a central mechanism of control. As one 
scholar has noted: "This pattern of fused union-party careers is vir-
tually universal. There is no strictly 'labor career' pattern."18 
In Venezuela union leadership is determined by competitive elec-
tions in which all political parties represented in the union are free 
to present a plancha, or slate of candidates. Seats on the union direc-
torate are divided, after elections, on the basis of proportional rep-
resentation. Each political party has a "multi-level labor bureau to 
which its union faction is responsible."19 Party labor bureaus can 
presumably impose guidelines on the formation of coalition slates and 
in some cases can impose their own nominees in local union elections. 
"In order to achieve its electoral objectives in local unions, a national 
labor bureau works through its factional heads in the federation-or, 
more infrequently, the bureau hierarchy at the regional or local 
level. " 2° Federation leaders in turn work actively in local union elec-
tions to ensure the election of their preferred slate. 
The fusion of union/party leadership roles represents a pattern of 
cooptation by political parties. Consequently, as several observers of 
the Venezuelan scene have noted, union leaders have been willing 
to shape union demands so as not to disrupt elite goals of rapid 
import-substitution industrialization. 21 Cooptation extends to rank-
and-file workers as well. Only a minority of Venezuelan workers are 
unionized.22 These workers, like their counterparts in Mexico, tend 
to be employed in the capital-intensive sector of the economy that 
can best absorb demands for higher wages and benefits. Conse-
quently, the wages and benefits of unionized workers in Venezuela 
tend to be much better than those of unorganized workers. 23 
Although cooptation, subsidy, and repression are used to main-
tain ADICOPEI domination of the Venezuelan labor movement, one 
should not overlook the reciprocal nature of the party-labor union 
relationship. As in Mexico both parties (labor union leaders and po-
litical parties) rerceive instrumental value in labor union ties to po-
litical parties. 2 Parties need the electoral support of unions; unions 
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need ties with party patrons in order to promote the political interests 
of organized labor. Daniel Levine recognizes both the asymmetry of 
the relationship as well as the instrumental basis for interest group 
ties with hegemonic parties. 
Party ties became a central kind of social affiliation, knitting together and 
often overriding more limited group and sectoral loyalties. Thus, for example, 
peasant, trade union, and student activists were simultaneously group leaders 
and party militants. As such, they could be called upon by party leaders to 
modify strategies, tactics, or goals in order to accommodate the long-range 
political interests of the party. In this way, party organization per se became 
strong and complex because it incorporated and reinforced other kinds of 
loyalties and affiliations. In addition to cutting across group ties, AD pene-
trated the society vertically as well, creating organizational ties from the na-
tional level through regions to blocks and precincts in cities, towns, and 
countryside alike. This set of party-based structures took root in the 1940s 
and, after surviving a decade of brutal military repression after the 1948 coup, 
became firmly established in the democratic period as the major channel of 
political action. To be effective in Venezuelan politics, groups and interests 
have been largely required to work through the matrix of party organization. 
This structural trait, added to the heterogeneous composition of Venezuelan 
parties, gave leadership a great deal of leverage vis-a-vis any single group. 
Moreover, in the case of AD, the combination of public office with party office 
gave leadership many key resources in its struggle to control intra-party dis-
sent. Thus, in many ways the particularly powerful organization of Vene-
zuela's political parties, and the degree to which they continued to channel 
popular support, strengthened the hand of leaders in the search for stability. 25 
As in Mexico the most powerful labor confederation was created 
by a hegemonic party, AD. This party established the CTV in 1947. The 
formation of the CTV came during Venezuela's first experience with 
competitive democracy, an era known as the trienio (1945-48).26 The 
CTV was revived after the downfall of the dictatorship and restoration 
of competitive democracy in 1958. Acci6n Democnitica either alone 
or in coalition with coPEI27 has been able to dominate the fifteen-
member executive council of the CTV ever since the Betancourt ad-
ministration. 28 How control over the CTV was initially exerted in the 
post-1958 era and the consequences of AD control over the labor move-
ment has been well described by Terry Karl. 
Before the insurrection (of the left in the early 1960s), AD youth and the 
Communist Party exerted important influence in the union structure. The 
unions had been militant under this leadership, raising economic demands 
and demonstrating the willingness to strike. The only redistribution of income 
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which took place during the democracy occurred under the pressure of strong 
leadership within the mass organizations. The expulsion of AD's youth wing 
in 1960 removed aggressive leadership in the unions. In November 1961, 
militants of the Communist Party and the URD were also purged under the 
auspices of the government, which moved quickly to consolidate its hold over 
the unions. The government awarded financial subsidies to the CTV, dis-
criminating against non-AD organizations established later. Eventually, the 
Confederation received over 50% of its funds from the government. CTV lead-
ers had access to officials at the Ministry of Labor and their strikes were 
supported by the government. In exchange for a degree of docility, several 
of their demands were met. The unions, while securing benefits for the or-
ganized workers, were transformed into institutions that could guarantee 
social peace, by controlling strikes, an arrangement made possible through 
the defeat of radical forces. 29 
In summary, several similarities between the Venezuelan and 
Mexican systems of control can be noted. In both countries incor-
porated union leaders extract benefits in exchange for labor peace and 
acquiescence to official policies. In both countries cooptation and sub-
sidy are used to keep the incorporated union leadership as well as 
rank and file in line. Rank-and-file union members in both countries 
constitute a labor aristocracy whose collective bargaining power en-
sures them a much larger share of the economic pie than unorganized 
workers receive. In both countries officials have resorted to repression 
when other mechanisms of control fail. 30 
There are significant cross-system differences, however, in the 
capacity of corporatist organizations to contain insurgency. Mean-
ingful partisan competition can emerge within Venezuelan unions; 
therefore, the union hierarchy can less easily ignore or manipulate 
rank-and-file workers. Ao/coPEJ control over unions is more easily 
challenged than is PRJ control over Mexican unions due to institu-
tionalized partisan competition within union organizations. Conse-
quently, incorporated union leaders in Venezuela are under more 
pressure to respond to rank-and-file demands if they wish to continue 
ADICOPEJ domination of organized labor. 
Both countries have experienced labor insurgency, as dissatisfac-
tion with the performance of government in dealing with economic 
crises during the seventies and eighties has increased. In Mexico some 
unions have disaffiliated from the CTM or other government-
controlled federations and realigned with newly formed independent 
confederations, such as the Independent Labor Organization (u01) 
and the Authentic Labor Front (FAT). 
However, the defection of labor unions from the PRJ-controlled 
68 Working-Class Mobilization 
federations has not been followed by realignment with left-wing par-
ties. The autonomous unions have tended to be formally apolitical, 
concentrating their efforts on improved collective bargaining. There 
are several reasons for the apolitical nature of independent unionism 
in Mexico. First, political alignment with opposition parties runs the 
risk of stimulating government repression, were the hegemony of the 
PRI to be threatened. Second, alignment with Mexico's weak and di-
vided left promises few rewards in terms of access to patronage. 31 
Third, the total number of independent unions is still rather small, 
not large enough to form a significant electoral bloc, thereby removing 
motivation to engage in explicit partisan activity. Fourth, leaders in 
autonomous unions fear, with some reason, that explicit commitment 
to the political left would undermine the unity of union members and 
thereby weaken the bargaining power of their unions. 32 For these 
reasons autonomous unions are not likely in Mexico to become for-
mally aligned with left-wing parties as found in many western Eu-
ropean contexts. 
By contrast, leftist parties in Venezuela should be able to forge 
alliances with dissident labor movements more easily than in Mexico. 
As noted, leftist parties can gain seats on union directorates through 
proportional representation and, if strong enough, can gain control 
of union directorates.33 However, recent dissident movements in 
Venezuela in the eighties, such as the case of textile workers in Caracas 
and steel workers in Ciudad Guyana, manifested a deep suspicion of 
the traditional left because of its accommodation with the established 
order and have sought to organize independent of the traditional 
left.34 Moreover, as will be shown, the political left in Venezuela 
suffers from fragmentation and disunity and other weaknesses that 
hinder it from taking advantage of growing political dissatisfaction. 35 
We shall now turn to problems faced by opposition parties in Mexico's 
semiauthoritarian polity and Venezuela's aggregative two-party sys-
tem. 
In both Venezuela and Mexico, partisan competition is restricted, 
although to different degrees. In Venezuela there is meaningful par-
tisan competition between two hegemonic centrist parties, the Chris-
tian Democratic Party (coPEI) and the Democratic Action Party (AD). 
The incumbent party has been voted out of office in the last four 
national elections of 1968, 1973, 1978, and 1983. Additionally, com-
petitive partisan elections are often employed to select the leadership 
of private associations. 
Meaningful competition in Venezuela, however, does not extend 
to parties of the left. This point is illustrated by the 1983 national 
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elections. In this election in which AD regained the presidency and 
overwhelming control of the legislature, AD and COPEI presidential 
candidates received 91.3 percent of the total valid vote, and their 
legislative candidates received 78.6 percent of the votes.36 
What factors account for the relative weakness of the left in Vene-
zuela? Certainly, factionalism has weakened the left. But even were 
the left permanently united, it would constitute a distinct minority. 
The systemic mobilization of bias favoring the two dominant parties 
must be taken into account. The allocation of public goods and ser-
vices is controlled by the party in control of the presidency. Both AD 
and coPEI have more patronage to distribute than do minor parties 
of the left. The latter must rely, therefore, primarily on ideological 
appeals to mobilize supporters. 
The hegemonic position of the two major parties also ensures that 
financial contributions are likely to flow to them. As David Myers 
points out about the 1978 presidential campaign: "This level of ex-
penditure (for the 1978 campaign) necessitated support from powerful 
interests, who expected some return in the form of favorable govern-
ment policies. Since parties with little chance of winning are not likely 
to receive contributions from those interests, it has become increas-
ingly difficult for any group other than the two dominant political 
parties to obtain sufficient funds to mount a competitive election cam-
paign."37 Their superior financial position gives AD and coPEI the 
opportunity to utilize the media more fully than do minor parties 
even though there is legal provision for "equal time."38 
Another factor that has weakened the left is its links to armed 
insurrection in the early sixties against the budding democracy. Sur-
veys have uncovered a high level of mass support for democratic 
institutions in Venezuela.39 The left may have difficulty in dissociat-
ing itself i~, the minds of some voters from its violent past, even 
though leftist parties having renounced violence are recognized now 
as legitimate power contenders in the electoral arena. 40 
While AD and COPEI enjoy mobilizational advantages over parties 
of the left, there are still incentives for leftist parties to attempt to 
mobilize supporters. While leftist control of a government in Caracas 
is unlikely in the foreseeable future, the left can gain legislative seats 
and representation on union directorates through proportional rep-
resentation. In the short run, this opens the possibility of leftist parties 
becoming an important swing bloc in these bodies. 
The Mexican party system presents a different picture. While 
there is party turnover in Venezuela, there is none in Mexico except 
for a few legislative seats and positions at the municipal level. The 
70 Working-Class Mobilization 
ruling PRI has never lost a gubernatorial or presidential election. Nor 
has it lost control of the national or state legislatures since its inception 
in 1928. The explanation for sixty years of PRI hegemony is quite 
similar to the biparty hegemony of coPEI and AD in Venezuela. Control 
over patronage and financial resources gives the PRI an overwhelming 
advantage over opposition parties. Indeed, the hegemony of the PRI 
in Mexico is so extreme that opposition parties are sometimes financed 
by the government in order to maintain the facade of a truly com-
petitive democracy. 41 
Even more than in Venezuela, leftist parties in Mexico remain 
very weak. As in Venezuela the left suffers from extreme factional-
ism. 42 Furthermore, the PRI coopts the symbols and rhetoric of the 
left. 43 Unlike in Venezuela the political left can win seats via propor-
tional representation only in the Chamber of Deputies. Restricted 
proportional representation for the Chamber of Deputies has existed 
in Mexico since the early sixties, most recently having been expanded 
in 1977. Given that the Chamber of Deputies is a politically unim-
portant institution, it is not likely that this "opportunity" would 
stimulate intense mobilizing efforts by leftist parties. 44 Indeed, the 
left is so weak in Mexico that the strongest electoral challenge to the 
PRI has come from the center-right National Action Party (PAN). 45 
In sum, leftist and other parties that favor alternative strategies 
of economic development are placed at a distinct competitive disad-
vantage in both the Venezuelan and Mexican political systems. This 
has both collective and individual consequences. Collectively, this 
disadvantage should weaken the capacity of leftist parties and interest 
groups affiliated with them to mobilize working-class opposition to 
dominant parties. In addition, the institutional weakness of the left 
might well explain the lack of political activism on the part of those 
working-class individuals who are discontented with the course of 
state-capitalist development. Such individuals may be inhibited from 
political activity, not by their own cognitive or attitudinal deficiencies, 
but rather by the absence of realistic opportunities for parties that 
favor alternative allocative patterns to gain power. 
Political control can also be asserted by removing political insti-
tutions from popular influence. Hence, one must ask if the institutions 
most deeply involved in making vital public policy decisions are sub-
ject to popular influence via mass mobilization. Working-class inclu-
sion can be restricted to political institutions that play an insignificant 
role in public policy making. 46 Elites, thereby, can more easily ignore 
popular sector demands in formulating development policies if they 
wish. Opportunities for working-class access to vital policy-making 
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centers are restricted in both Mexico and Venezuela but more so in 
Mexico than in Venezuela. 
The three-sector structure of the PRI provides for formal repre-
sentation of organized Mexican workers in the party. Formal repre-
sentation in the party, however, does not provide rank-and-file 
workers any significant input into party decisions. The CTM hierarchy, 
especially Fidel Velasquez, has a voice in party decisions, but rank-
and-file workers rarely do. Furthermore, the party itself has little or 
no influence over the formulation of public policy. Described as "one 
of the world's most accomplished vote-getting machines," the pru's 
principal function is to ensure that large PRI majorities are produced 
in all elections, only secondarily to provide a mechanism for interest 
articulation. 47 
Likewise, legislative bodies in Mexico have little or no influence 
on policy-making. Legislative seats from the municipal to the national 
level are distributed through patron-client networks. As noted pre-
viously, some of these seats are distributed to union leaders as a 
cooptative device. In return for the rewards that go with the seat, 
PRI legislators are expected to support presidential policy. Given the 
overwhelming PRI majorities in all legislative bodies, bills backed by 
the chief executive are not defeated. 48 
Policy-making in Mexico is virtually the exclusive prerogative of 
the president who is limited to a single six-year term. While there is 
maneuvering and bargaining among various factions within the gov-
ernment, ranks close once a presidential decision is made.49 This fall-
ing in line can be explained by the rather extraordinary power that 
the Mexican president has. As Wayne Cornelius and Ann Craig note: 
All but a few public officeholders in Mexico serve at the pleasure of 
the president. State governors, leaders of Congress and the PRI, some high-
ranking military officers, heads of state-owned industrial enterprises, and 
hundreds of other officeholders down to middle-level administrative positions 
are hand picked by each incoming president. For lesser offices, the president 
can veto any nomination recommended by his subordinates and substitute 
his own choice. Officeholders whose actions have proven embarrassing, dis-
ruptive, or otherwise troublesome to the president or his inner circle of ad-
visers can be arbitrarily unseated. Even popularly elected state governors who 
fall badly out of favor with an incumbent president are faced with almost 
immediate dismissal, which is accomplished simply by ordering the federal 
Congress to declare the offending state government "dissolved."50 
A strong presidency or chief executive is not incompatible with 
popular accountability, as liber~l academicians in the United States 
72 Working-Class Mobilization 
have argued ever since the New Deal. However, in Mexico there is 
little accountability. The "no-reelection rule" means that the perfor-
mance of the incumbent is not assessed by the electorate. Public in-
fluence over the electoral process is very circumscribed by limited 
partisan competition (the PRI candidates always win) and by exclusion 
of the electorate from the nomination process. The PRI presidential 
candidate is selected by a process shrouded in mystery. The major 
actor is the outgoing president, but just how the selection is made 
is not fully understood. 51 The important point to be emphasized is 
that the process is a closed one, excluding most Mexicans from any 
input into the selection of their next president. 
We are not suggesting that policymakers in Mexico remove them-
selves completely from input from the so-called popular sector. To 
the contrary, political elites in Mexico are particularly sensitive to 
maintaining system stability by upholding the social pacts upon which 
the system rests. Ever since President Cardenas began the practice of 
the giras de trabajo (working trips among the masses), Mexican presi-
dents and politicos in general worked hard at cultivating an image of 
responsiveness and of concern for the social welfare goals of the Mexi-
can Revolution. 52 
Nonetheless, Mexican political elites have considerable flexibility 
either to respond to or to ignore popular demands. As Evelyn Stevens 
puts it, "The regime's success in limiting, discouraging, and manipu-
lating demand input is the system's most distinguishing character-
istic."53 Political elites will often choose to ignore popular sector 
demands when seeking to implement austerity/monetary stabilization 
policies or when seeking to regain the confidence of domestic and 
international capitalists. Such seems to have occurred under the de 
la Madrid administration as it sought to restore the Mexican economy 
from the 1982 economic collapse. 54 At other times, however, elites 
will adopt more populist policies in response to political crises or as 
a means to restore confidence and system support. Echeverria's and 
Lopez Portillo's economic reform policies, for example, must be seen 
in the context of rebuilding system support following the trauma of 
the 1968 Tlateloco massacre and the near economic collapse of 1975.55 
This flexibility either to ignore or to respond to popular demands is 
rooted in the virtual removal of the presidency from popular control. 
Clearly, some political elites in Mexico are situated in positions 
more removed from interaction with the masses than are others. As 
a general rule, so-called politicos interact more with the masses than 
do tecnicos. The former serve in positions that require them to cultivate 
large mass constituencies. These include PRI officials, state or local 
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chief executives, and legislators. Tecnicos, by contrast, generally oc-
cupy highly technical positions in the bureaucracy where they have 
not had the opportunity to develop large mass followings. 
In recent years high-ranking positions in the Mexican government 
have been increasingly filled by tecnicos. Each of Mexico's last three 
presidents (Luis Echeverria, Jose Lopez Portillo, and Miguel de la 
Madrid) came initially from bureaucratic rather than political back-
grounds. 56 Given the increasing complexity of industrial development 
in Mexico, the trend toward technocratic domination of policy-making 
is not surprising. However, this trend, some argue, will tend to isolate 
policymakers even further from public opinion. In addition, techno-
cratic decisionmaking obscures hidden policy biases that shift the bur-
den of austerity implied by economic stabilization programs to the 
poor and working class. 57 
Like the Mexican political system, the Venezuelan polity can aptly 
be characterized as "presidentialist." A president who cannot be re-
elected for ten years dominates the policy-making process, although 
not to the degree of presidential dominance seen in Mexico. Unlike 
in Mexico the president can sometimes be constrained by opposition 
parties, by a rival faction in his own party, or by the legislative branch. 
Still, the power of the Venezuelan president is considerable. Like in 
Mexico major economic policy decisions have increasingly been made 
by technocrats and corporatist planning boards that bypass mass-
based institutions like parties and legislatures. Furthermore, the 
Venezuelan president, like his Mexican counterpart, has extensive 
appointment powers, including state governors and other top-level 
positions in state enterprise. The major difference in Venezuelan 
presidentialism comes in the nomination and election process, which 
is considerably more open and competitive than in Mexico. 
Unlike in Mexico nominations for national office are decided 
through institutionalized processes, not through secretive, closed con-
sultation among elites. Presidential nominees of both AD and COPEI 
are decided through conventional party conflict resolution mecha-
nisms-national conventions or primaries. In the past both parties 
have used national conventions to select their presidential nominee. 
In recent elections (and in 1967), AD has experimented with a national 
primary. 
Conflict generally revolves around various personalist factions 
within the party. In the 1978 presidential election, for example, the 
battle for the AD nomination was fought between the Betancourt 
faction58 backing Luis Pinerua Ordaz and the Andres Perez faction 
backing Jaime Lusinchi.59 While Lusinchi failed in 1978 to capture the 
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nomination, he won the presidency in 1983. He has since split with 
his mentor, Andres Perez, and tried unsuccessfully to promote an-
other candidate for the 1988 J'residential election in order to block 
Andres Perez's nomination.6 Opportunities are thus available for 
mobilized groups to influence the nomination process as well as the 
general election within parameters set by Venezuela's two-party sys-
tem. 
Political parties also determine nominees for the Venezuelan Con-
gress. "Every party's national executive committee (or its functional 
equivalent) reserves to itself the prerogative of making the final de-
cision concerning the persons to be listed as legislative candidates and 
the position of each on the list."61 Following Venezuela's system of 
proportional representation, the number of seats that a party wins 
within an electoral district is determined by its share of the total vote. 
Centralized control by party elites over the nomination process 
for Congress gives the Venezuelan president control over his party 
in the legislature, assuming that the president does not lose control 
over the national executive committee. If his party is dominant in the 
legislature, the president has a free hand to get his legislative program 
passed. Such was the situation of Carlos Andres Perez when a large 
AD majority was also elected to the Senate and Chamber of Deputies 
in 1973. If, however, the opposition party controls Congress, the presi-
dent must often negotiate and bargain with Congress as the COPEI 
president, Rafael Caldera (1968-73), was forced to do with an AD ma-
jority in Congress. 62 
In sum, the political process is considerably more open in Vene-
zuela than in Mexico, providing more opportunities for mobilized 
groups to exert influence. There are, however, constraints on mass 
influence over policy-making. When commanding legislative majori-
ties, Venezuelan presidents can dominate the legislative branch just 
as completely as the Mexican president. Like the PRI in Mexico, domi-
nant parties in Venezuela are mechanisms to mobilize mass electoral 
support. 63 The nature of the linkage between masses and elites, as 
in Mexico, tends to be downward through patron-client networks. 
Due to a highly centralized authority structure in the dominant par-
ties, few opportunities exist for opposition groups to mobilize within 
the dominant parties. Rather, the trend has been for dissident factions 
to split from the dominant parties and join the ranks of other impotent 
minority parties. 64 
As in Mexico technocrats have come to exercise an ever-increasing 
role in policy-making. This trend was exacerbated during the Andres 
Perez administration (1973-78). Confronted with an inordinately large 
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amount of petroleum dollars, Perez was persuaded that state admin-
istration needed to be rationalized by removing partisan politics. In 
lieu of existing administrative agencies dominated by the parties, 
newly created tripartite boards and planning commissions would em-
ploy more technical criteria in formulating policy. In effect, political 
institutions, like parties and legislatures, were to be bypassed. Karl 
shows how the various tripartite boards that Perez set up to nation-
alize administration favored a conservative, probusiness strategy of 
development. 65 Karl's argument does not have to be examined in 
detail except to note that the "technification" of policy-making in 
Venezuela and the concomitant demise of traditional party politics 
limits opportunities for workers and other popular sector groups to 
exercise political influence over policy-making. 
Elite consensus is another mechanism of political control in Vene-
zuela and Mexico. While it would be difficult to quantify the degree 
of elite consensus in either Venezuela or Mexico, most students of 
politics in either country would agree that there is a high level of 
consensus among political elites. The rules of the political game are 
almost universally accepted, and there is basic agreement on the de-
sirability of a state-capitalist strategy of development, that is, the use 
of the state to enhance the role of a private sector, taking over activities 
necessary to the private sector but that are unattractive to it. Leftist 
elites reject this model of development and in some cases, particularly 
in Mexico, also reject the political rules of the game. But leftist elites 
generally exercise little political power and generally opt for coopta-
tion via the electoral system rather than risk repression by engaging 
in revolutionary activity. 
There is a certain irony here. As Levine notes, "Historically, AD 
came on the national scene as spokesman for a broad coalition of the 
marginal and dispossessed of Venezuelan society-above all, lower 
classes from peripheral regions."66 The same observation applies to 
the PRI in Mexico, which traces its roots to the Mexican Revolution. 
Yet these ruling parties have generally retained the tacit support of 
the bourgeoisie and upper class by recognizing and upholding social 
pacts with privileged groups (chapter 3). 
Conflict and dissension do develop at the elite level between re-
formers and conservatives. 67 However, conflict is contained and re-
solved within existing institutions, thereby also containing mass 
mobilization within the contours of the established political system. 
Elites are not tempted to mobilize the poor "to do in" their antagonists 
among other elite factions. What factors account for this high degree 
of elite consensus? 
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A major factor promoting elite consensus in both countries is the 
historical memory of elites. Mexican elites are painfully aware of the 
costs of the Mexican Revolution in which more than a million lives 
were lost. A decade of war did not end until competing revolutionary 
leaders agreed to a pact in which "they pledged themselves to mutual 
toleration and a division of the spoils that reflected the existing balance 
of power among them."68 A major factor sustaining the commitment 
of contemporary elites to renewing the pact is fear of repeating the 
trauma and violence of the revolution were the system to break down 
again. 
The memory of Venezuelan elites is not of the costs of violent 
revolution but rather of the costs of a dictatorship that developed 
when Venezuela's first experience with competitive democracy failed. 
Venezuela's experiment with democracy during the trienio (1945-48) 
collapsed largely because of elite polarization and fragmentation. The 
social pact upon which competitive democracy was reinstituted in 
Venezuela in 1958 signified an effort to reach an elite accommodation 
(see chapter 3). Levine notes: 
With the overthrow of military rule, steps were taken to correct the errors of 
the past. The most striking feature of Venezuelan politics after 1958 is the 
conscious, explicit decision of political elites to reduce interparty tension and 
violence, accentuate common interests and procedures, and remove, insofar 
as possible, issues of survival and legitimacy from the political scene. This 
orientation took concrete form in an agreement signed between AD, COPEI, 
and URD in October 1958-the Pact of Punto Fijo. As Romulo Betancourt 
noted, this pact reflected a belief that extreme partisanship and intense conflict 
during the trienio had opened the doors to military intervention."69 
Another factor that has contributed to elite consensus in both 
countries is a deideologizing of politics. Among major power con-
tenders, there is ideological agreement on the basic model of state-
capitalist development. Political conflict does not reflect fundamental 
ideological issues. 70 Such issues are resolved through the negotiation 
and renegotiation of social pacts. Rather, conflict is centered on issues 
of allocation of resources and their distribution within the established 
sociopolitical framework. The political weakness of the left in both 
Mexico and Venezuela is a function of and contributes to fundamental 
ideological consensus on the elite level. 
The management of conflict in both systems is contingent on the 
distribution of benefits to major power contenders. The capacity to 
satisfy distributive demands is dependent on stable economic growth. 
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A shrinking or devalued economic pie would mean fewer resources 
to distribute. Both Venezuela and Mexico have faced severe economic 
crises in recent years. By shrinking the pie, these crises may well 
strain an important mechanism for sustaining elite consensus. 71 
A final factor contributing to elite consensus in both countries is 
the centralization of authority. Hierarchy reinforced by patron-client 
networks enables top-level elites to impose discipline on subordi-
nates. As noted, power is more concentrated in the Mexican political 
system with the rather extraordinary power of the president. How-
ever, even in Venezuela power is concentrated in the dominant parties 
and in the presidency. The concentration of power makes elite dis-
sensus less likely than if power were more widely diffused. 
The last control mechanism, the use of political repression in both 
the Venezuelan and Mexican political systems, has already been 
touched on. In order to understand the effectiveness of cooptation, 
we need to consider the other side of the coin, threatened or actual 
repression. To refuse cooptation is to risk repression. 72 In both polities 
it is important to emphasize the last-resort character of political repres-
sion. This is not to imply that repression is unimportant in either 
polity, only that repression is generally used only when other control 
mechanisms have failed. 
As with elite consensus, it is also difficult to quantify the level of 
repression in either system. Scholars have generally made subjective 
judgments consistent with their preconceptions about either polity. 73 
Still, scholars most surely would agree that both polities have relied 
far less on repression than have the present and past bureaucratic-
authoritarian regimes in the southern cone. 74 Part of the attractiveness 
of inclusionary systems to elites must rest on the availability of other 
mechanisms, besides repression, for controlling political mobilization. 
The critical questions to ask are (1) whether legal or extralegal 
means of repression are used and (2) for what purposes is repression 
used. In respect to the first question, there are no hard facts to judge 
which polity utilizes extralegal repression more fully. Impressionistic 
evidence suggests that such extralegal repression as the use of thugs 
to disrupt opposition activities, arbitrary firings, or disappearances 
and assassinations are far more common in Mexico than in Venezuela. 
However, such activities are not unknown in Venezuela as shown by 
some of the arbitrary actions taken to establish AD control over the 
labor movement in the sixties,75 by the harassment of the People's 
Electoral Movement during the 1968 electoral campaign,76 or by the 
attempt to purge leftist leaders from the SIDOR steel mill in Ciudad 
Guyana in 1982.77 
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In both Venezuela and Mexico, political repression has been used 
for purposes other than ensuring that mass political activity remains 
nonviolent. It has also been used to ensure that strategic economic 
activity is not disrupted, to suppress groups that challenge the pre-
vailing social pacts and alliances that cement the established state, 
and to maintain the hegemony of dominant parties in labor and peas-
ant mass organizations. Each of the purposes for which repression is 
used will be studied. 
In both polities political elites do not look kindly toward the dis-
ruption of production in strategic industries. Labor unions in these 
industries are generally able to extract attractive benefits and wages 
for workers. These workers tend to be among the best paid in the 
work force. In return, workers are expected to keep production going. 
The oil workers' union in Mexico perhaps provides an extreme but 
yet an instructive case. The union has acquired a vast array of com-
munity services and personal benefits for workers. Close ties between 
the union leadership and PRI officials enable the union to deliver the 
goods. However, the union leadership is expected to and does stamp 
out dissidence and militancy by both legal and extralegal means, in-
cluding assassinations and arbitrary dismissals. 78 Both factors, coop-
tation and repression, explain why Section 24 of the STPRM (the Oil 
Workers' Union), which was studied in Salamanca, has never gone 
out on strike. 
In Venezuelan strategic industries, one is not as likely to find 
repression exercised through the internal governing structure of 
unions, as these structures tend to be more open and democratic than 
in Mexico. However, the government can and does act to suppress 
strikes in strategic industries. Strikes are suppressed in two ways: (1) 
by the Organic Law of Security and Defense that "allows the president 
to declare security zones in which the armed forces can impose 'ex-
ceptional means' of preserving order"79 and (2) by the Labor Ministry 
declaring a strike illegal, thereby allowing the government to use the 
police and military to break up the strike.80 Both powers have been 
used to break up strikes principally in strategic industries. 81 
The rules of the game in both polities provide limited space for 
opposition political parties to challenge the existing allocation of po-
litical and economic resources; however, that space is restricted to the 
electoral arena dominated by the hegemonic parties. In Venezuela's 
case labor unions and peasant associations can freely affiliate with 
socialist parties opposed to the dominant socioeconomic pacts. By 
contrast, autonomous-interest associations in Mexico generally 
choose to remain apolitical. However, political parties and labor 
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unions in both countries may not mobilize a broad-based movement 
to challenge existing distributional patterns outside of the electoral 
arena without risking repression. 
The leftist insurrection in the sixties in Venezuela would have 
provoked repression from virtually any state. What is significant is 
that repression was lifted for those parties willing to limit political 
mobilization to the electoral arena. 82 At this point, it would be pure 
speculation to guess how political elites would react to a broad-based 
sociopolitical movement of workers and peasants that sought to chal-
lenge peacefully existing distributional systems by calling for a redis-
tribution of political and economic resources. The guess is that such 
mobilization would be tolerated only if it were confined to the electoral 
arena. However, the example of Chile under Allende suggests the 
possibility of a military coup and repression if power were ever gained 
through the electoral process. 83 
The experience of a dissident faction of the electrical workers' 
union during the seventies illustrates well conditions that lead to 
political repression in Mexico. A union known as the suTERM union 
was formed in 1972 by the Echeverria administration to consolidate 
a militant independent union with a CTM union. Unity was short-
lived as the independent faction pushed for greater militance and 
internal democracy. In March 1975 the independent faction was ex-
pelled from SUTERM. Organized afterward as the Democratic Ten-
dency, the militant electricians organized a meeting of 20,000 workers 
in Guadalajara on April 5, 1975. A Declaration of Guadalajara was 
issued. It called not simply for greater benefits and privileges for 
electricians within the existing distributional system but for radical 
reform that would lead to a fundamental reallocation of wealth and 
political power. While it contained bread-and-butter economic de-
mands, it also called for specific steps to democratize all unions, 
for collectivization of agriculture, for expropriation of forei§n firms, 
and for increased worker participation in public planning. 8 
Later that same year, a large demonstration was organized in 
Mexico City. One account describes the event as follows: "On the 
afternoon of November 15, 250,000 supporters of the democratic 
movement filled the streets of Mexico City: Members of the SME 
[Union of Mexican Electricians], railroad workers, telephone workers, 
university employees, representatives of independent unions and 
caucuses, militants from the left political parties, residents from the 
colonies of Netzahualcoyotl, Ixtacalco, Ecatepec and others, members 
of the Central Campesina Independiente (the Independent Peasant Cen-
tral), and representatives of independent campesino organizations 
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from 12 states. It was the largest and most important demonstration 
since 1968."85 
The next year the Democratic Tendency was suppressed b~ both 
the extralegal and legal means available to the Mexican state. This 
case study illustrates well conditions that are likely to lead to political 
repression in Mexico: (1) the electrical workers did not confine their 
demands to bread-and-butter demands that the regime could satisfy 
but called for radical change; (2) the dissident movement refused to 
be coopted by the benefits offered through consolidation with a CTM 
union; (3) the dissident movement of electricians sought to expand 
into a broad-based movement unifying disparate elements of the 
lower class and the progressive element of the middle class; and (4) 
the movement operated outside the electoral arena using mass dem-
onstrations and other unconventional means to articulate demands. 
Susan and John Purcell have defined well the parameters of "ac-
ceptable" mobilization. "Mexican populism has always been highly 
successful at activating particular categories of people in the name of 
specific bread-and-butter demands while dampening, through coop-
tation and repression, further demands as well as the rapid spread 
of those demands to other groups. Tiny segments of social classes are 
mobilized in the name of social justice, but class-based mobilization 
is firmly and successfully discouraged."87 The Democratic Tendency 
encountered repression once these limits were broached just as other 
past dissident movements have.88 
Thus far, the use of repression by Mexican and Venezuelan po-
litical elites to protect strategic industries and to contain challenges 
to the dominant social pacts has been discussed. Repression has also 
been used to maintain control by the hegemonic parties over the 
official labor movement. The use of repression by Acci6n Democratica 
to put down a leftist challenge to its hegemony in the Confederation 
of Venezuelan Workers ( CTv) in the early sixties89 and to crush a leftist 
insurgency in Ciudad Guyana has already been noted. 
A similar example is provided in Mexico by the suppression of 
the Coalition of Worker and Peasant Organizations during the Aleman 
presidency (1946-52). This organization mobilized dissident unions 
and presented "a serious challenge to the CTM' s claim to be the coun-
try's principal labor organization." This challenge was inspired by the 
crM' s policy of avoiding strikes and wage demands that would disrupt 
the "Pacto Obrero-Industrial" to guarantee labor-management peace. 
The Aleman administration eliminated the coalition by using 
trumped-up charges of corruption and by forcefully imposing a more 
conservative leadership in unions that had supported the coalition. 90 
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In summary, this chapter suggests that the Mexican and Vene-
zuelan political systems are inclusionary but are polities that leave the 
working class and the poor relatively powerless to effect meaningful 
change in the development strategy preferred by elites. Elites choose 
development strategies that the poor "accept." Political elites may 
well adopt preemptive reform measures, fearing rebellion from below. 
When the political situation calls for it, political elites in both Mexico 
and Venezuela will pursue economic reforms. But it should be em-
phasized that reform measures are better understood as an elite 
choice, not as a response to pressures generated by widespread mass 
mobilization. How specific control mechanisms affect working-class 
mobilization will be examined in chapters 6 to 8. First, chapter 5 will 
examine patterns of working-class political mobilization. 
Chapter Five 
Patterns of Political 
Mobilization 
Chapter 1 examined alternative patterns of political mobilization. Au-
tonomous and controlled political mobilization along with demobilization 
were discussed. As noted, each of these patterns of mobilization is 
characterized by subordinate groups manifesting a particular syn-
drome of political attitudes and participatory behaviors. 
Autonomous political mobilization occurs when subordinate 
groups (1) perceive their collective interests in conflict with those of 
other groups and/or with the state and (2) engage in collective political 
action to defend those interests. Individuals who are so mobilized 
become aware of their collective interests and tend to be psychologi-
cally involved in politics. Furthermore, they tend to be political ac-
tivists whose involvement in politics extends beyond periodic voting. 
Furthermore, the autonomously mobilized individuals are likely to 
support political parties that most closely identify with the collective 
interests of the class or groups with which they identify. In the case 
of workers in capitalist systems, they are likely to support socialist or 
reform parties that are committed to the promotion of working-class 
interests (see chapter 1). 
By contrast, controlled political mobilization implies limited ca-
pacity of a subordinate group to pursue collective interests. As a con-
sequence of control, individuals within the group are not likely (1) to 
acquire motivations to engage in collective political action or (2) to 
engage in political activity beyond periodic voting or (3) to vote for 
militant, antisystem political parties. In the case of a working-class 
population in a contemporary state-capitalist regime, one would ex-
pect to find (1) strong support for hegemonic parties and weak sup-
port for leftist parties, (2) low levels of psychological involvement in 
politics and of concientizacion, (3) minimal political activity except for 
regular voting in periodic elections. 
In this chapter the analytic task is to explore whether Venezuelan 
and Mexican workers who were interviewed for this study exhibit 
characteristics of controlled or of autonomous political mobilization 
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Table 8. Electoral Choice of Venezuelan Workers 
1973 1978 1979 
Presidential Presidential Municipal 
Election Election Election 
% % % 
AD 29.2 17.5 14.5 
CO PEl 30.8 42.7 40.2 
MAS 16.1 15.5 15.9 
MIR 3.9 7.0 9.8 
MEP 9.2 7.3 8.7 
PCV 1.3 1.0 1.4 
LS a a 1.8 
Null ballot 4.9 6.3 3.3 
Other parties 4.6 2.9 4.3 
Total leftist voteb 30.5 30.8 35.8 
•uga Socialista voters for 1973 and 1978 were coded in "other parties" category. 
bCompilation of percentages for MAS, MIR, MEP, and PCV. LS percentage in 
1979 was not counted in order to keep figures compatable. 
and to what extent. The aggregate levels of electoral support for he-
gemonic parties and for leftist parties will be explored first. Compa-
rable data from individual workers in pre-1973 Chile and in Western 
European countries will also be used. Then, the aggregate levels of 
psychological involvement in politics and concientizaci6n for both sam-
ples of workers and the aggregate levels of political activity will be 
examined. 
Tables 8 and 9 show the percentage of the vote obtained by each 
party among reported voters for three elections. Care should be taken 
in interpreting these results, given the nonrandom sampling proce-
dures used. Nevertheless, the results show that hegemonic parties in 
both countries captured a sizable portion of the vote. The PRI obtained 
a significantly higher percentage of the vote for each election than 
did AD and COPEI in Venezuela. This difference holds up even if one 
excludes the 1976 presidential election in which the PRI was the only 
party listed on the ballot. 1 
It is significant to note a slight decrease in Ao/coPEI strength in 
the 1979 elections and a much larger decrease in PRI support in the 
same year. One cannot determine if this decline in electoral support 
is related to declining satisfaction with government performance. 
Such a hypothesis might seem reasonable, especially in Venezuela 
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Table 9. Electoral Choice of Mexican Workers 
PRI 
PAN 
PARM 
PPS 
PDM 
PMT 
PST 
PCM 
Null ballot 
Total leftist vote 
1970 
Presidential 
Election 
% 
78.8 
14.6 
1.0 
1.1 
0.0 
b 
b 
b 
4.7 
1.1 
1976 
Presidential 
Election 
% 
90.0 
4.6 
5.3 
4.6 
1979 
Legislative 
Election 
% 
65.0 
20.4 
1.0 
2.0 
2.8 
b 
1.5 
5.1 
2.0 
8.6 
•In 1976 the PRI was the only party listed on the presidential ballot. Hence, a 
sizable number (n = 67) who reported voting for the PAN were excluded. This point 
as well as the inclusion of the PCM vote is explained further in chapter 9, note 10. 
bN ot officially listed on ballot. 
where the petroleum boom of the seventies had already expired. How-
ever, other factors may have played a determining role. The 1979 
elections in both countries did not involve a presidential election. 
Hence, there was no coattail effect. The message of opposition parties 
might be more easily transmitted in nonpresidential elections when 
attention is not focused on the top of the ticket. In Mexico's case, PRI 
strength might also have been eroded by the effects of the 1977 po-
litical reform that provided greater incentives and opportunities to 
opposition parties to wage an effective campaign. 2 
Tables 8 and 9 show that leftist electoral support is low in both 
samples but much lower in Mexico than in Venezuela. Perhaps, the 
presence of a centrist opposition alternative in Mexico, the National 
Action Party (PAN), accounts for some of the difference. However, even 
if one adds the PAN percentage for 1970 and 1979 to the percentage 
for leftist parties, 3 the combined opposition vote remains lower than 
the leftist percentages for Venezuela. Of course, we would not pre-
sume that PANistas would convert to leftist partisans if the PAN were 
dissolved. The point is to emphasize that electoral opposition to he-
gemonic parties is greater in Venezuela than in Mexico. 
To summarize, the propensity to vote for the left appears to be 
low both among Venezuelan and Mexican workers. Nevertheless, the 
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Table 10. Electoral Support for the Left by French and Italian 
Industrial Workers 
French workers Italian workers 
Party 1969 1964 
Communist/Socialist 57.2% 68.0% 
Christian Democratic 16.9 28.0 
Right-wing parties 25.9 4.0 
Total% 100.0% 100.0% 
N 717 392 
85 
Note: Based on surveys reported in Brian H. Smith and Jose Luis Rodriguez, "Com-
parative Working-Class Political Behavior: Chile, France, and Italy," American Behavioral 
Scientist 18, no. 1 (Sept. 1974): 63, 64, tables 2 and 3. 
data reveal substantial differences between the Mexican and Vene-
zuelan workers. Fewer Mexican workers vote for leftist parties than 
do Venezuelans. This difference suggests more effective political con-
trol over working-class mobilization in Mexico than in Venezuela. 
To place these results in a comparative perspective, let us examine 
the extent to which industrial workers in other regimes support the 
left. The available survey data show that industrial workers (males) 
in Chile were far more likely to have preferred the socialist Allende 
than either the Christian Democratic or Conservative party candidate 
in the 1970 election. Fully 44 percent of respondents supported the 
socialist Allende, while the next highest candidate, Allessandri, was 
supported by only 25 percent of the respondents. In the 1958 and 
1964 presidential elections, electoral support of industrial workers for 
Allende was less but still noticeably higher than the leftist support 
given by Mexican and Venezuelan workers. 4 
Leftist voting by industrial workers in France and Italy provides 
an even more striking contrast with the cases of Venezuelan and 
Mexican workers. Table 10 reports political preferences of industrial 
workers in France and Italy in 1969 and 1964 respectively. In both of 
these countries, Communist and Socialist parties are the overwhelm-
ing preference of industrial workers. Brian Smith and Jose Luis Rod-
riguez present data to show that this same pattern is almost 
universally found in Western European democracies.5 
These comparative results suggest then that worker support for 
the left is effectively discouraged in the Mexican and Venezuelan 
political systems. Why leftist parties fail to harvest greater electoral 
support from industrial workers will be examined in chapter 8. The 
next point to consider is the extent to which these Mexican and Vene-
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zuelan workers acquired motivations to engage in collective political 
action, focusing on psychological involvement in politics and then 
concientizacion. 
Psychological involvement in politics implies long-term attentive-
ness to the world of politics. It has been defined by Sidney Verba, 
Norman Nie, and Jae-on Kim as an issue-neutral motivation to par-
ticipation, entailing long-term attention to politics independent of is-
sue or ideological concems.6 Certainly, elites who wish to control 
mass mobilization are well served by a low level of psychological 
involvement in politics. The political activity of inattentive citizens is 
more easily manipulated and controlled than that of an attentive pub-
lic. 
Two dimensions of psychological involvement in politics can be 
examined: a cognitive and a predispositional component. The cog-
nitive component refers to knowledge or awareness of the sociopoliti-
cal system. Without such knowledge it is difficult to see how 
individuals could develop long-term attention to politics. The other 
component is predispositional-the level of interest in politics. Both 
components will be examined, focusing first on the levels of political 
interest exhibited by Mexican and Venezuelan workers. 
Studies of participation in the industrial democracies have dem-
onstrated a relatively low level of citizen interest in politics. 7 While 
there is evidence of increased interest among younger generations, 
interest still remains quite low in absolute terms. 8 The implications 
of these findings for democratic theory have been fully explicated in 
the ongoing debate between theorists of elite democracy and its 
critics. 9 
One would expect workers in both polities to exhibit minimal 
political interest but levels of interest to be higher in democratic Vene-
zuela than in authoritarian Mexico. The data analysis shows that levels 
of political interest are low among workers in both countries. As 
shown in table 11, a substantial majority of workers in both countries 
exhibit little or no interest in discussing or following political events. 
In fact, levels of political interest are substantially less in both coun-
tries than levels reported for the U.S. populace. It is instructive to 
compare these findings with those reported for a U.S. working-class 
sample interviewed in 1976 (figure 1). U.S. workers appear to be far 
more attentive to politics than either Venezuelan or Mexican workers 
interviewed for this study. 10 Thus, the data provide evidence of very 
limited political interest in the case of Venezuelan and Mexican work-
ers. 
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Table 11. Political Interest among Mexican and Venezuelan 
Workers 
Mexico Venezuela 
Almost Almost 
Never/ Never/ 
Regularly/ Once in a Regularly/ Once in a 
Frequently While Frequently While 
% % % % 
Discuss politics 
at home 20.6 79.4 16.6 82.4 
Discuss politics 
at work 20.0 80.0 9.9 90.1 
Read political 
news 34.8 65.2 34.0 66.0 
Watch news on 
TV/radio 37.4 62.6 33.8 66.2 
Contrary to expectations, the study found Mexicans to be slightly 
more interested in politics than Venezuelan workers (table 11). The 
differences are small except for one item. That item refers to the dis-
cussion of politics at work. Only 9.9 percent of the Venezuelans en-
gage in such activity. Perhaps, the partisan and ideological diversity 
of the Venezuelan work force leads to avoidance of discussion of 
politics on the job. By contrast, no such avoidance behavior appears 
to be operative on the job in Mexico's one party dominant polity. 
To assess political knowledge, respondents were asked an array 
of questions ranging from the name of the immediate past president 
to more esoteric subjects, such as identifying the major national export 
or estimating the size of the national population. Six items were used 
for both countries and a six-point index was constructed. The mean 
score for the Venezuelan national sample was 5.2 items correct (stan-
dard deviation = .74); for the Mexican sample, the mean number 
identified correctly was 5.1 (standard deviation = .51). Certainly, 
these results show an awareness of the sociopolitical environment in 
which workers operate. 
These data are consistent with additional data to be presented in 
later chapters that show these workers to be politically sophisticated. 
These workers are not cognitively incapable of attention to politics. 
Still, few workers are disposed to follow current events or to discuss 
Figure 1. Interest in Politics, by Occupational Level and Employment 
Status among Workers in the United States 
Percent of 
category 
Percent of 
category 
60 Very interested in politics 
40 
20 
46 
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,,' Workina 
32 ,,' 42 
•' .... 
21 ...... 30 19 ,., ________ ., 
16 
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100 Listen to TV news every day 
80 
60 
78 
74 --------- 75 74 
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66 ~ 
2 3 4 
Low- Occupational - High 
level 
100 Read a newspaper every day 
Percent of 
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Low- Occupational-High 
level 
Reprinted from Kay Lehman Schlozman and Sidney Verba, Injury to Insult: Unemploy-
ment, Class, and Political Response (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1979, 243, by per-
mission of Harvard University Press. 
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politics. Politics is perceived as remote from their daily lives. Thus, 
their psychological involvement is limited to awareness of the political 
environment but with little corresponding interest. Low levels of in-
terest in politics are consistent with the ideal type of controlled po-
litical mobilization as outlined in chapter 1. 
Let us turn to an issue-based motivation, concientizaci6n. Workers 
are not likely to mobilize in defense of working-class interests unless 
they are aware of distinct interests that need to be articulated through 
the political process. If workers believe that their interests are pro-
tected by higher social classes or by the state, then they have little 
reason to mobilize politically. Therefore, working-class mobilization 
might be controlled by inculcating beliefs in a benevolent state or 
bourgeoisie. Conversely, autonomous mobilization by the working 
class requires an awareness of antagonistic class interests. The next 
point to consider is how Venezuelan and Mexican workers who were 
interviewed perceive the bourgeoisie and the state. 
First we examine the workers' attitudes toward management. Ta-
ble 12 reports the percentage of workers in each work setting who 
expressed accommodative attitudes toward management. The most 
striking finding is the relatively low percentage of workers in both 
countries and in every type of work setting that expressed favorable at-
titudes toward management. On almost all indicators, fewer than a 
majority of workers in each setting expressed an accommodative at-
titude toward management. The only noticeable exceptions are the 
substantial number of non unionized workers and workers in scattered 
union settings who linked worker welfare with company profits and 
who expressed satisfaction with company salaries (table 13). But the 
general trend is toward dissatisfaction. 
Similarly, neither Mexican nor Venezuelan workers believe that 
working-class interests are well served by political elites. In both coun-
tries most workers believe that their political leadership pays little 
attention to workers. Fully 71.8 percent of the Mexicans indicated that 
their government paid little or no attention to workers. The percentage 
of Venezuelan workers who expressed this opinion is 82.8 percent. 
Later on, the data will show that these workers are also dissatisfied 
with recent government performance. 
In sum, these workers tend to perceive antagonistic interests with 
the bourgeoisie and with the state, indicating relatively high levels of 
concientizaci6n. However, as has been seen, high levels of concientizaci6n do 
not coexist with high levels of support for the left or of political in-
terest. Nor are high levels of political activism found among these 
workers, as will be shown next. 
co 
Table 12. Indicators of Accommodative Attitudes toward Management 
0 
Mexico Venezuela 
Non unionized/ Unionized Non unionized/ Unionized 
Percentage favorable Nonstrategic Nonstrategic Strategic Nonstrategic Nonstrategic Strategic 
to management Industries Industries Industries Industries Industries Industries 
Incorp.• Auto. Incorp. Auto. Incorp. Auto. Incorp. Auto. 
General fairness 
of workers' salaries 49.0% 35.0% 47.0% 37.0% 25.0% 25.9% 36.0% 31.0% 52.5% 47.5% 
N= (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (85) (100) (100) (99) (99) 
Employer concern 
for workers 41.0% 17.0% 36.0% 38.0% 24.0% 9.2% 7.0% 17.3% 25.3% 31.4% 
N= (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (85) (100) (98) (99) (99) 
Fairness of 
management salaries 16.0% 9.0% 17.0% 22.0% 14.0% 3.6% 13.0% 24.5% 31.6% 23.5% 
N= (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (84) (100) (94) (98) (98) 
Satisfaction with ~ 0 
company salaries 54.0% 35.4% 67.0% 54.0% 38.0% 43.5% 54.0% 48.0% 30.8% 31.4% 
..... Q. 
N= (100) (99) (100) (100) (100) (85) (100) (98) (99) (99) 
:::s 
CCI 
Linkage of worker 
0 
iii' 
welfare to company en en 
profits 59.0% 49.0% 74.0% 18.0% 31.6% 33.8% 30.9% 45.6% 43.2% 43.6% s:: 
N= (100) (98) (100) (100) 0 (95) (74) (97) (90) (95) (94) 
0 g 
•Incorp. = Incorprated union; Auto. = Autonomous union 
§' 
-a· 
:::s 
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Previous research has demonstrated in a variety of political con-
texts that political participation is multidimensional. There are a va-
riety of ways by which citizens may be politically active. Activism in 
a particular mode does not necessarily imply activism in other modes. 
What is rather remarkable is that functionally equivalent modes of 
conventional political activity have been empirically uncovered in a 
variety of political systems.11 However, there is evidence that the 
political environment can alter modal structures most commonly en-
countered. 
In a seven-nation study, Verba, Nie, and Kim found functionally 
equivalent modes of participation in all countries except Yugoslavia. 
Using the statistical technique of factor analysis, they identified four 
equivalent modes in all the competitive polities: voting, campaign 
activism, communal activism, and particularized contacting of public 
officials. 12 
Empirical studies of political participation in Latin America have 
generally confirmed the cross-national functional equivalence of the 
conventional modes reported in the Verba and associates' studies. 13 
Still there is ample evidence that the political environment can affect the 
availability of these modes. Not surprisingly, studies in nonelectoral poli-
ties do not find a voting or campaign activism dimension. Electoral 
modes are simply nonexistent. However, studies conducted while 
Ecuador and Peru were ruled by military dictatorships show that 
citizens in these countries did use nonelectoral modes, such as com-
munal activity and particularized contacting. 14 These cases illustrate 
that even in exclusionary regimes political activity involving little or 
no collective mobilization might be tolerated. 
Citizens tend to be more active in some modes of participation 
than in others. Those modes that impose fewer costs in terms of time, 
energy, and money tend to attract more participants than do the more 
"costly" modes. Thus, empirical studies have consistently found vot-
ing to be a more popular mode than more demanding activities, such 
as campaign work, community problem solving, or protest. While 
there is considerable cross-national variation in voting turnout, voting 
tends universally to be the activity in which citizens most frequently 
engage. Verba, Nie, and Kim found that in their six democratic nations 
virtually all of their indicators of voting participation yielded per-
centages above 50 percent (the highest being 96 percent in Austrian 
national elections), while indicators of other modes were substantially 
lower in all nations. 15 
Empirical studies from Latin America have generally found con-
ventional participation to be in the same range as reported in the early 
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industrializing nations. As found elsewhere, voting is the most com-
mon activity. More demanding activities attract fewer participants. 
One of the more intriguing findings from Latin America is that in 
some contexts levels of particularized contacting and communal ac-
tivism are often higher than the levels generally found in the industrial 
nations of the first world. 16 Conditions of poverty and resource scar-
city in Latin America explain the difference. These conditions force 
the poor to seek greater government assistance and to seek their own 
collective solutions when government assistance is not forthcoming. 17 
Studies conducted in advanced industrial nations show that few 
citizens engage in unconventional political activities outside the in-
stitutionalized electoral system. 18 This is not to say that outbreaks of 
protest activities and even of extreme forms of unconventional par-
ticipation do not periodically occur. Clearly, such phenomena do oc-
cur and occur more frequently in some political contexts than in 
others. 19 The same pattern seems to hold in Latin America. Despite 
Latin America's reputation for political violence, empirical studies 
have uncovered little evidence of widespread unconventional political 
participation in the region even among deprived lower-class popu-
lations. Wayne Cornelius, for example, found that only 2 percent of 
his sample of urban squatters in Mexico City had ever participated in 
a protest meeting or demonstration. 20 Low citizen involvement does 
not mean that periodic outbreaks of protest will not occur among 
aggrieved groups at various times;21 but except in revolutionary situa-
tions, wide-scale involvement in protest activities is generally muted. 
As Verba, Nie, and Kim correctly note, caution must be exercised 
in making cross-national comparisons of levels of participation. Lack 
of equivalence in survey items and in response formats creates prob-
lems. Similar activities may vary considerably in difficulty for par-
ticipants. For example, the act of voting might be considerably more 
difficult in some locales than in others due to variations in registration 
procedures and accessibility of the polls. In using survey data on 
voting, the analyst must also be cautious about possible overreporting 
by nonvoters. 22 Care must also be taken in interpreting cross-national 
differences in frequency of participation in other modes. Are differ-
ences due to different sampling techniques, to compositional differ-
ences in the makeup of the samples, or to regime effects? 
As reported in Appendix C, both Venezuelan and Mexican work-
ers utilize multiple modes of political participation. Here the interest 
is in examining the extent to which workers utilize various modes of 
political activity. One presumes that under conditions of controlled 
mobilization, workers would engage in periodic voting and relatively 
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Table 13. Reported Voting in Recent Elections 
Voted Did not vote 
(%) (%) 
1970 Presidential race: Mexico 80.3 19.7 
1973 Presidential race: Venezuela 93.5 6.5 
1976 Presidential race: Mexico 82.6 17.4 
1978 Presidential race: Venezuela 95.2 4.8 
1979 Legislative race: Mexico 84.0 16.0 
1979 Municipal race: Venezuela 62.2 37.4 
Note: Individuals ineligible because of age were excluded. 
little else. In particular, one would expect to find low levels of political 
involvement in demanding modes of political participation, such as 
political protest or campaign activity that requires a high level of poli-
tical mobilization. To complete the picture, I shall also examine worker 
involvement in contacting public officials and communal activity. The 
latter are political activities that elites might tolerate and even en-
courage because they do involve limited demands on scarce resources 
by small groups rather than demands for fundamental changes in 
resource allocation. 
First, levels of voting are examined. Consistent with all past stud-
ies, voting is the political activity in which these Venezuelan and 
Mexican workers most frequently engage. Even if inflated by over-
reporting, a substantial majority appears to be fairly regular voters 
(see table 13). 
In presidential elections Venezuelan workers are more likely to 
participate than Mexican workers. Indeed, the percentages for Vene-
zuelan workers rank higher than all countries that were examined by 
Verba, Nie, and Kim, except Austria.23 The explanation cannot be 
entirely attributed to more rigorous enforcement of compulsory voting 
laws in Venezuela than in Mexico. In both countries enforcement is 
lax. Still, these laws no doubt increase voting turnout beyond what 
it would normally be. 24 
But there are other explanatory factors as well. Meaningful com-
petition between Venezuela's two major parties provides greater in-
centive for voting than Mexico's one-party system. Proportional 
representation in national, state, and municipal legislative bodies pro-
vides minor parties with an incentive to turn out voters. With the 
exception since 1978 of elections for municipal councils, lerslative 
elections occur simultaneously with presidential elections. 2 In the 
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two presidential elections reported in table 13, there was no com-
parable system of proportional representation in Mexico to stimulate 
greater partisan mobilization by minor parties.26 Finally, otherwise 
cynical Venezuelans express pride in their electoral system. This pride 
might generate further motivation for voting. No such motivation is 
found among Mexicans about their electoral system. 27 
A different picture develops for the 1979 elections-legislative 
races in Mexico, municipal races in Venezuela. As shown in table 13, 
participation was significantly less among Venezuelan workers. Some 
unique circumstances might explain these results. In 1978 the Organic 
Law of the Municipalities was passed. This law introduced several 
reforms to open up the political process at the local level. In order to 
provide for greater visibility, municipal elections were to be held at 
different times from national and state elections. For the first time 
since the overthrow of the Perez Jimenez dictatorship in 1958, Vene-
zuelans could select their local representatives without the distraction 
of national elections. 28 The effect of separating local elections from 
national and state elections, however, may have been to remove an 
important stimulus to voting for local offices. The data show a sharp 
drop-off in voting in the 1979 elections. 
In general, both Venezuelan and Mexican workers tend to be 
regular voters. If there is controlled mobilization, one would not ex-
pect political participation to extend to more demanding modes that 
would indicate more intense political mobilization. To assess partici-
pation in demanding forms of participation, I shall examine levels of 
campaign activism and protest. 
Three items, as reported in Appendix C, loaded on the campaign-
activism factor for both national samples. These items are frequency 
of attending campaign rallies, of discussion of politics in one's or-
ganizations, and of working for candidates. The data in table 14 show 
that few workers in either polity participate in campaign activities 
with any regularity. 29 This finding is consistent with the study's analy-
sis of political interest. Campaign activity is demanding of one's time 
and energy; hence, it is not likely to appeal to the politically dis-
interested. These findings are consistent with Verba, Nie, and Kim's 
findings that also show relatively few campaign participants in the 
countries used in their sample. 30 
The data show only one striking difference between the two sam-
ples. Mexicans are significantly more likely to participate in campaign 
rallies. Perhaps, this difference is related to the increasing use of 
Madison Avenue-style campaigning in Venezuela. Robert O'Connor 
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Table 14. Campaign Activism among Mexican and Venezuelan 
Workers 
Participate in 
campaign rallies 
N 
Participate in 
election campaigns 
N 
Discuss politics in 
organizations 
N 
Mexico 
Regularly/ 
Frequently 
17.2% 
(86) 
9.6% 
(48) 
11.0% 
(55) 
Once in a 
While/ 
Never 
82.6% 
(413) 
90.4% 
(452) 
89.0% 
(445) 
Venezuela 
Regularly/ 
Frequently 
7.7% 
(40) 
6.9% 
(36) 
12.0% 
(62) 
Once in a 
While/ 
Never 
92.3% 
(475) 
93.1% 
(481) 
88.0% 
(452) 
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provides some interesting insight into the character of the 1978 presi-
dential campaign. 
During the 1978 election campaign the sophistication and variety of televised 
political communication were truly remarkable. Anyone watching Venevi-
sion, one of the two national commercial networks, on November 26, 1978-
a typical evening late in the campaign-was exposed to forty-one political 
advertisements between 8:00P.M. and 11:15 P.M. Each of the eleven adver-
tising breaks or "sets" also included an announcement from the Supreme 
Electoral Council with instructions on the mechanics of voting. The forty-one 
political advertisements, each lasting between fifteen seconds and five min-
utes, and the eleven Supreme Electoral Council messages were interspersed 
among the many advertisements for commercial products. In addition, the 
news and interview shows with political guests conveyed political messages. 
Even the casual viewer of Venezuelan television during the campaign could 
not have avoided encountering hundreds of political messages. 31 
The effect of increased use of television might be decreased face-
to-face campaigning in Venezuela if the experience of other countries 
is a guide. Even if rallies remain as common since the advent of 
television, participation may have dropped off if potential participants 
opt for television coverage in lieu of actual participation. By contrast, 
face-to-face campaigning is still utilized extensively in Mexico even 
by the PRI presidential candidate as a way to mobilize system support. 
96 Working-Class Mobilization 
These arguments should not be pushed too far, however, as face-to-
face campaigning is still extensively used in Venezuela, as in Mexico, 
and Mexican candidates also use the mass media. 32 
Levels of political protest are next examined. There is a variety 
of forms that unconventional participation might take outside the 
institutionalized electoral system. Edward Muller, for example, in-
cludes in his measure of aggressive political participation illegal 
strikes, refusal to pay taxes, seizure of buildings, willingness to fight 
police and demonstrators, and use of violence against the govern-
ment. 33 Because of the sensitivities of the marketing research firms 
that were contracted for these surveys, the more extreme forms of 
unconventional participation, such as those used by Muller, were not 
attempted. Only involvement in legal protest demonstrations was 
utilized. 
The number of workers who report participation in a legal dem-
onstration is very small for both national samples. Only 2.6 percent 
of Mexican workers and 6.5 percent of Venezuelan workers indicated 
that they had participated in a legal demonstration. It seems highly 
unlikely that the percentages would be higher for more "aggressive" 
or violent forms of participation. It is safe to assume that occurrence 
of all forms of unconventional participation is very low among the 
workers interviewed in 1979 and 1980. Furthermore, the number of 
strikes carried out by the unions in which these workers were affiliated 
is very low (chapter 2). 
Next, the levels of communal activism and particularized con-
tacting will be studied. The investigation of communal activism was 
limited to only one type of community problem-solving activity: mem-
bership in formal community organizations. Community problem 
solving can take place informally as well. In general, the data in table 
15 show that few workers in either country are members of these 
organizations, at least the ones examined. The data show far less 
community-oriented participation than often reported for lower-class 
populations in Latin America. For example, one study of six squatter 
settlements in Lima found that 73 percent of the residents "had co-
operated with other residents in some community improvement ac-
tivity."34 
Workers in this sample might have been less active in this mode 
because of greater economic security and access to government and 
union benefits than those enjoyed by more marginal peasant and 
urban squatter populations. These workers can generally secure, 
through their own personal resources or by access to government or 
union services, the goods and services that marginal groups must 
Patterns of Political Mobilization 97 
Table 15. Communal Activism among Mexican and Venezuelan 
Workers 
Mexico Venezuela 
Yes No Yes No 
Membership in parents' 
association 12.4% 87.6% 8.7% 91.3% 
N (62) (438) (45) (473) 
Membership in 
cooperative 2.8% 97.2% 21.8% 78.2% 
N (14) (486) (113) (406) 
Membership in 
neighborhood 8.6% 91.4% 5.0% 95.0% 
association 
N (43) (457) (26) (492) 
frequently secure by cooperative activity. Still, one cannot rule out 
the alternative explanation that low participation is simply an artifact 
of measuring activism only by formal community activity. 
With one exception Mexicans and Venezuelans appear to be 
equally inactive in community organizations. The one exception is the 
greater activity of Venezuelans in cooperatives. Venezuelan activity 
in this mode perhaps reflects the strength of cooperativismo in the 
metropolitan Barquisimeto area where many of these unions are lo-
cated. In Barquisimeto one finds numerous small business, consumer, 
credit, and transportation cooperatives. 35 
The levels of particularized contacting are examined last. Cor-
nelius reports a variation between 6 and 42 percent in the number of 
lower-class respondents contacting government in samples from 
Mexico, Peru, Brazil, and Chile. 36 In this sample of industrial workers, 
only 3 percent of the Mexican sample had contacted public officials. 
This figure is considerably less than the 25.8 percent reported by 
Cornelius or the 8.3 percent reported for Mexican urban areas in the 
Sidney Verba-Gabriel Almond five-nation study.37 Noticeably more 
Venezuelans reported contacting public authorities (11 percent). This 
figure falls within the range reported by Cornelius but toward the 
lower end of the continuum. This study also found that very few of 
these workers utilized services furnished by political parties to low-
income neighborhoods. Only 2.9 percent of the Venezuelans and 0.8 
percent of the Mexicans had ever utilized these party favors. 
How might the relative absence of particularized contacting in our 
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sample be explained? Again, the explanation lies with the relatively 
privileged position of industrial workers when compared to workers 
mired in the tertiary sector of third-world economies. While these 
industrial workers enjoy substantially lower incomes than do their 
counterparts in industrial countries, their income levels usually far 
exceed those of peasants and urban service sector workers in urban 
areas. Additionally, they receive a larger share of basic public ser-
vices. 38 Therefore, industrial workers have less need to petition gov-
ernment. To illustrate this point, workers in this sample can be 
compared to urban migrants interviewed by Cornelius in Mexico City. 
A total of 25.8 percent of his sample reported contacting government 
officials. Not surprisingly, most of these contacts made by urban 
squatters involved either security of land tenure or water supply. For 
workers in this sample, these were simply not problems. 39 
One can think of autonomous political mobilization in terms of 
(1) psychological capacity and (2) collective political action. It is clear 
that Venezuelan and Mexican workers interviewed for this study ex-
hibit the capacity for autonomous mobilization. They tend to be aware 
of the political environment and of antagonistic class interests. How-
ever, they tend to eschew collective political action and are politically 
inactive except for periodic voting. Furthermore, electoral support is 
extended to hegemonic parties rather than to leftist parties that have 
historically attracted working-class support in Western Europe. In 
short, Venezuelan and Mexican workers do not challenge hegemonic 
parties even though they believe that their interests have not been 
well served by the status quo. The next two chapters will try to provide 
a better understanding of why this situation exists. 
In closing, let us note one other point. The data indicate patterns 
of controlled mobilization for both Venezuelan and Mexican workers 
at the behavioral level. Nevertheless, the study found that Venezuelan 
workers are marginally more likely to engage in elite-challenging be-
havior than are Mexican workers. This is true for both protest and 
leftist voting. Here is the first indication that the type of regime affects 
working-class political mobilization. Elite-challenging participation is 
more likely to occur in Venezuela's competitive polity than in Mexico's 
authoritarian, semicompetitive polity. 
Chapter Six 
Political Control and 
Participatory Motivations 
Two types of political mobilization can occur: external and cognitive. 1 
External mobilization results when individuals otherwise lacking mo-
tivations to political participation in politics are drawn into partici-
pation by interest groups or political parties with which they are 
aligned. 2 Cognitive mobilization, on the other hand, occurs when 
individuals participate in politics based on their own long-term mo-
tivations.3 Cognitive mobilization involves two stages: (1) the acqui-
sition of long-term motivations and (2) the conversion of these 
motivations into specific political action. Typically, cognitive mobili-
zation is self-initiated, while external mobilization is normally guided 
participation. This chapter focuses on stage 1 of cognitive mobiliza-
tion, the acquisition of participatory motivations. 
Motivations to participate in politics can be issue-based or issue-
neutral. 4 Issue-based motivations derive from salient policy issues 
that capture the public's attention or from more abstract ideologies 
that stimulate them to political action. This chapter considers worker 
acquisition of an issue-based motivation, labeled concientizaci6n or 
critical consciousness. This motivation ought to be a prerequisite for 
workers to mobilize autonomously in pursuit of their collective in-
terests. Concientizaci6n has been defined as "a multifaceted orientation 
to the social order, rooted in an interpretation of the obvious social 
differences that exist in capitalist societies. Some workers may see the 
existing order as an organic, cooperative whole in which various social 
classes have their roles to fulfill, but in which all classes contribute 
to the functioning of the greater social whole. By contrast, other work-
ers may see the existing order as a system of domination in which 
certain social interests prevail in imposing costs on other social 
groups. Individuals who perceive a system of domination are exhibit-
ing what is herein called critical consciousness."5 
Motivations to participate can also be issue-neutral. Issue-neutral 
orientations are generally considered prerequisites for self-initiated 
participation in democratic polities and are seen as necessary for "par-
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ticipant citizenship."6 They include such orientations as political ef-
ficacy, civic duty, awareness of the relevance of government, and 
psychological involvement in politics. This chapter focuses on the 
latter variable also necessary if individuals are to engage in self-
directed political activity. Autonomous working-class mobilization is 
only possible if rank-and-file workers are attentive to the political 
environment and have some conception of their class interests. 
Chapter 5 established that Mexican and Venezuelan workers tend 
to be fully aware of antagonistic class interests but not particularly 
involved in politics. This chapter examines whether exposure to al-
ternative mechanisms or agents of control reduces critical conscious-
ness of the established sociopolitical order and attention to politics. 
Variables considered related to political control are analyzed. These 
include (1) membership in an incorporated union, (2) loyalty to a 
hegemonic party, and (3) satisfaction with government performance. 
Additionally, the extent to which opposition groups are able to foment 
these motivations among rank-and-file supporters is analyzed. As will 
be discussed, political control over mobilization involves not only 
effective cooptation by hegemonic organizations but also enervation 
of the opposition groups' mobilizational capabilities. 
Last, relationships between relevant personal characteristics (so-
cioeconomic status and age) and psychological involvement in politics 
are explored to determine whether personal resources lead Venezue-
lan and Mexican workers toward attention to politics. Incapacity to 
convert personal resources into increased psychological involvement 
in politics would constitute further evidence of effective political con-
trol over working-class potential for cognitive mobilization. Before 
turning to data analysis, two theoretical issues will be discussed: (1) 
how various control mechanisms might affect the capacity of workers 
to acquire participatory motivations and (2) how the capacity of work-
ers to convert personal resources into psychological involvement in 
politics might be conditioned by the political environment. 
Obreros concientizados by definition perceive potential conflict be-
tween their interests and those of higher classes and of political elites. 
To prevent the emergence of such workers, hegemonic parties and 
incorporated unions may try to preempt negative images by identi-
fying closely with the lower classes. Hegemonic organizations, as 
found in Venezuela and Mexico, identify with reform or revolutionary 
traditions and promise to continue such traditions. The underlying 
message to the lower classes is that the existing state-capitalist state 
serves the interests of all social classes comprising the national com-
munity. This message is reinforced by distribution of national benefits 
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and services to clientele groups. Of course, dominant parties, par-
ticularly their labor sector, and incorporated unions occasionally criti-
cize privileged groups and advocate reform. 7 However, the rhetoric 
and proposed reforms are generally designed to strengthen social 
pacts with labor and, thereby, to preempt radical movements.8 By 
identifying with lower-class interests, hegemonic organizations can 
help, nevertheless, to forestall workers from becoming critical of the 
existing order. 
In like manner, hegemonic parties and incorporated unions might 
discourage workers from psychological involvement in politics. If 
workers believe their interests are well protected by hegemonic or-
ganizations, they might believe that there is little benefit to be gained 
from political involvement. In addition, hierarchical and centralized 
patterns of authority in these organizations might create difficulties 
in gaining access to important officials (see chapter 4) and, thereby, 
discourage active political interest. 
Finally, psychological motivations for cognitive mobilization 
could be weakened by satisfaction with the performance of incumbent 
government. Satisfied workers would have reason to believe that their 
interests are well served by the existing state-capitalist order and that 
there is little need to devote attention to the world of politics, with 
trusted leaders and institutions already serving their interests. In sum, 
performance satisfaction might prevent the emergence of a critically 
conscious, politically attentive working class. 
Control mechanisms examined so far discourage workers from 
developing long-term motivations associated with political partici-
pation. Another facet of political control also deserves examination. 
Political control over mobilization can also be asserted by weakening 
opposition groups as agents of cognitive mobilization (Chapter 1). 
Lacking patronage resources, they must frequently try to promote 
self-generated political activity by instilling in their members con-
sciousness of group interests and attention to the political universe. 
Several factors might explain why opposition groups fail as agents 
of cognitive mobilization. These groups may lack resources for ex-
tensive political resocialization of rank-and-file members. Addition-
ally, access to the mass media and educational institutions might be 
monopolized by hegemonic institutions. Finally, opposition groups 
could be weakened by an ineffective or coopted leadership more 
interested in self-gain than in professed political objectives.9 
Evelyne Stephens and John Stephens have shown that leftist or-
ganizations do occasionally serve as vehicles for cognitive mobiliza-
tion of the working class in third-world capitalist regimes. They make 
102 Working-Class Mobilization 
clear how this phenomenon occurred in the case of Michael Manley's 
People's National party in Jamaica. They assert: 
During the 1970s, Jamaica achieved considerable prominence on the inter-
national level through forceful advocacy of the New International Economic 
Order and because of externally visible repercussions from internal social and 
economic changes. Both internationally and nationally, the importance of 
ideological programmatic, as opposed to the previous nonprogrammatic, 
clientelist politics increased. The move toward ideological politics and the 
related development of a mass party formed an integral part of the People's 
National Party's (PNP) democratic socialist development project. Making a 
deliberate attempt to generate consensus among the party leadership on the 
new development model and to educate the rank and file about contemplated 
changes was a necessary feature, insofar as the political strategy for the pursuit 
of this path required the buildup of a programmatic mass party and the 
replacement of patronage-based political loyalties with ideologically-based 
loyalties. 10 
This chapter investigates the extent to which leftist parties and 
autonomous unions in Mexico and Venezuela foment concientizaci6n 
and psychological involvement in politics. A comparison of the Vene-
zuelan and Mexican cases is particularly interesting because of the 
contrasting electoral settings, with Venezuela providing a more com-
petitive electoral system. Thus, one can study the impact of the larger 
electoral setting on the capacity of opposition groups to enhance cog-
nitive mobilization among the working class. 
Another facet of political control is manifested in the capacity of 
citizens to convert personal resources into psychological involvement 
in politics. In the abstract there are a number of reasons why personal 
characteristics, in particular age and socioeconomic status, might lead 
to greater psychological involvement in politics. Possession of socio-
economic resources, including education, can easily be imagined to 
stimulate interest in politics as well as the belief that one can be ef-
fective politically. Economic security, working in an intellectually 
stimulating occupation, or possessing analytical skills imparted by 
education should facilitate psychological attraction to and involve-
ment in the political process. The data from the Verba, Nie, and Kim 
seven-nation survey support this interpretation. In all seven coun-
tries, those who have most socioeconomic resources consistently ex-
hibit high psychological involvement in politics. 11 Similarly, age might 
enhance attention to politics; greater maturity may increase one's at-
tention to and psychological involvement in politics. 
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But does conversion of personal resources into psychological in-
volvement in politics occur irrespective of the wider political context? 
It is plausible that potentially capable citizens might see little reason 
to be attentive to politics if opportunities to influence policies and 
decisions are minimal. If the political context affects motivations in 
this manner, more conversion of personal resources into psychologi-
cal involvement in politics should occur among Venezuelan than 
among Mexican workers. This hypothesis provides a partial test of 
whether or not the conversion of personal resources into political 
attention is influenced by the wider political context. 
The data analysis will involve an examination of (1) how the type 
of union membership influences the participatory motivations of Ven-
ezuelan and Mexican workers in this sample, (2) how partisanship is 
related to participatory motivations, (3) how evaluations of incumbent 
performance are related to these motivations, and (4) the extent to 
which Mexican and Venezuelan workers convert personal resources 
into increased psychological involvement in politics. 
Are workers belonging to incorporated unions less likely to ac-
quire motivations to participate than are nonunionized workers and 
workers belonging to autonomous unions? Conversely, does mem-
bership in an autonomous union help workers to develop participa-
tory motivations? The first point to consider is the extent to which 
the acquisition of concientizaci6n by industrial workers in this sample 
was contingent on the type of union to which they belonged. 
In table 16 standardized regression coefficients (betas) that mea-
sure the impact of type of union membership on concientizaci6n are 
reported. 12 It is readily apparent that neither membership in an in-
corporated nor in an autonomous union is related significantly to 
levels of concientizaci6n. Whether workers in this sample are critical 
of the existing sociopolitical order has little to do with the type of 
union (incorporated versus autonomous) with which they are affiliat-
ed. 
These conclusions are supported by the multiple classification 
analyses reported in figure 2. Here, the type of union is disaggregated 
according to location in either a strategic or a nonstrategic industry 
(see chapter 1). In this analysis the sample of nonunionized workers 
can be considered a control group with which to compare samples of 
unionized workers. A quasi-experimental design is also approximated 
by adjusting the deviations from the grand mean of the dependent 
variable for socioeconomic status and age. Thereby, possible sources 
of confounding variation can be controlled in analyzing the effects of 
0 
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Figure 2. Union Membership and Level of Concientizaci6n 
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Note: Multiple Classification Analysis, controlling for socioeconomic status, age, and 
partisanship. 
union membership on concientizaci6n. The results of the multiple clas-
sification analysis also demonstrate that unions with ties to hegemonic 
parties do not inhibit rank-and-file workers from becoming critical of 
the existing socioeconomic order. Workers are likely to exhibit similar 
levels of concientizaci6n regardless of the type of work setting in which 
they are located. This is shown by the weak beta of .13 as well as by 
the patterns of deviations reported in figure 2. 
Next, this study considers how union incorporation affects the 
propensity of workers to become attentive to national politics. The 
results in table 16 show that the type of union with which Venezuelan 
and Mexican workers are affiliated has little effect on attention to 
politics. There are modest relationships in the expected direction for 
Mexican workers, with workers in incorporated unions being less 
attentive to politics and workers in autonomous unions more attentive 
to politics. However, these relationships are too modest to conclude 
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Table 16. Labor Unions and the Acquisition of Motivations to 
Participate: Regression Analyses 
Beta Coefficient 
105 
Psychological 
Involvement in 
Politics Concientizaci6n 
Mexico 
Membership in 
incorporated union 
autonomous union 
r2 change 
Venezuela 
Membership in 
incorporated union 
autonomous union 
r2 change 
-.11 
.08 
.03a 
.03 
-.03 
.00 
-.03 
-.03 
.00 
.04 
.06 
.00 
Note: Socioeconomic status, age, partisanship, and performance evaluation are con-
trolled. In analyzing determinants of psychological involvement in politics, concienti-
zaci6n is controlled. 
asignificant at the .01 level. 
that union incorporation accounts well for low levels of attention to 
national politics on the part of Mexican workers. 
The Multiple Classification Analyses (MCA) reported in figure 3 
provide a more complete picture of how Mexican and Venezuelan 
unions affect the attentiveness of workers to the world of politics. 
The MCA analysis for Venezuelan workers (figure 4) helps to account 
for the previous findings of weak relationships between membership 
in an incorporated or an autonomous union and psychological in-
volvement in politics. The determining factor in whether or not Ven-
ezuelan workers become attentive to politics is not whether they 
belong to an incorporated or an autonomous union but whether or 
not they belong to a union located in a strategic industry (figure 3). 
Unionized workers in Venezuela's oil fields are likely to become more 
psychologically involved in politics than are unionized workers in 
nonstrategic industries. This relationship holds up for oil workers in 
both autonomous and incorporated unions. 
These findings suggest that the type and size of the enterprise in 
which Venezuelan workers are employed determines in part whether 
they become attentive to politics. Workers in larger, more capital-
intensive industries may be more aware of their collective capability 
106 Working-Class Mobilization 
Figure 3. Union Membership and Psychological Involvement in 
Politics 
0 
Nonunion Auto./ 
Nonstrategic 
Ven 
Auto./ 
Strategic 
beta= .47 
r2= .30 
lncorp./ 
Nonstrategic 
lncorp./ 
Strategic 
Note: Multiple Classification Analysis, controlling for socioeconomic status, age, and 
partisanship. 
to capture the attention of state authorities. Thus, they have more 
incentive to pay attention to national politics than do workers in non-
strategic industries. In the case of Venezuelan oil workers, one should 
also recognize that these workers are employed in a nationalized in-
dustry. Public sector employment may well have heightened their 
attention to national politics. 
This same relationship between employment in a strategic in-
dustry and psychological involvement in politics does not hold up for 
Mexican workers. 13 Workers in strategic Mexican industries exhibited 
low levels of psychological involvement in politics (figure 3). The 
Mexican findings suggest that workers in strategic industries do not 
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inevitably believe that they can gain the attention of state authorities. 
If the political system is relatively closed, as in Mexico, workers in 
strategic industries may believe that the state cannot be compelled to 
act on their behalf. 
What is striking about the Mexican data (figure 3) is that the level 
of psychological involvement in politics in three out of four union 
subsamples is lower than for the nonunionized subsample. The ten-
tative conclusion to be drawn is that Mexican unions, whether in-
corporated or autonomous, tend to discourage workers from attention 
to the world of politics. As such, both incorporated and autonomous 
unions appear to blunt cognitive mobilization by industrial workers. 
Unions in Mexico may serve a control function similar to that observed 
for grass-roots organizations in other authoritarian regimes. They di-
vert attention from the national scene by focusing attention at the 
local level. 14 
In sum, data analysis provides very little, if any, support for the 
proposition that corporatist-interest intermediation inhibits workers 
from acquiring participatory motivations. Likewise, union autonomy 
does not facilitate acquisition of such motivations. Union linkages to 
hegemonic parties in Venezuela and Mexico, therefore, cannot ade-
quately account for the relative absence of cognitive mobilization by 
the industrial workers interviewed for this study. 
The findings do suggest, nevertheless, that unions in Venezuela 
and Mexico are significant agents for political socialization. Mexican 
unions, with one exception, tend to inhibit worker attention to poli-
tics. On the other hand, unionized workers in the Venezuelan oil 
fields are likely to be politically attentive. The tradition of political 
activism in the Venezuelan oil fields15 might account in part for this 
finding. However, there is no evidence that unions in this industry 
promote a critically conscious work force. The same is true for all 
unions examined for the study, suggesting that Venezuelan and Mexi-
can unions are unlikely to promote any type of radical political action. 
The next point to examine is how partisanship affects the acqui-
sition of participatory motivations. First, one must assess how par-
tisanship is related to levels of concientizaci6n exhibited by Venezuelan 
and Mexican workers. Table 17 shows beta coefficients for hegemonic 
and leftist partisanship. For both samples partisanship exerts a 
stronger influence on concientizaci6n than does type of union mem-
bership (compare table 16 with table 17). It is particularly striking to 
note that hegemonic partisanship is related differently to concienti-
zaci6n in Venezuela than in Mexico. Partisans of Mexico's PRI are 
significantly less critical of the existing order than are other Mexican 
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workers (beta - .18, table 17). By contrast, partisans of AD and 
COPEI in Venezuela tend to be slightly more critically conscious than 
other workers (beta = + .05, table 17). How might these differences 
be explained? It may be that Venezuelan workers are more exposed 
to a wider variety of critical perspectives in election campaigns than 
are Mexican workers. The Venezuelan electoral context provides for 
more open discussion of issues and criticism of the incumbent per-
formance than does Mexico's semicompetitive electoral system. Thus, 
it is more difficult for hegemonic parties in Venezuela to generate 
contentment with the status quo among industrial workers. 
Table 17 shows that concientizaci6n is significantly higher among 
leftist workers than among other workers. This finding is to be ex-
pected, but it underscores the importance of leftist partisanship for 
the formation of a critically conscious industrial work force. Again, it 
is clear that leftist partisanship is a far more important determinant 
of concientizaci6n than is affiliation with an autonomous union. 
In the Multiple Classification Analysis reported in figure 4, the 
deviations of various subsamples of Venezuelan and Mexican parti-
sans from the mean on the concientizaci6n scale are reported. Here, 
deviations have not been adjusted for the performance evaluation 
variable as was done in the regression analysis. 16 Consequently, the 
differences between partisan subsamples are greater than they appear 
in the regression analysis (table 17). 
Contrasts between Venezuelan and Mexican workers become 
more apparent in the MCA analysis. The PRI appears to be more ef-
fective than AD and COPEI in Venezuela in preventing working-class 
supporters from becoming critical of the existing order. Furthermore, 
leftist workers in Venezuela are more critical than are leftist workers 
in Mexico. Thus, the data indicate that the larger electoral context 
affects the capability of political parties to suppress or promote work-
ing-class concientizaci6n. Limited competition increases the likelihood 
that hegemonic parties will suppress concientizaci6n among working-
class supporters and that leftist parties will be less successful in de-
veloping obreros concientizados. 
Let us now turn to an analysis of the relationship between par-
tisanship and psychological involvement in politics. The data analysis 
in table 17 shows that partisans of both hegemonic parties and of the 
left in Venezuela are more likely to be attentive to politics than are 
nonpartisans. These results are consistent with findings from other 
competitive electoral systems that show nonpartisans to be disinter-
ested in politics.17 Interestingly, no such relationship is found among 
Mexican workers in this sample. To the contrary, PRI supporters tend 
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Table 17. Partisanship and the Acquisition of Motivations to 
Participate: Regression Analyses 
Beta Coefficient 
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Psychological 
Involvement in 
Politics Concientizaci6n 
Mexico 
Partisanship: 
Hegemonic party -.06 -.18a 
Leftist party .04 .13a 
r2 change .01 .o6a 
Venezuela 
Partisanship: 
Hegemonic party .12a .05 
Leftist party .17a .19a 
r2 change .03a .03a 
Note: Type of union membership, age, SES, and performance evaluation variables are 
controlled. In analyzing psychological involvement in politics, concientizaci6n is con-
trolled. 
asignificant at the .01 level. 
to be slightly less psychologically engaged in politics than other work-
ers (beta = - .06, table 17). In contrast to the Venezuelan results, 
leftist partisanship produces virtually no increase in political atten-
tiveness among Mexican workers (beta = + .04, table 17). These results 
suggest that the absence of meaningful partisan competition in Mexico 
produces a type of disengaged partisanship particularly among sup-
porters of the ruling PRI. 
The effects of restricted partisan competition are even more apparent 
in the Multiple Oassification Analysis (figure 5). As before, deviations 
of partisan groups have not been adjusted for performance satisfaction 
and concientizaci6n as in the regression analysis. Neither the opposition 
parties of the right nor those of the left in Mexico are as capable as the 
Venezuelan left in sustaining political attentiveness among rank-and-file 
partisans.18 Furthermore, the PRI is more likely to restrain attention to 
politics among its working-class supporters than is AD or COPEI in Ven-
ezuela. Oearly, the degree of partisan competition is an important de-
terminant of working-class attentiveness to the political environment. 
Restricted partisan competition decreases the likelihood that partisan-
ship will generate a politically aware work force. 
Satisfaction with the performance of incumbent governments is 
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Figure 4. Political Party Affiliations as Determinants of Concientizaci6n 
0 
No 
Party 
Dominant 
Party a 
Center-
Right Party a 
beta= .44 
r2 = .21 
Ven 
Left 
Party a 
Note: Multiple Classification analysis, controlling for age and socioeconomic status. 
"Dominant Parties: Venezuela, AD and COPEI; Mexico, PRI. Center-Right Parties: 
Mexico, PAN, PARM, and PDM. Leftist Parties: Venezuela, MAS, MEP, MIR, and 
PCV; Mexico, PCM, PPS, PST, and PMT. 
yet another mechanism that might impede workers from acquiring 
participatory motivations needed for autonomous mobilization. The 
analytic task is twofold. First, how are evaluations of incumbent per-
formance related to participatory motivations-namely, psychological 
involvement in politics and concientizaci6n. Second, levels of satisfac-
tion with performance must be examined. Obviously, satisfaction 
with performance does not contribute to control if workers are, in 
fact, dissatisfied with government performance. 
The reader interested in knowing more about technical details 
about operationalization of performance evaluation is referred to the 
Appendix. Suffice it to note here that workers were asked to evaluate 
the performance of the then current national administration and the 
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Figure 5. Political Party Affiliations as Determinants of Psychological 
Involvement in Politics 
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Note: Multiple Classification analysis, controlling for age and socioeconomic status. 
•see note to figure 4. 
previous administration in several policy areas. 19 Factor analysis re-
vealed that Mexican workers structured their evaluations around the 
following policy areas: urban services, public education, and eco-
nomic redistribution. On the other hand, Venezuelan workers struc-
tured their evaluations around the presidential administrations of 
Carlos Andres Perez (1973-78) and Luis Herrera Campins (1978-83). 
Table 18 shows that for both samples evaluations of government 
performance are more closely related to concientizaci6n than to psy-
chological involvement in politics. In contrast to relatively strong re-
lationships between concientizaci6n and performance evaluation, the 
relationships between performance evaluation and psychological in-
volvement in politics is quite weak for both samples. However, there 
is an indirect relationship between performance satisfaction and psy-
chological involvement in the case of Mexican workers. Performance 
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Table 18. Performance Evaluation and Motivations to Participate: 
Regression Analyses 
Mexico 
Evaluation of urban services 
Evaluation of education 
Evaluation of economic 
redistribution 
Venezuela 
Evaluation of Andres Perez 
Evaluation of Herrera Campins 
r2 change 
Beta Coefficient 
Psychological 
Involvement in 
Politics Concientizaci6n 
-.na -.23a 
.12a -.12a 
.02 .o9a 
-.01 -.11 
.06 -.17a 
.00 .osa 
Note: Partisanship, type of union membership, SES, and age are controlled. 
8 Significant at the . 01 level. 
satisfaction tends to lower concientizaci6n. In turn, low concientizaci6n 
leads to lower attention to politics on the part of Mexican workers 
(table 18). 
In sum, if Venezuelan and Mexican workers are satisfied with 
incumbent performance, they are less likely to become critical of the 
existing sociopolitical order. Satisfied Mexican workers are also less 
likely to be attentive to politics so long as they have not developed a 
critical consciousness. The question then becomes how satisfied were 
Mexican and Venezuelan workers with government performance at 
the time of the interviewing in 1979 and 1980. 
Workers were asked to evaluate the performance of the incumbent 
and previous president in the areas of law enforcement, public hous-
ing, jobs creation, public transportation, and public education (table 
19). Summative indices of performance evaluation for both current 
and previous presidents were constructed. Each index ranged from 
0 to 20, the most favorable evaluation of performance. A mean score 
below 10, the absolute midpoint on the scale, indicated a negative 
assessment of performance. Workers in both countries in every type 
of industry and in every type of union evaluated the performance of 
both the previous and the then current president negatively. Every 
mean score reported in table 19 is below the midpoint on the index. 
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As I have shown elsewhere, that discontent with performance was 
manifested among both economically privileged and nonprivileged 
workers alike. 20 
Clearly, political elites in both countries did not impede cognitive 
mobilization by keeping workers content with government perfor-
mance. A great deal of discontent was evident among this sector of 
the working class. Indeed, the relatively high-level concientizaci6n ob-
served among these workers is, in part, related to discontent with 
regime performance. As shown elsewhere, preemptive reforms at-
tempted by the Echeverria and Lopez Portillo governments in Mexico 
failed in their intended effect of regenerating popular support for 
government policies. 21 The data suggest that the attempted reforms 
of the Andres Perez administration in Venezuela during the seventies 
also failed in this respect. 
The last issue to be addressed is how the larger regime context 
affects the capacity of workers to convert personal resources into psy-
chological involvement in politics. The research of Verba and others 
has shown that citizen attention to politics is not shaped entirely by 
the political environment. To the contrary, socioeconomic status and 
age have been found to be powerful determinants of psychological 
involvement in politics. The implications of this research are clear. 
Demographic changes and improvements in living standards among 
the lower class could result in a significant increase in the aggregate 
level of attentiveness to politics. An older, more affluent work force 
should be more politically attentive. Interestingly, the trend through-
out the sixties and seventies in Latin America was toward greater 
literacy and higher real wages, at least for industrial workers. Ac-
cordingly, the work force may have become more politicized, thereby 
creating problems for the maintenance of political control. While lack-
ing the data to test this proposition, the more restricted hypothesis-
that conversion of personal resources into psychological involvement 
in politics is contingent on the nature of the underlying regime-can 
be tested. 
Table 20 shows that attentiveness to politics among Venezuelan 
workers is highly contingent on age and socioeconomic status. The 
level of psychological involvement in politics exhibited by Mexican 
workers is not contingent on their age or socioeconomic status level. 
In the case of Mexican workers, primarily the critically conscious are 
likely to become psychologically involved in politics. In other words, 
only the more militant Mexican workers pay much attention to poli-
tics. 
~ 
Table 19. Worker Evaluations of the Performance of Recent Presidents 
Mexico Venezuela 
Non unionized/ Unionized Non unionized/ Unionized 
Evaluation of Nonstrategic Nonstrategic Strategic Nonstrategic Nonstrategic Strategic 
performance Industries Industries Industries Industries Industries Industries 
Incorp. a Auto. Incorp. Auto. Incorp. Auto. Incorp. Auto. 
Incumbent 
presidentb 
mean 7.93 8.03 7.35 7.68 7.26 3.95 4.83 4.49 6.47 4.93 
standard 
deviation (4.88) (4.58) (2.63) (4.68) (4.38) (3.21) (3.76) (4.10) (3.98) (3.91) 
N (99) (100) (100) (100) (95) (83) (99) (99) (94) (94) 
Previous 
presidentb ~ 
mean 5.76 5.07 5.01 5.13 5.14 4.82 4.99 5.00 7.98 6.71 ..., Q. 
standard :::l <C 
deviation (5.53) (4.66) (2.33) (3.94) (4.34) (4.12) (3.87) (4.01) (5.24) (5.39) () 
ar N (99) (100) (99) (100) (97) (85) (100) (100) (95) (97) (/) (/) 
•Jncorp. = Incorporated union; Auto. = Autonomous union s: 0 
bRange (0-20) g N. 
~ 
0 
:::l 
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Table 20. Personal Resources vs. Other Determinants of 
Psychological Involvement in Politics: Regression Analyses 
Beta Coefficients 
Mexico Venezuela 
Issue-based motivations 
1. Cocien tizaci6n .23a .08 
2. Evaluation: 
Urban service (M) 
Andres Perez (V) - .1la -.01 
Economic redistribution (M) 
/Herrera Campins (V) -.02 .05 
Education (M) .12a 
r2 change .06a .01 
Organization-based motivations 
1. Partisanship 
PRI/AD/COPEI -.06 .12a 
Left .04 .17a 
2. Union membership 
Incorporated -.11 .03 
Autonomous .08 -.03 
r2 change .03a .03a 
Resource-based motivations 
1. SES .02 .48a 
2. Age -.06 .12a 
r2 change .00 .22 
Total r2 .10 .32 
asignificant at the .01 level. 
The Venezuelan results are consistent with what Verba, Nie, and 
Kim found in other competitive political systems. The Mexican results 
are not. Why not in Mexico? 
The Mexican political system is obfuscatory and somewhat con-
fusing to all in Mexico, no matter how much income or time they 
have available or regardless of the analytical skills that might have 
been developed by formal education. Given the secrecy of the Mexican 
political system, making sense of what happens is often impossible, 
even for the educated. 22 Therefore, what would be a politically rele-
vant resource in some contexts is rendered useless in the secretive 
atmosphere of authoritarian Mexico, where authoritative political in-
formation is in short supply and (misleading) rumors are ever pres-
ent.23 
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In terms of other personal resources, age is weakly but signifi-
cantly related to psychological involvement in politics in Venezuela 
(beta = + .12) but not in Mexico. The Venezuelan data resemble data 
elsewhere in that cognitive involvement in politics seems to grow in 
response to life-cycle phenomena, with psychological attentiveness 
to the political process increasing as a function of age until the re-
tirement years. In Mexico that phenomenon cannot take effect because 
the political system becomes no more comprehensible with the pas-
sage of time or with personal maturity. 24 
These findings suggest that political elites in authoritarian polities 
might be better able to manage the political consequences of rapid 
socioeconomic transformations than can elites in more democratic 
polities. However, it should be kept in mind that depoliticization of 
the lower classes in Mexico's authoritarian polity depends on keeping 
the masses content with the status quo. By the late seventies, Mexican 
elites faced new difficulties in generating political support, and these 
problems have likely magnified in the eighties with Mexico's most 
severe economic crisis of this century.25 Furthermore, Mexico's au-
thoritarian polity contains fewer institutionalized electoral channels 
to absorb political discontent than more competitive polities such as 
the Venezuelan. 
These results show that the political environment shapes in im-
portant ways how a working-class population acquires motivations 
to participate in politics. The political environment can either facilitate 
the acquisition of motivations to participate or discourage citizens 
from participation in politics. To the extent that the latter occurs, 
cognitive mobilization is less likely to occur. Political mobilization is 
likely to be externally guided and, thereby, controlled by hegemonic 
organizations. 
What is surprising about these results is that corporatist interest 
intermediation is not the key feature of the political environment that 
inhibits workers from acquiring participatory motivations. Corporatist 
union structures do not account for weak parh\:ipatory motivations 
found among Venezuelan and Mexican workers. Unions matter but 
not in ways suggested by the literature on corporatism in Latin 
America. For example, evidence was found that unions in strategic 
industries in Venezuela foster greater psychological involvement in 
politics. On the other hand, both incorporated and autonomous 
unions in Mexico seem to deflect workers' attention from national 
politics. In no case do the data show that unions in either country 
promote a politically conscious, militant work force. 
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The degree of partisan competition shapes working-class partici-
patory motivations far more than do corporatist links between unions 
and hegemonic parties. Partisans of ruling parties are more likely to 
pay little attention to politics if they are located in the semicompetitive 
polity of Mexico rather than in Venezuela's competitive polity. Simi-
larly, "hegemonic partisans" are less likely to be obreros concientizados 
if located in the Mexican political system. In like manner, leftist work-
ers exhibit less psychological involvement in politics and concientiza-
ci6n if located in the semicompetitive polity of Mexico rather than in 
the competitive polity of Venezuela. 
These results cannot be explained adequately by differences in 
cognitive sophistication and performance satisfaction between Mexi-
can and Venezuelan workers. Workers in both countries are pro-
foundly skeptical about recent government performance and tend to 
be politically sophisticated. Furthermore, partisan loyalties do shape 
participatory motivations in the same manner regardless of the level 
of political sophistication and of performance satisfaction. 26 The more 
likely explanation is that meaningful partisan competition sharpens 
workers' attention to class interests in politics and to the political 
environment. Thus, cognitive mobilization of the working class be-
comes more possible in a competitive regime context. Conversely, 
restricted partisan competition decreases the likelihood of working-
class cognitive mobilization as it becomes more difficult for workers 
to sustain interest in politics and to cognize their interests in the 
political process. 
Chapter 7 considers how the control variables examined in this 
chapter affect actual political behavior, focusing on voter turnout. 
Worker involvement in demand-protest activities is not examined be-
cause of the infrequency of this type of behavior among industrial 
workers interviewed for this study. 
Chapter Seven 
Political Control and 
Electoral Mobilization 
Chapter 5 presented evidence of controlled political mobilization 
among Venezuelan and Mexican workers interviewed for this study. 
These workers tend to engage in little political activity beyond periodic 
voting. In fact, nonelectoral demand-protest activity is so low as to 
almost be a constant; therefore, it is not feasible to analyze empirically 
why these formal sector workers do not protest via nonelectoral 
means. However, one can analyze why these workers choose to vote 
in elections and why they tend to support hegemonic parties rather 
than leftist parties. These main questions are addressed in this and 
the following chapters. In this chapter the focus is on how workers 
are mobilized to vote. 
As discussed earlier, individuals come to participate in politics as 
a consequence of either external or cognitive mobilization. Similarly, 
voters are mobilized either by internalized motivations and resources 
or through ties to external organizations. The capacity of a regime to 
control and manipulate voting turnout is clearly related to the way 
voters are mobilized. External mobilization of voters facilitates control. 
Conversely, cognitive mobilization of voters lessens the capacity of 
the regime to manipulate voting turnout. If voting is largely guided 
by parties and interest groups, hegemonic parties should benefit be-
cause they, along with incorporated interest groups, should be able 
to turn out more voters than opposition parties and interest groups. 
Furthermore, external mobilization of voters protects ruling parties 
from a large "floating vote" that could threaten their hegemony. Con-
versely, cognitive mobilization makes possible an increase in "floating 
voters" that could strengthen opposition parties. 
Previous studies of working-class politics in Mexico and Vene-
zuela have emphasized the capacity of hegemonic parties and incor-
porated unions to turn out voters. Presumably, workers are often 
enticed to the polls via exchange relations established by clientelist 
networks. 1 Sometimes implicit is the notion that the lower classes lack 
the incentive and sophistication for active participation without these 
Political Control & Electoral Mobilization 119 
exchange networks. Similarly, the research of Verba, Nie, and Kim 
suggests that the working class generally lacks the motivation and 
capacity for active voting unless externally mobilized. 2 Thus, previous 
research leads one to expect that workers vote in Mexico and Vene-
zuela primarily as a result of external mobilization rather than as a 
consequence of their motivations or personal resources. 
The extent to which organizations mobilize individual workers to 
vote indicates the degree of externally guided political activation. This, 
in turn, facilitates controlled political mobilization. Conversely, the 
extent to which individuals are mobilized as a consequence of ac-
quiring motivations and resources indicates the degree of cognitive 
or self-directed mobilization. The degree to which electoral mobili-
zation is guided or self-directed will be examined empirically. Then 
the external mobilizing capability of hegemonic and opposition or-
ganizations will be compared. 
Mexican workers will be considered first. Are individual Mexican 
laborers mobilized to vote primarily through organizational affiliations 
or through personal resources and motivations? The answer to this 
question is made possible by the use of a scale to measure strength 
of institutional affiliation. This scale is similar to the one used by 
Verba, Nie, and Kim in their classic seven-nation study (see Appendix 
B). Regressing this scale and various measures of resources and mo-
tivations on a scale of voting participation produces the results re-
ported in tables 21 and 22. Additionally, regression coefficients for 
each type of labor union (autonomous versus incorporated) and each 
type of partisanship (hegemonic or leftist party) are presented. 3 
The data show clearly that workers in the Mexican sample vote 
primarily as a consequence of external mobilization, not as a conse-
quence of previously acquired participatory motivations or personal 
resources (table 21). The strongest determinant of voting participation 
for Mexican workers is strength of institutional affiliation (beta = + 
.18)4 and, in particular, affiliation with the PRI (beta = + .22). There 
is virtually no evidence that workers who have acquired motivations 
to participate or who possess facilitating resources are any more prone 
to vote than workers lacking in motivations or resources. To the con-
trary, there is some evidence that Mexican workers who have acquired 
participatory motivations or personal resources are less likely to vote 
than other workers. For example, issue-based motivations tend to 
slightly decrease voting by workers in Mexico. In fact, some discon-
tented workers engage in what might be called "protest abstention." 
Table 21 shows that critically conscious workers (beta = - .09) and 
those dissatisfied with urban services (beta = - .14) are less likely to 
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participate in elections. Some discontented workers apparently see 
more utility in abstention than in voting for opposition parties in 
Mexico's one-party dominant system.5 Likewise, there is little evi-
dence that workers attentive to politics participate any more actively 
in Mexican elections than the less attentive (beta = - .01). 
Nor does the availability of personal resources necessarily make 
voting more likely in Mexico. Age is weakly related to voting fre-
quency (beta = + .10). But notice that socioeconomic status is nega-
tively associated with voting (beta = - .14). In sum, Mexican workers 
are more likely to vote as a consequence of external mobilization rather than 
as a result of either cognitive mobilization or personal resources. 
Clearly, these results indicate that the mobilization of individual vot-
ers in Mexico is external, subject to control, and not a result of in-
dividual motivations. 
How about Venezuelan workers? Are they mobilized to vote pri-
marily through organizational affiliation or through personally ac-
quired resources and motivations? The data in table 22 show that 
external mobilization in Venezuela is not the dominant factor as in 
Mexico. External mobilization of voters does occur in Venezuela (beta 
= + .12 for strength of institutional identification). 6 However, voting 
is also a consequence of resources and cognitive mobilization. Age, 
for example, is a much stronger determinant of voting than is insti-
tutional affiliation (beta = + .31 for age; beta = + .12 for strength 
of institutional affiliation). Likewise, psychological involvement is a 
statistically significant predictor (beta = + .13) of voting participa-
tion. 
Significantly, critically conscious Venezuelan workers and those 
dissatisfied with Andres Perez's performance are more likely to vote 
than are the satisfied. The relationships are very weak but are in the 
opposite direction from those operating among Mexican workers. In 
fact, issue-based motivations generate little voting among either Mexi-
can or Venezuelan workers. But the modest effects observable are in 
opposite directions in the two countries. 
In sum, the data provide evidence of greater external mobilization 
of individual voters in Mexico than in Venezuela. Workers vote in 
Mexico primarily because of ties to the PRI, not because of resources 
or cognitive mobilization. Mexican workers who have acquired re-
sources and motivations needed for self-directed participation tend 
to withdraw from electoral participation. By contrast, evidence of 
more self-directed participation in elections is found among workers 
in the more competitive electoral system of Venezuela. These findings 
imply, then, that the larger electoral context influences the extent to 
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Table 21. Alternative Processes of Mobilization for Voting: Mexico 
Resources 
Age 
SES 
Cognitive mobilization 
Discontent with 
urban services 
public education 
economic performance 
psychological involvement in politics 
Critical consciousness 
External mobilization6 
r2 
Strength of institutional affiliation 
Party Id: 
PRI 
Left 
Membership in 
incorporated union 
autonomous union 
Multiple r 
•significant at .05 level 
Beta Coefficient 
-.14a 
-.03 
-.06 
-.01 
-.09• 
.22• 
.u• 
-.1s• 
.02 
.37 
.14 
bBeta coefficients shown for disaggregated measure also. These were not used in 
estimating other beta coefficients reported here. The Multiple R is calculated from the 
equation using strength of institutional affiliation. 
which working-class voting participation can be guided by ruling par-
ties rather than by being self-directed. Guidance of voting partici-
pation becomes more problematic when genuine competition exists 
and the incumbent party can be voted out of office. Under these 
conditions politically motivated workers, as in Venezuela, might see 
more reason to vote. 
Table 21 shows that the PRI can tum out Mexican voters more 
effectively (beta = + .22) than can leftist parties (beta = + .11). The 
virtual absence of self-directed voting combined with the strength of 
the PRI in turning out working-class voters must surely contribute to 
PRI's electoral hegemony. By contrast, dominant parties in Venezuela, 
AD and coPEI, do not tum out their working-class supporters more 
effectively than leftist parties (table 22). The beta for dominant parties 
is merely + . 05 in Venezuela, while that for leftist parties is + .12, 
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Table 22. Alternative Processes of Mobilization for Voting: 
Venezuela 
Resources 
Age 
SES 
Cognitive mobilization 
Discontent with performance of Andres Perezb 
Psychological involvement in politics 
Critical consciousness 
Exteneral mobilizationa 
r2 
Strength of institutional affiliation 
Party Id 
AD/CO PEl 
Left 
Membership in 
incorporated union 
autonomous union 
Multiple r 
Beta Coefficient 
.313 
-.05 
.09 
.13c 
.05 
.05 
.12c 
.18c 
.13c 
.40 
.16 
3 Beta coefficients shown for disaggregated measure also. These were not used in 
estimating other beta coefficients reported here. The Multiple r is calculated from the 
equation using strength of institutional affiliation. 
bE valuation of Herrera Campins not used because most elections used in the voting 
scale occurred before his presidency. 
csignificant at .05 level. 
suggesting clear limits on the capacity of ruling parties in Venezuela 
to manipulate voting turnout. 
The Multiple Classification Analysis reported in figure 6 further 
reveals how different political parties mobilize working-class voters 
in Venezuela and Mexico. First, it should be observed that the left in 
Venezuela's competitive polity is more effective than the left in Mexi-
co's semicompetitive polity in turning out voters. However, note that 
the center-right parties in Mexico, particularly the PAN, are consid-
erably more effective in mobilizing voters than the left. This apparent 
anomaly is almost entirely due to the strong voting turnout of PANista 
voters in Leon. Most likely, the autonomous union in the Leon factory 
maintains some type of informal ties with the PAN. 7 As noted in chap-
ter 2, the FAT union retains ties to the international Central Latina-
americana de Trabajadores (cLAT), which, like the PAN, is committed 
to the Christian Democratic ideology.8 When the Leon shoe workers 
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Figure 6. Political Parties and External Mobilization of Voters 
Mex 
0 
Independents Loyalty to Center-Right 
Hegemonic Party (Mexico) 
Party 
beta= .24 
r2: .21 
Leftist 
Party 
123 
Note: Multiple Classification Analysis, controlling for age and socioeconomic status. 
are excluded, PAN exhibits a significantly lower capacity to turn out 
voters. With the exception of PANistas in Leon, these results suggest 
more limited capacity of opposition parties to mobilize their long-term 
supporters in Mexico than in Venezuela. 
The data (figure 6) also indicate that partisanship is a more im-
portant prerequisite for voting in Mexico than in Venezuela. Non-
partisans are less likely to vote in Mexico's semicompetitive system 
than in Venezuela's competitive electoral system. This finding is con-
sistent with the previously reported finding of greater cognitive mo-
bilization of voters in Venezuela than in Mexico. Venezuelan workers 
need not be mobilized by parties as in Mexico. Individually acquired 
motivations and resources are sufficient conditions for active voting 
in Venezuela. 
Next, let us examine unions as agents for external mobilization 
of voters. The data provide little evidence that incorporated unions 
mobilize voters more effectively than autonomous unions in either 
country (tables 21 and 22). Still, there are significant differences across 
regimes. Both incorporated and autonomous unions in Venezuela 
engage in external voter mobilization. Relationships are still relatively 
modest (betas of + .18 and + .13, respectively), and incorporated 
unions enjoy only a marginal advantage in mobilizing capability over 
autonomous unions. In Mexico's case incorporated unions actually 
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Figure 7. Union Membership and External Mobilization of Voters 
Ven 
0 
Nonunion Auto./ 
Nonstrategic 
Auto./ 
Strategic 
beta= .33 
r2: .49 
lncorp./ 
Nonstrategic 
lncorp./ 
Strategic 
Note: Multiple Classification analysis, controlling for socioeconomic status, age, and 
partisanship. 
demobilize potential voters (beta = - .15), while membership in au-
tonomous unions has no effect on voting turnout (beta = + .02). 
These results indicate that Mexican unions, whether autonomous or 
incorporated, are ineffective in mobilizing voters. 
Multiple Classification Analysis of the impact of union member-
ship on voting participation makes it clear (figure 7) that Venezuelan 
unions, regardless of their incorporation status, are more likely to 
mobilize voters externally than are Mexican unions. None of the Mexi-
can unions, by contrast, appear to be very effective in turning out 
voters. In two cases the effect of union membership is to decrease 
the likelihood of voting in Mexican elections (figure 7). 
This analysis suggests a possibe complex interaction between de-
gree of union incorporation and type of industry in the case of Mexican 
workers. Autonomous unions are most likely to mobilize voters 
within strategic industries. Conversely, incorporated unions mobilize 
voters most successfully in nonstrategic industries (figure 7). Only in 
the case of workers in an autonomous union of a strategic industry, 
however, is the mean substantially above the mean for nonunionized 
workers. Therefore, there is little evidence that unions, except in lim-
ited situations, effectively turn out voters for Mexican elections. These 
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findings are clearly inconsistent with the conventional wisdom that 
incorporated unions in Mexico help to perpetuate the electoral he-
gemony of the PRI. 
The larger electoral context appears to be a more important de-
terminant of union capacity to mobilize voters than are ties to he-
gemonic parties. In neither country do incorporated unions exercise 
a significantly greater capacity to mobilize voters than do autonomous 
unions. Whether unions engage at all in external mobilization for 
voting seems to depend primarily on the context of electoral com-
petition. Where that context provides for partisan turnover on a regu-
lar basis, as in Venezuela, both incorporated and autonomous unions 
are likely to turn out their members on election day. By contrast, all 
unions appear to have greater difficulty in mobilizing voters when 
electoral contests are overwhelmingly dominated by one party, as in 
Mexico. Political parties seem to activate voters in Mexico far more 
than unions do. 
Overall, these results suggest that limited partisan competition 
facilitates the capacity of a hegemonic party to influence voting turn-
out to its advantage. In Mexico's semicompetitive polity, virtually no 
evidence of cognitive mobilization of voters was found. The strongest 
determinant of voting was found to be PRI partisanship. By contrast, 
external voter mobilization by hegemonic parties in Venezuela ap-
peared weaker. Evidence of cognitive mobilization of Venezuelan vot-
ers was found. 
An alternative hypothesis to explain these cross-national differ-
ences is that Mexican workers are mired in an authoritarian, working-
class culture. In other words, the explanation for the differences found 
may be cultural rather than structural. However, two problems arise 
with the cultural explanation. First, as noted in chapter 5, workers in 
both Venezuela and Mexico exhibited relatively high levels of political 
sophistication. Other studies have demonstrated that Mexican po-
litical culture is far more democratic than is the political system. 9 
Second, the data show that Mexican workers who have acquired po-
litical motivations and resources tend to be active in nonelectoral ac-
tivities. 
Participation in community organizations (communal activism) is 
such a nonelectoral activity. While the relationships are generally 
weak (r2 = + .07), there are some interesting contrasts with voting. 
The data in table 23 show that some weak external mobilization of 
communal activists (beta = + .11) exists among workers in Mexico 
and that mobilization is done primarily by the PRI and incorporated 
unions (betas of + .07, respectively). But it should also be noted that 
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Table 23. Alternative Processes of Mobilization for Communal 
Activism: Mexico 
Resources 
Age 
SES 
Cognitive mobilization 
Discontent with 
urban services 
public education 
economic performance 
psychological involvement in politics 
Critical consciousness 
External mobilizationb 
Strength of institutional affiliation 
Party ld 
r2 
PRI 
Left 
Membership in 
incorporated union 
autonomous union 
Multiple r 
"Significant at .05 level. 
Beta Coefficient 
.01 
.01 
.os• 
.17• 
.02 
.o7• 
.00 
.07 
.26 
.07 
bBeta coefficients shown for disaggregated measure also. These were not used in 
estimating other beta coefficients reported here. The Multiple r is calculated from the 
equation using strength of institutional affiliation. 
there is also some statistically significant cognitive mobilization to 
communal activity as well. Note that workers who are psychologically 
involved in politics or discontent with government economic perfor-
mance tend to become communal activists (betas of + .17 and + .08, 
respectively). Neither of these variables was significantly related to 
voting. Psychologically involved and discontented Mexican workers 
might well perceive greater utility in communal activities than in vot-
ing. The former represents a self-help approach to problem solving, 
whereas the latter represents an attempt at directive political partici-
pation in a system resistant to direction from below. 
In general, cross-national differences in electoral mobilization 
might better be explained by differences in political structures rather 
than in political culture. How then does one account for the greater 
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mobilizing capability of the Mexican PRJ when compared to Vene-
zuela'S AD and COPEJ? 
One possible explanation is that the PRI possesses greater pa-
tronage resources with which to mobilize voters than either AD or 
COPEI. However, the data present problems for this interpretation. 
Chapter 5 made it clear that industrial workers interviewed for this 
study almost universally do not depend on the party for access to 
public services and benefits. 10 The next chapter will show that in-
corporated unions exercise relatively little influence over the electoral 
choice of workers, even though these organizations are directly in-
volved in the delivery of public goods. Thus, it seems that hegemonic 
parties do not depend on the delivery of benefits and services by 
incorporated unions to turn out voters. 
The capacity of the PRJ to mobilize voters might depend more on 
containing the potential for cognitive mobilization among its parti-
sans. Suppression of cognitive mobilization, in turn, is related to lim-
ited partisan competition and turnover. Cognitive mobilization of 
voters occurs to the extent that realistic opportunities exist to remove 
the incumbent party from power. If such opportunities do not exist, 
as in Mexico, the cognitively mobilized citizenry may see little to be 
gained by voting. Mexican voters are more likely to be relatively apo-
litical partisans of the ruling party. They can be counted on to cast 
only a perfunctory vote for the PRI. 11 On the other hand, the cogni-
tively mobilized worker in a competitive polity, such as in Venezuela, 
may see some utility in voting so long as the incumbent party can be 
removed from power. Such voters decrease the number that can be 
externally mobilized by parties. Hence, external mobilization of voters 
seems to occur less in Venezuela's competitive electoral system than 
in Mexico's semicompetitive system. 
In light of the cross-national differences in relationships between 
partisanship and voting, the relationships between union member-
ship and voting for the Venezuelan and Mexican samples are curious. 
Unions, not parties, mobilize voters in Venezuela; parties, not unions, 
mobilize voters in Mexico. How does one explain this seeming 
anomaly? As indicated earlier, the explanation cannot be that parties 
are agents of patronage in Mexico, while unions are sources of pa-
tronage in Venezuela. The more likely explanation is related to pene-
tration of partisan politics into internal union politics in Venezuela 
but not in Mexico. Internal partisan politics in Venezuelan unions 
might cause workers to be more sensitive to partisan politics outside 
the union and thus more likely voters than nonunionized workers. 
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Additionally, unionized workers in Venezuela might be more exposed 
to electoral campaigns than nonunionized workers because partisan-
structured unions are a natural target for campaigning. Conversely, 
the lack of conflictual partisan politics within Mexican unions may 
weaken their external mobilizing capacity. 
This chapter has presented further evidence that control over 
working-class political mobilization in Venezuela and Mexico may 
depend more on restricted partisan competition than on clientelist 
structures operating through corporatist interest associations. Re-
stricted partisan competition as found in Mexico weakens the mobilizing 
capability of unions; consequently, only the ruling PRJ can effectively 
turn out voters. No such advantage accrues to hegemonic parties in 
Venezuela's competitive electoral system. As we have seen, restricted 
competition also helps to explain why cognitively mobilized workers 
in Mexico, unlike those in Venezuela, do not become active voters. 
The capability of the PRI to mobilize industrial workers does not seem 
to hinge on clientelist networks but on perpetuating a type of dis-
engaged partisanship explored more fully in the next chapter. Spe-
cifically, chapter 8 will examine why interviewed workers tend to 
deliver their vote to hegemonic parties. 
Chapter Eight 
Political Control 
and Electoral Choice 
The fundamental issue to be addressed in this chapter is why indus-
trial workers in this sample tend to vote for hegemonic parties com-
mitted to the prevailing state-capitalist model of development rather 
than for leftist parties committed to socialist strategies of develop-
ment. The purpose of this study is to identify control mechanisms 
within the inclusionary political systems of Mexico and Venezuela 
that enable centrist ruling parties to maintain their hegemony and to 
suppress system-challenging mobilization among lower-class popu-
lations. This chapter explores how (1) corporatist interest interme-
diation, (2) restricted partisan competition, and (3) satisfaction with 
government performance contribute to working-class support for he-
gemonic parties rather than for leftist parties. To do so, I shall examine 
how (1) partisanship, (2) evaluations of incumbent performance, and 
(3) labor union membership are related to voting behavior. 
Before examining relationships between partisan loyalty and elec-
toral choice, the nature of partisanship exhibited by workers in this 
sample is first examined. The early research of the University of Michi-
gan team of social scientists assumed that partisanship is a long-term 
attachment (or loyalty) to a party formed during early childhood. As 
such, it guides individual voting behavior unless short-term forces 
related to issues or to candidate image lead to defections from un-
derlying partisan loyalties. 1 This view of partisanship, however, has 
come under considerable criticism in recent studies. It has been shown 
that partisan loyalties of voters may be less stable and shaped more 
by short-term forces than previously thought. 2 Additionally, partisan 
loyalties may simply reflect more fundamental social and religious 
cleavages in society. 3 These revisionist studies have not established 
that partisanship is an empirically and theoretically meaningless con-
cept but rather that the nature of partisanship can be variable. Thus, 
it is important to understand what party loyalty means to voters if 
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one is to interpret intelligently the relationship between partisanship 
and electoral choice. 
Three types of partisanship can be identified: (1) an early sociali-
zation-based partisanship, (2) an issue-based partisanship, and (3) a pa-
tronage-based partisanship. 4 The first type is that developed in the early 
University of Michigan studies. The second type, an issue-based par-
tisanship, is contingent on consistency between an individual's issue 
and candidate preferences and partisan preference. A patronage-
based partisanship is contingent on access to party patronage re-
sources. Such partisanship ought to be found in the context of party 
machines and typically among lower-class populations that depend 
on such machines. 
Unfortunately, data are lacking to assess fully the nature of the 
partisan loyalty exhibited by workers in this sample. However, the 
data provide some limited insight into the nature of partisanship of 
workers in this sample. 
First, recall that these workers received virtually no personal bene-
fits or public services directly from the party. While a patronage-based 
partisanship might be pervasive among informal sector workers in 
both countries, 5 it may be less common among formal sector workers 
who do not depend on the party for the delivery of personal goods 
and services. Still, it might be premature to dismiss patronage-based 
partisanship as altogether irrelevant in the case of Mexican workers. 
Table 24 shows that the delivery of urban services is more closely 
linked to PRI partisanship than are evaluations of public education 
and of economic performance. Perhaps, these differences reflect the 
type of issues over which Mexican workers believe that they can ex-
ercise influence. Mexican workers may believe that macroeconomic 
policy decisions are beyond their influence as these decisions are gen-
erally formulated by top-level technocrats with minimal citizen input. 6 
On the other hand, the delivery of urban services may be associated 
with politicos who broker services in exchange for electoral support 
for the PRI. Thus, loyalty to the PRI on the part of these workers may 
be partly contingent on the delivery of urban services. However, this 
loyalty does not likely depend on the delivery of personal services as 
may be the case with the more economically vulnerable members of 
the lower class. 
To what extent are the partisan loyalties of workers shaped by 
their retrospective evaluations of government performance? The latter 
variable represents a type of "short-term" force that, if partisanship 
is formed by early socialization, should have little influence on par-
tisanship. Table 24 shows how various performance-evaluation scales 
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Table 24. Partisan Structuring of Performance Evaluations 
Mexico 
Urban Public Economic Partisan 
Loyalty Services Education Performance 
PRI 
PAN 
Left 
Partisan loyalty 
AD 
CO PEl 
Left 
.1s• 
.01 
-.17• 
Andre Perez 
Government 
.10· .02 
-.12· -.03 
-.16a - .1s• 
Venezuela 
Herrera Campins 
Government 
Note: Pearson correlations. Operationalization of evaluation scales are found in Ap-
pendix B. 
•significant at the .01 level. 
are related to partisan loyalty among Venezuelan and Mexican work-
ers. 
Two findings are particularly noteworthy. First, leftist partisans 
in both the Mexican and Venezuelan samples are more dissatisfied 
with government performance than are other workers (table 24). This 
finding suggests a significant issue-based component to leftist parti-
sanship in both the authoritarian and democratic polity. Second, it is 
clear that hegemonic partisanship is more likely to structure evalua-
tions of performance among workers in the democratic polity of Vene-
zuela than in Mexico. This difference can be explained by the fact that 
partisan loyalty ought to be a more important cue for evaluating policy 
performance in genuinely competitive electoral systems. In sum, an 
issue-based partisanship might be more commonly found among work-
ers where there is meaningful partisan competition. By contrast, a 
socialization-based partisanship might be more typical of workers in 
semicompetitive electoral systems. While this interpretation seems 
plausible, it is not possible to test these hypotheses fully with these 
data. 
One other point about hegemonic partisanship in the case of 
Venezuelan workers needs to be noted. Interestingly, partisans of 
hegemonic parties in Venezuela do not tend to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the incumbent opposition party negatively. AD partisans in 
this sample did not evaluate the performance of COPEI president, Luis 
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Herrera Campins, any more negatively than did other workers (beta 
= .00, table 24). Perhaps, a different picture would have emerged 
after the 1982 economic crisis, but the data are lacking to assess this 
possibility. In like manner, COPEI partisans were only slightly more 
likely to evaluate negatively the performance of the Andres Perez 
administration than were other workers (beta = - .07, table 24). The 
tendency of voters in two-party systems to view parties in nonbipolar 
terms has been noted in other national contexts. 7 The lack of bipolar 
perceptions of Venezuela's two major parties should facilitate more 
shifting of party loyalties than would be the case if the two major 
parties were viewed as polar opposites. 
Last, I reiterate the earlier point about the disengaged nature of 
hegemonic partisanship in the case of Mexican workers. Hegemonic 
partisans who vote in Mexico's semicompetitive polity exhibit little 
interest in politics (chapters 6 and 7). By contrast, hegemonic partisans 
in Venezuela tend to be interested in politics, though not to the degree 
exhibited by leftist partisans (chapters 6 and 7). 
Purposes of political control are clearly served better by the type 
of partisanship exhibited by Mexican workers. Loyalty to the PRI leads 
to perfunctory voting with minimal psychological involvement in poli-
tics or attention to government performance. By contrast, hegemonic 
partisans in Venezuela are likely to be attentive to politics and to form 
their partisan loyalties consistent with their assessments of perfor-
mance. Hence, hegemonic partisans in Venezuela have greater po-
tential to become autonomous participants in the political process than 
do their counterparts in Mexico. 
The next point to examine is how partisan loyalty is related to 
electoral choice. Obviously, partisan loyalty does not guide voting 
behavior unless such loyalties have been formed. Thus, the distri-
bution of party loyalties is examined in order to ascertain the number 
of partisans and nonpartisans. The data show a large number of non-
partisan workers in both the Venezuelan and Mexican samples (table 
25). Indeed, nonpartisans are the single largest category for both sam-
ples. It becomes important, therefore, to examine not only how par-
tisanship shapes voting behavior but also the voting patterns of 
non partisans. 
Tables 26 and 27 analyze the effects of partisanship on recent 
electoral choice8 and show how two different types of partisans and 
nonpartisans voted in recent elections. Of particular interest are any 
observable tendencies of party loyalists to cross over and to vote for 
opposition parties. Overall, there is relatively little deviation, showing 
that party loyalty is a strong determinant of voting behavior. Not 
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Table 25. Distribution of Party Loyalties: Mexican and Venezuelan 
Workers 
Mexico Venezuela 
Frequency Frequency 
Distribution Distribution 
Party % Party % 
Hegemonic partya Hegemonic partr 
PRI 34.8 AD 10.8 
COPEI 22.0 
Rightist opposition• 
PAN 11.0 
PARM 0.8 
PDM 1.6 
Leftist opposition• Leftist opposition:• 
PPS 1.8 MAS 9.2 
PMT 2.2 MIR 5.5 
PST 1.4 MEP 5.9 
PCM 4.6 PCV 1.0 
LS 0.4 
Other parties 1.2 
No party loyalty 41.4 No party loyalty 44.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
•rhe complete names of these parties are found in tables 30 and 31. 
surprisingly, partisanship was found to be the strongest determinant 
of electoral choice for both Mexican and Venezuelan workers in the 
regression analyses. 9 
Observed patterns of deviations from party loyalties that do occur 
can be explained by the nature of partisan competition in these two 
political systems. First, note that there is virtually no deviation from 
party loyalties in the case of supporters of hegemonic parties. This 
pattern can be observed among both the Mexican and Venezuelan 
samples (tables 26 and 27). By contrast, deviations from party loyalties 
are more apt to occur among supporters of minor opposition parties. 
Interestingly, there is a perfect correlation between overall electoral 
strength of the party and amount of deviant voting in the case of 
Mexican workers. It is particularly important to note that deviations 
from opposition party loyalties occur more among Mexican workers 
than among Venezuelan workers and that the PRI is more likely to 
benefit than are COPEI or AD in Venezuela. 
In sum, minor opposition parties in Mexico's semicompetitive 
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Table 26. Partisan Loyalty and Electoral Choice in the 1979 Mexican 
Legislative Races 
Party Loyalty 
Minor 
Leftist Rightist 
PRJ PAN Parties Partiesa Nonpartisan 
Electoral choice: 
PRJ 96.3% 13.7% 17.1% 18.1% 61.2% 
PAN 2.4 84.3 4.9 9.1 24.8 
Leftist party 1.2 1.9 75.6 0.0 10.9 
Minor rightist 
party 0.0 0.0 2.4 72.7 3.1 
Total deviationb 3.6% 15.6% 24.4% 27.2% 
NT 164 51 41 11 129 
3 Minor rightist parties include PARM and PDM. Leftist parties include PPS, PMT, 
PST, and PCM. 
bThe percentage of party loyalists who voted for another party. 
electoral system seem to be less able to retain the support of their 
long-term supporters than are their counterparts in Venezuela's com-
petitive electoral system. Furthermore, opposition partisans who do 
deviate are more likely to switch to a hegemonic party if they are 
situated in Mexico rather than in Venezuela. These findings suggest 
that opposition parties confront difficulty in preventing defections 
where party competition is re~tricted. This weakness on the part of 
opposition parties in Mexico clearly contributes to the continuing elec-
toral strength of the PRI among industrial workers in this sample. 
Nonpartisan workers are studied next. Keep in mind that these 
voters comprise a very large bloc of voters in both samples (N = 128 
for Venezuela, N = 129 for Mexico; see tables 26 and 27). The results 
show that a large percentage of the nonpartisan vote goes to hege-
monic parties in both cases. The capacity of hegemonic parties to capture 
this vote is certainly a major factor in explaining their electoral strength among 
industrial workers. It is probable that the dominant position of these 
parties accounts for their success in attracting electoral support from 
non partisans. Given the unlikelihood of minor opposition parties win-
ning power, nonpartisans may see their options as either nonvoting 
or voting for hegemonic parties. In fact, a large number of nonpar-
tisans in both countries do not vote, as was shown in the previous 
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Table 27. Partisan Loyalty and Electoral Choice in the 1978 
Venezuelan Presidential Election 
Party Loyalty 
Leftist 
135 
AD COPEI Parties• No Party 
Electoral choice: 
AD 94.1% 1.0% 1.0% 17.2% 
COPEI 3.9 99.0 9.8 50.0 
Leftist party 1.9 0.0 2.0 26.6 
Others 0.0 0.0 2.0 6.3 
Total deviationb 5.8% 1.0% 12.8% 
N 51 98 102 128 
•Leftist parties include MAS, MIR, MEP, PCV, and LS. 
bThe percentage of party loyalists who voted for another party. 
chapter. Nonpartisans who do vote tend to vote for hegemonic par-
ties. 
One should also note that the Venezuelan left is able to capture 
a significantly larger share of the nonpartisan vote than is the Mexican 
left. This finding helps to explain why a larger percentage of Vene-
zuelan workers in this sample support the left than do Mexican work-
ers (chapter 5). Greater opportunities for the Venezuelan left than for 
the Mexican left to gain a share of power via proportional represen-
tation might partially explain this difference. Another factor is the 
absence of a strong opposition on the right in Venezuela. The presence 
of the PAN in Mexico dearly helps to deflect some opposition voting 
away from the left. 
Overall, the influence of partisanship on voting behavior seems 
to be very much conditioned by the larger electoral system. In electoral 
systems with more restricted partisan competition as in Mexico, one 
is likely to find (1) fewer defections from the ruling party, (2) a type 
of disengaged partisanship on the part of supporters of the ruling 
party, (3) the ruling party capturing a large share of the nonpartisan 
vote, and (4) more defections by loyalists of opposition parties to the 
ruling party. 
There is an expanding literature that examines how perceptions 
of economic conditions and of government management of the 
economy influences voting behavior. 10 In these studies the effects of 
perceived macroeconomic conditions, of perceived personal economic 
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conditions, and of evaluations of government management of the 
economy on voting behavior have been investigated. 11 In general, 
these studies have shown that evaluations of incumbent management 
of the economy are a major determinant of whether voters support 
the incumbent party. 12 Perceptions of personal economic and of gen-
eral macroeconomic conditions, however, have been found to have 
little direct effect on voting behavior. 
This chapter investigates the effects of retrospective evaluation of 
incumbent performance on the electoral choices of Mexican and Vene-
zuelan workers. In addition, the effects of workers' assessments of 
personal economic conditions on voting behavior are examined. Per-
formance-evaluation scales were devised by using factor analysis for 
each national sample. The factor analysis shows that Mexican workers 
did not differentiate the performance of presidents Luis Echeverria 
and Jose Lopez Portillo. Rather, respondents differentiated three 
policy areas: economic performance, public education, and urban ser-
vices (see Appendix B). By contrast, Venezuelan workers differen-
tiated the performance of AD president, Carlos Andres Perez, and 
COPEI president, Luis Herrera Campins. 
The Mexican sample was analyzed to see how workers' evalua-
tions of urban services, of public education, and of economic perfor-
mance affected their electoral choice in the 1979legislative races. The 
1976 presidential election was not used because of the possibility of 
greater recall error and also because of PANS failure to nominate a 
presidential candidate. 13 In the case of Venezuelan workers, the ef-
fects of evaluations of Andres Perez's performance on electoral choice 
in the 1978 presidential election were analyzed, as well as the effects 
of evaluations of Herrera Cam pins's performance on electoral choice 
in the 1979 municipal elections. These presidents were the respective 
incumbents at the time of these elections. Additionally, assessments 
of expected future social mobility and perceived past mobility were 
also analyzed in order to determine if workers are sensitive to personal 
economic conditions when deciding for which party to vote. 14 Also 
included in the regression analysis were a broad range of other pos-
sible determinants of voting behavior in order to avoid specification 
problems.15 
The purpose of the regression analyses is to assess how perfor-
mance satisfaction shapes working-class support for hegemonic par-
ties. Additionally, it was necessary to find out if worker discontent 
with the performance of hegemonic parties leads to support for leftist 
parties. Thus, two important facets of political control can be inves-
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tigated: (1) the extent to which satisfaction with regime performance 
accounts for electoral support for hegemonic parties and (2) the extent 
to which leftist parties can capitalize on working-class discontent with 
incumbent hegemonic parties. 
Tables 28 and 29 show beta coefficients for retrospective evalua-
tions of incumbent performance and for perceived social mobility. 
First, it should be noted that perceived social mobility, whether per-
ceptions of past mobility or expected future mobility, did not influence 
how either Venezuelan or Mexican workers voted in the 1978 and 1979 
elections. These findings are consistent with previous research that 
shows perceptions of personal economic conditions to have little in-
fluence on voting behavior. 16 These findings are inconsistent with the 
"labor aristocracy thesis" that industrial workers in third-world capi-
talist countries tend to support hegemonic parties because of satis-
faction with their own personal economic situation. 
The next item to examine is how retrospective evaluations of per-
formance affect working-class voting behavior. Tables 28 and 29 reveal 
rather dramatic differences between Mexican and Venezuelan work-
ers. Note that Mexican workers satisfied with government perfor-
mance were not necessarily prone to support the PRJ in the 1979 
elections. The only variable that achieves statistical significance is 
evaluation of urban services (beta = .10). Discontent with perfor-
mance is, at best, weakly converted into electoral support for oppo-
sition parties. As we have seen, workers were discontent with 
government performance at the time of the interviewing, yet this 
discontent did not lead to significant voting for either the PAN or for 
leftist parties. 
Unfortunately, the 1976 presidential election in Mexico cannot be 
used for reasons previously discussed. Hence, it is impossible to 
assess whether these results are simply an artifact of using a low-
stimulus legislative election in the analysis. Fortunately, the Vene-
zuelan data provide a usable high-stimulus and low-stimulus election. 
The results in table 29 show that evaluations of incumbent per-
formance significantly affect the voting behavior of Venezuelan work-
ers. Note that how workers evaluated the performance of the AD 
incumbent, Carlos Andres Perez, strongly influenced whether or not 
they voted for AD in the 1978 presidential election (beta = .38). Simi-
larly, how workers evaluated the performance of the COPEI admin-
istration of Luis Herrera Cam pins significantly influenced whether or 
not a ballot was cast for coPEI candidates in the 1979 municipal elec-
tions (beta = .21). Clearly, performance evaluation is a stronger de-
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Table 28. Perceived Social Mobility, Retrospective Evaluation of 
Government Performance, and Electoral Choice in the 
1979 Mexican Legislative Races: Standardized Regression 
Coefficients 
Voted for 
PRI PAN Left 
Evaluation of urban services .lOa -.03 -.05 
r2 change (.Olt (.00) (.00) 
Evaluation of public education .06 .03 -.04 
r2 change (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Evaluation of economic performance .04 .04 -.09 
r2 change (.00) (.00) (.01) 
Expected future mobility -.02 .00 -.02 
Perceived past mobility -.09 .03 .05 
r2 change for two mobility 
indicators (.01) (.00) (.00) 
Note: Each evaluation of performance variable was entered in separate equations to 
avoid any multicolinearity problems. The r2 value for social mobility indicators is based 
on equation in which evaluation of urban services was entered. Type of union, socio-
economic status, age, and ideological identification (left, center, or right) were used as 
controls. Partisanship was not used, because of multicolinearity problems that were 
particularly severe in the case of Venezuelan workers. 
asignificant at the .05 level. 
terminant of electoral choice in a high-stimulus presidential race, but 
even in municipal races, these assessments influence how workers 
vote. 
Let us next examine how Venezuelan workers tend to express 
political discontent. For both the 1978 and 1979 elections, discontented 
Venezuelan workers were more prone to vote for the "out" hegemonic 
party rather than for a leftist party (table 29). The left was clearly 
better able to capitalize on discontent in the more visible presidential 
election of 1978 than in the 1979 municipal elections, though ironically 
the left fared better nationally in the 1979 than in the 1978 elections. 
What do these findings reveal about how working-class political 
mobilization is controlled? Clearly, performance satisfaction is not a 
reliable mechanism for generating electoral support for incumbent 
parties in either country. Performance satisfaction has little effect on 
how Mexican workers vote. It does influence whether Venezuelan 
workers support the incumbent party. However, performance satis-
faction must generate only limited electoral support for an incumbent 
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Table 29. Perceived Social Mobility, Retrospective Evaluation of 
Incumbent Performance, and Electoral Choice in 
the 1979 Municipal Elections and 1978 Presidential 
Election in Venezuela: Standardized Regression 
Coefficients 
Voted for 
AD COPEI Left 
1978 1979 1978 1979 1978 1979 
Evaluation of 
performance of 
Andres Perez .38a -.17a -.12a 
r2 change (.12)a (.03)a (.01)a 
Evaluation of 
performance of 
Herrera Campins - .19a .21a -.05 
r2 change (.03)a (.04t (.00) 
Expected future mobility -.01 .11 .07 -.02 -.04 -.03 
Perceived past mobility -.02 .07 .04 .00 -.04 -.00 
r2 change for 
two mobility 
indicators (.00) (.02) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Note: Controlling for socioeconomic status, age, type of union, and ideological iden-
tification (left, center, right). See note in table 23 as to rise of ediological identification. 
•significant at the .05 level. 
party among these workers given that discontent with performance 
is pervasive. 
These results are revealing as to why leftist parties in both coun-
tries confront difficulty in capitalizing on working-class discontent 
with state capitalism. Discontent is high but not strongly converted 
into electoral support for the left. 17 In the case of Venezuelan workers, 
there is a tendency to convert discontent into support for the "out" 
hegemonic party rather than into support for the left. This pattern 
observed among workers in this sample has likely been repeated on 
the national level where the "out" hegemonic party has defeated the 
incumbent party in all presidential elections since 1963.18 In the case 
of Mexican workers, discontent is simply not channeled into the elec-
toral arena. Workers in both countries are not likely to convert dis-
content into leftist voting since the left does not provide a viable 
alternative to hegemonic parties. 
Before leaving this topic, one should recognize that these results 
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Table 30. Percentage of Mexican Workers Identifying Parties with 
Correct Spatial Label 
Identifying Socialist Party with Left 
Mexican Communist Party (PCM) 
Socialist Workers Party (PST) 
Mexican Workers Party (PMT) 
Popular Socialist Party (PPS) 
Identifying Center/Right Party with Right 
Party of the Institutional 
Revolution (PRI) 
National Action Party (PAN) 
Authentic Party of the Mexican 
Revolution (P ARM) 
Mexican Democratic Party (PDM) 
76.2 
68.8 
38.2 
54.8 
76.8 
61.4 
67.6 
38.0 
are not simply an artifact of partisanship. While partisanship could 
not be controlled because of multicolinearity problems, ideological 
identification, a variable that is highly correlated with partisanship, 
could be controlled. 19 Thus, the study has indirectly controlled for 
partisanship. The findings reported are not a result of partisans re-
acting favorably to their party and adversely to other parties. 
Additionally, it should be noted that the failure of discontented 
workers to vote for the left is not simply a result of their lack of political 
sophistication. Sophistication is shown by comprehension of spatial 
labels and capacity to apply them to political parties. 
To assess comprehension of spatial labels, workers were asked to 
explain the meaning of "left" and "right." Responses were dichoto-
mized as either comprehensible or incomprehensible (including don't-
know responses). Comprehensible does not mean that workers impart 
well-developed abstract ideological content to those labels. Few 
citizens anywhere exhibit this ability. 20 Rather, a response was con-
sidered comprehensible if respondents accorded some meaning to the 
term that accorded with conventional usage. For example, if there-
spondent defined "left" as being against the government or pro-
workers, the response was considered comprehensible. 
Using this criterion, 64.7 percent of the Venezuelan sample could 
impart comprehensible meaning to the label"left." Seventy-two per-
cent of this sample could impart meaning to the label "right." An 
equally high percentage of Mexican workers could impart meaning 
to these terms: 75.8 percent of the Mexicans understood the term left 
and 72.6 percent understood the meaning of right. 
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Table 31. Percentage of Venezuelan Workers Identifying Parties 
with Correct Spatial Label 
Identifying Socialist Party with Left 
Electoral Movement of the People (MEP) 
Movement toward Socialism (MAS) 
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) 
Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) 
Identifying Center/Right Party with Right 
Democratic Action Party (AD) 
Christian Democratic Party (COPEI) 
75.5% 
86.7% 
91.7% 
91.3% 
88.8% 
89.8% 
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Turning next to the capacity of workers to apply spatial labels to 
parties, tables 30 and 31 show that Venezuelan laborers are clearly 
more able than Mexican workers to label correctly various parties 
representing different positions on the ideological continuum. This is 
not unexpected, given differences in political contexts and in the his-
tory of recognition of opposition parties. 21 Only two Mexican parties 
were not recognized correctly by a majority of Mexican workers: the 
Mexican Workers Party and the Mexican Democratic Party. The latter 
is a small, right-wing party whose influence is largely restricted to a 
small geographic area. The former is a small, then recently formed, 
left-wing party that did not field candidates in the 1979 legislative 
races. 22 Overall, the percentages are relatively high for both samples. 
Indeed, the results are comparable to those reported for advanced 
industrial countries. 23 
Not only do workers in this sample tend to comprehend generally 
what leftist parties are about but also to adopt points of view com-
patible with the left. Elsewhere we have shown that only a very few 
of these workers adopt a laissez-faire view of government regulation, 
and most favor either government ownership of industry or else gov-
ernment regulation of industry. 24 In sum, the data suggest that the 
structural weakness of leftist parties and their competitive disadvan-
tage vis-a-vis hegemonic parties better accounts for the lack of work-
ing-class support for the left. It is clearly not a case of working-class 
conservatism or the presence of a "working-class culture" that stymies 
industrial workers from supporting the left in Venezuela and Mexico. 
Many political analysts, including Lenin, have recognized the 
dual role of labor unions in capitalist economies. Labor unions can 
assume a short-term economistic role in seeking to maximize labor's 
immediate benefits through collective bargaining. They can also per-
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form a longer-term political role by seeking to maximize the collective 
political power of labor. Political power permits labor to influence 
electoral outcomes (or nonelectoral processes of leadership selection), 
thereby structuring the public-policy choices made by political lead-
ers. 25 This distinction in union roles corresponds to what William 
Form labels job unionism versus political unionism. 26 Political union-
ism may be manifested in a highly militant or more moderate form, 
depending on attitudes toward the existing sociopolitical system. Juan 
Felipe Leal, for example, differentiates "anti-capitalist unionism" from 
"conciliatory unionism." The former seeks the elimination of capi-
talism via the "socialization of the means of production." The latter 
seeks "the defense of the interests of the workers ... from a base of 
collaboration with employers and with the state."27 
Left-wing parties in Western Europe have traditionally depended 
on formal and informal ties with organized labor in order to maximize 
their electoral strength. 28 Their electoral success often hinges on the 
capacity of the union movement to turn out the vote. The literature 
on corporatism in Latin America29 provides an explanation as to why 
unions have not served a similar function in this region of the world. 
Presumably, the union movement has been captured by hegemonic 
parties or else is controlled by the bureaucratic state, 30 all of whom 
are committed to delivering the union vote to hegemonic parties. The 
literature thus suggests that incorporated unions engage in a type of 
"political unionism" that is basically "conciliatory" in nature, de-
signed to prevent system-challenging mobilization. By contrast, "anti-
capitalist" political unionism ought to be found only among 
autonomous unions. Presumably, the leadership of these unions 
ought to be more militant and sympathetic toward labor's national 
allies on the left as these leaders have not been coopted or incorpo-
rated into structures of control. Thus, one would expect to find evi-
dence of greater leftist voting among members of autonomous unions. 
This section of the chapter analyzes (1) the extent to which in-
corporated unions deliver the vote to hegemonic parties and (2) the 
extent to which autonomous unions deliver the vote to leftist or other 
opposition parties. The data analysis will show that neither type of 
union decisively influences how rank-and-file workers vote. There-
fore, I shall discuss reasons for these findings, drawing both from 
qualitative interviews31 conducted among leaders of unions used for 
this study and from survey data on rank-and-file perceptions of their 
unions and their leaders. 
In assessing how unions influence voting behavior, one must be 
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cautious in using only raw percentages because these tell nothing 
about the extent of actual union influence on voting behavior. A par-
ticular distribution of electoral preferences within a given union may 
be an artifact of self-selection or of a particular distribution of indi-
vidual characteristics within the union population. To illustrate, leftist 
workers might conceivably seek out employment in industries or-
ganized by left-wing organizers. Unions might conceivably recruit a 
particular type of worker who is disposed to support leftist parties. 
Such unions might well produce a strong leftist vote without the union 
leadership undertaking to deliver the union vote to the left. Regres-
sion analysis allows one to avoid the problem with using raw per-
centages by holding constant individual characteristics in assessing 
the effects of union membership on voting behavior. 32 
The first point to examine is how unions influenced voting be-
havior in the 1979 legislative elections in Mexico. The raw percentages 
in table 32 indicate that support for the PRI tends to be higher in 
incorporated unions than in either autonomous unions or nonunion-
ized workplaces. However, the regression analysis in which indi-
vidual characteristics are controlled show that these unions exert 
minimal effect on worker support for the PRI (beta = .02, table 33). 
It is plausible that incorporated unions could exercise a strong indirect 
effect on voting behavior by shaping the attitudes and beliefs of work-
ers. However, the qualitative interviews with union leaders in Mexico 
suggest otherwise as does the data analysis reported in chapter 6. 
In like manner, the data provide no indication that autonomous 
unions deliver the vote to the left. The beta coefficient for the rela-
tionship between an autonomous union and leftist voting in the 1979 
elections is a weak .04, the same as for incorporated unions (table 
33). Table 32 does suggest, nevertheless, that Mexican unions may 
generally exercise a slight depressing effect on leftist voting. Notice 
that with one exception, the percentage of leftist voting is lower in 
all unionized settings than it is in the nonunionized setting. The one 
exception is the autonomous union in a strategic industry where the 
leftist vote is slightly higher than for nonunionized workers. In no 
case is there evidence that any of the Mexican unions deliver a sig-
nificant vote to leftist parties as commonly found in Western Europe. 
The Mexican data do provide one case in which unions clearly 
influence the voting behavior of rank-and-file workers. That case is 
the autonomous union in a nonstrategic industry (the shoe factory of 
Leon). Both tables 33 and 34 show that a sizable portion of this vote 
in the 1979 elections was delivered to PAN. The previous chapter sug-
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Table 32. Type of Union Membership and Electoral Choice in the 
1979 Mexican Legislative Races 
Type of Union Membership 
IncorEorated Union Autonomous Union 
Union/ 
Non- Nonstrategic Strategic Nonstrategic Strategic 
unionized Industry Industry Industry Industry 
Electoral choice 
PRI 56.5% 67.6% 81.1% 51.9% 61.4% 
PAN 17.6 14.8 10.4 39.5 18.2 
Minor 
rightist parties 10.6 1.4 0.0 0.0 3.4 
Left 14.1 12.2 7.7 8.6 15.9 
Null 1.2 4.0 3.9 6.0 1.1 
N 85 74 77 81 88 
Table 33. Union Membership and Electoral Choice in the 1979 
Mexican Legislative Elections: Standardized Regression 
Coefficients 
Membership 
Incorporated Autonomous 
Voted for Union Union R2 Change 
PRI .02 -.14b .o2b 
PAN -.04 .20b .o5b 
Left .04 .04 .00 
Note: Controlling for retrospective evaluations of performance, socioeconomic status, 
social mobility, age, and ideological identification. 
3 R2 value represents the percentage of variance explained by the union member-
ship variables. 
bSignificant at the . 05 level. 
gested that the FAT union may well maintain informal ties with PAN 
as both the union and party retain close ties with the Christian Demo-
cratic movement. 
Next, the influence of Venezuelan unions on the electoral choice 
of rank-and-file workers in the 1978 presidential race and 1979 mu-
nicipal races is examined. Particularly noticeable about the raw per-
centages shown in table 34 is the greater dispersion of electoral choice 
among nonunionized workers than among unionized workers. This 
would suggest union influence on individual electoral choice, leading 
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Table 34. Type of Union Membership and Electoral Choice in the 1978 
and 1979 Venezuelan Elections 
Type of union membership 
Non unionized Nonstrategic Strategic Strategic Industry Industry Industry 
Strategic 
Industry 
1978 1979 1978 1979 1978 1979 1978 1979 1978 1979 
AD 24.2% 28.3% 8.6% 6.3% 18.6% 18.2% 12.9% 12.3% 25.9% 9.3% 
COPEI 31.8 39.1 53.1 58.3 52.9 38.2 50.6 53.2 19.8 18.8 
Left 31.8 26.1 25.9 31.2 24.3 27.3 24.7 31.9 50.6 62.5 
Others 4.5 0.0 1.2 0.0 2.8 12.7 5.9 2.9 0.0 6.3 
Null 7.5 6.5 11.1 4.2 1.4 3.6 5.9 0.0 3.7 1.5 
N 66 46 81 48 70 55 85 47 81 64 
Note: 1978 presidential election; 1979 municipal election. 
to greater homogeneity in voting behavior within unions. However, 
the regression analysis shows that union influence on voting behavior 
is slight, though clearly present. Table 35 shows that members of 
incorporated unions were likely persuaded to vote for coPEI. How-
ever, this factor does not account well for coPEI electoral support in 
either the 1978 or 1979 elections, as shown by the weak r2 values. 
Leftist electoral strength is found only in the autonomous unions 
in the strategic oil industry (table 34). However, the regression analy-
sis (table 35) suggests that autonomous unions do not have a strong 
effect on rank-and-file voting behavior. These results suggest then 
that other factors might better account for strong electoral support 
for the left by petroleum workers in Venezuela's autonomous unions. 
In sum, Venezuela's unions do not appear to exert a strong in-
fluence on how rank-and-file workers vote. The data reveal that 
unions exercise some limited influence on voting behavior but clearly 
other factors are more important in explaining how Venezuelan work-
ers vote. Indeed, partisan and ideological identifications as well as 
evaluations of government performance are more decisive in deter-
mining how Venezuelan workers vote than is the type of union to 
which they belong. 
How might the incapacity of local unions in Mexico and Venezuela 
to influence voting behavior be explained? Interviews with local union 
leaders in Venezuela and Mexico reveal that greater priority is given 
to job unionism than to political unionism. This was the case for all 
union officials who were interviewed for this study. As will be shown, 
the primary mission of the union movement was seen to be the maxi-
mization of economic benefits. The leadership may have been reflect-
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Table 35. Union Membership and Electoral Choice in the 1978 and 
1979 Venezuelan Elections: Standardized Regression 
Coefficients 
Membership 
Incorporated Autonomous Rz 
Voted for Union Union Change a 
AD 
1978 -.06 -.01 .01 
1979 -.13 -.13 .01 
CO PEl 
1978 .13 .03 .01 
1979 .13 .06 .01 
Left 
1978 -.05 .03 .01 
1979 -.04 .09b .01 
Note: Controlling for retrospective evaluations of performance, SES, social mobility, 
age, and ideological identification. 
aR2 represents the percentage of variance explained by the union membership 
variables. 
bSignificant at the .05 level. 
ing not only the larger political environment, in which anticapitalist 
political unionism is risky, but also the wishes of rank-and-file work-
ers. 33 In fact, unionized workers in both countries overwhelmingly 
perceived the primary mission of their union in terms of strictly short-
term economistic goals. These attitudes are clearly shown in response 
to an open-ended question about the principal struggle of the union. 
A total of 91.4 percent of the Mexican workers mentioned either 
salaries or benefits; 67.4 percent of the Venezuelan workers men-
tioned these goals as the principal struggle of the union movement. 
Virtually no workers mentioned broad public policy objectives (0.3 
percent for both samples), and relatively few even mentioned contract 
negotiations (7.3 percent for the Mexican sample; 16.0 percent for the 
Venezuelan sample) or violations that involve government arbitration 
boards (1.0 percent for the Mexican sample; 14.9 percent for the Vene-
zuelan sample). It is interesting to note, however, that contract ne-
gotiations are more salient to workers in Venezuela than in Mexico. 
This may reflect less paternalistic labor relations in Venezuela. 
The presence of job unionism among both local union elites and 
rank-and-file workers helps to account for the lack of a strong union 
influence on voting behavior. The primary attention of rank-and-file 
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workers is not focused on politics. The same appears to be largely 
true for k>cal union leaders, as will be demonstrated, first for Mexico, 
then for Venezuela. 
In the two incorporated unions that were examined in Mexico, 
leaders viewed political mobilization as serving strictly short-term, 
utilitarian goals. The leaders of both unions admitted to seeking elec-
toral support for the PRI. However, in neither union was there any 
formal mechanism for ideological indoctrination, nor was there any 
systematic effort to shape political consciousness. The tie that bound, 
as is so often the case in Mexican politics, was instrumental rather 
than ideological. One of the members of the executive committee of 
the textile workers' union put it this way. "More participation is 
needed. It benefits the workers because they become familiar with 
those elements that represent them. Thus it is possible to propose 
things, to mention needs. On the other hand, one can be burned 
principally by supporting the wrong party."34 In both unions workers 
are cued by leaders to support the PRJ for instrumental reasons. The 
ties seem more subtle and implicit in the textile workers' union and 
quite overt in the case of the petroleras. Officials of both unions em-
phasized the absence of compulsion at the local level. They pointed 
out that some workers vote for opposition parties, principally for the 
National Action Party. Moreover, the leaders at Ayotla Textiles alleged 
that, in contrast to many other PRJ unions, workers were not mobilized 
for participation in progovernment demonstrations. 
Still, the Ayotla union was certainly partisan. A few low local 
union officials held ranking positions in the PRJ-dominated local muni-
cipio. These positions are not likely to be important policy-making 
positions. 35 Rather, they are more likely to be positions offered with 
a cooptative purpose in mind, that is, relatively minor positions al-
located by the PRJ to interest group leaders so as to keep them in line. 
The effect of this cooptation pattern is that union leaders are not likely 
to align with opposition parties but rather to support the PRJ so as to 
maintain access to privilege. Accordingly, they are highly unlikely to 
try to align their union with a leftist party. 
By contrast, Section 24 of the STPRM in Salamanca does formally 
endorse PRJ candidates from the local to the national level. Section 24 
leaders dutifully support the official endorsements made at the na-
tional level of the union. With the STPRM strict, centralized control is 
exercised by a union leadership that maintains a tightly symbiotic 
relationship with the PRJ-government hierarchy. As noted in chapter 
2, the leadership does not hesitate to use repression and to impose 
strict control from above but combines the stick with very juicy carrots. 
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On the surface it would appear that the STPRM local would possess a 
high capacity for external mobilization. However, the data analysis 
indicates that this capacity may not be as effective as generally as-
sumed. 
Both of the Mexican incorporated unions limit their political role 
to conciliatory unionism. They give greater priority to job unionism 
than to political unionism in that they accept the existing distributional 
parameters within society and seek to maneuver for improvements 
within those limits. Political activity is only encouraged when needed 
to gain access to short-term benefits. 
But how about the autonomous unions that have recently received 
so much attention in Mexico? Do they seek to align with Socialist and 
Marxist parties or movements? Do they seek to become the vanguard 
of the working class? To the contrary, Mexico's autonomous unions, 
including those that were studied, 36 exhibit a tendency to shun formal 
entry into partisan politics. 37 While they may be militant and strike 
over local issues, they nonetheless engage primarily in job unionism. 
They may, as in the case of the Nissan union, challenge local rep-
resentatives of the political elite in order to attain autonomy for a local 
union. However, they generally eschew any permanent alliances with 
external organizations. Their only links are with independent labor 
confederations, which themselves eschew overt partisan connections. 
At most, the independent local unions engage in sporadic solidarity 
strikes with other unions or in demonstrations sponsored by leftist 
parties.38 
The reasons given by autonomous union leaders for eschewing 
partisan politics are that workers' interests would not be well served. 
The union delegate in the leather-goods local in Leon stated: "We 
believe that politics should not be mixed with unionism. We think it 
is prejudicial for the workers. Take the case of what is occurring in 
Poland as evidence. "39 A similar view was expressed by a union of-
ficial at the Nissan plant in Cuernavaca. "Parties are not beneficial 
for the unions. They should not be inside of unions because they 
would handle grievances for political motives instead of protecting 
the interests of the workers."40 
Mexico's autonomous unions are willing to forego political union-
ism for enhanced job unionism. This implicit bargain implies that they 
are seeking autonomy from the state but not autonomy to transform 
the state. Their bargain is consistent with the leadership's stated view 
that improvement in the short-term conditions of employment is the 
primary purpose of the union movement. Alignment with the left 
offers little or nothing for achieving these goals. Leftist parties are in 
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no position to deliver on material benefits. They are also unlikely to 
produce systemic transformation. Therefore, autonomous union lead-
ers see the possibility of alignment with the partisan left as only risking 
disunity among their followers. Such disunity could only undermine 
the collective bargaining power of the union. Leaders of autonomous 
unions are also likely to be aware of the severe costs imposed on 
dissident unions that have overstepped the boundary of permissible 
behavior in the past. So while their conciliatory unionism may be 
more militant than that of the leaders of incorporated unions, they 
are not really seeking to supplant Mexican state capitalism, nor are 
they challenging the nature of the Mexican polity itself. 
Before turning to Venezuelan leaders, we should note the special 
case of the FAT union in Leon. As shown, union leaders denied any 
mixing of partisan politics and union affairs. However, the data analy-
sis indicated that this union clearly influenced workers to vote for the 
PAN. While one can only conjecture, it appears that ties between the 
union and PAN are largely covert and informal. Indeed, the leaders 
may perceive greater security in this arrangement than in more formal 
links to the PAN. Here it should be noted that labor ties are not with 
the left but with a center-right opposition party. Furthermore, this 
union is located in a small, nonstrategic industry and in a provincial 
city. Thus, no threat is posed to PRI hegemony in this isolated case 
of limited political unionism. 
The local Venezuelan labor leaders who were interviewed were 
also more attuned to job unionism than to political unionism. Their 
primary concerns were with collective bargaining and with obtaining 
improved benefits for workers. In contrast to Mexican leaders, how-
ever, they tended to see partisan activity as normal activity for labor 
leaders and for workers. As a general rule, Venezuelan leaders tended 
to be skeptical of the value of overtly political activity by unions. They 
did not see politics as highly useful in generating material bene-
fits for workers or in improving other working conditions. Indeed, 
overtly political activity on the job was viewed as being potentially 
divisive and a threat to unity that was necessary in collective bar-
gaining. 
Nonetheless, in twelve of thirteen Venezuelan unions, leaders 
acknowledged that they do work actively in political campaigns. They 
claimed to do so as individuals. The contrast with the Mexican unions 
is striking. In Mexico only the leaders of the petroleum workers union 
openly acknowledged campaign involvement (on behalf of the PRI). 
Interestingly, while Venezuelan union leaders acknowledged work-
ing actively for their respective parties, their unions generally do not 
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officially endorse candidates. Only in a communist-dominated union 
in a plastics company in Barquisimeto were formal endorsements 
made. Nonendorsement of candidates seems to be a practice by which 
to avoid inflaming partisan divisions within the union. 
Furthermore, union leaders generally drew a sharp distinction 
between their politico and sindical roles. Proselytizing for parties is 
carried out as an adeco or as a mepista, not as a part of one's union 
responsibilities. This role differentiation seems to be related to a belief 
that the material defense of workers' interests can be weakened by 
political involvement. Leaders in five Venezuelan unions saw political 
activity to be a disadvantage because of potential partisan divisiveness. 
In three cases union leaders acknowledged advantages in partisan 
activity but believed that the benefits accrued only to union leader-
ship, not to the rank and file. Only one union leader interviewed saw 
political activity as opening up any benefits to rank-and-file workers. 
That leader, a mepista union official in the liquor company at La Miel, 
viewed politicized unions as effective pressure groups on behalf of 
working-class interests. 41 
What mobilizing strategies, then, might Venezuelan union lead-
ers employ? The data provide few hints that there is any reciprocal 
exchange of votes or campaign support for material benefits for work-
ers. There may well be some implicit understandings that were un-
covered. Many Venezuelan union leaders admitted to propagandizing 
on behalf of parties with which they are affiliated. These activities 
may indicate efforts at external mobilization via symbol manipulation. 
But no evidence of clientelist-exchange relationships was found. 
Venezuelan unior.leaders are frequently committed to a brand of 
conciliatory unionism, even when they are members of socialist par-
ties. The following quotation, from a nominally socialist union leader, 
illustrates that conciliatory attitude. The individual was asked to de-
fine the term class struggle. We have to defend the workers, of course, 
but we are not only leaders of industrial workers, we are also leaders 
who need to serve the popular classes when they are in need. The 
union has to contribute something to the community, in the social 
and recreational fields. "We have to struggle on behalf of the dis-
possessed in the community-to help the poor (reconstruct their 
housing) when there are floods, to support the students in their 
causes, etc."42 While displaying an admirable sense of class solidarity 
with those who are less well off, this "socialist" expressed little sense 
of conflict with higher social classes. His views reflect the conciliatory 
perspective of many Venezuelan Socialists. 
By way of contrast, a communist labor leader did express a more 
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combative view when defining the term class conflict. "Class struggle 
is the history of humanity; as long as exploiters and exploited exist, 
the confrontation of social classes is inevitable. The struggle begins 
when the worker arrives at the company and says 'I would like to 
earn 40 bolivares' and the company says 'You are going to earn 35 
bolivares.' The class struggle ends when the workers take power."43 
The leader who uttered this statement, an almost eloquent expres-
sion of militant class consciousness, heads a union that has never gone 
out on strike. His union had existed for only seven years, but it re-
mained quite unclear that the leader's rhetorical commitment to a 
socialist transformation was matched by any corresponding behav-
ioral patterns as a union tactician. 44 
These two individuals represent the range of variation one finds 
among leftist labor leaders in Venezuela. While less conciliatory at 
the rhetorical level than are the autonomous labor leaders in Mexico, 
the Venezuelan leaders generally fall short of having well thought-
through strategies for long-range political action. In some cases they 
are Socialists who seem to deemphasize class conflict, to have little 
idea of how socialism might be instituted in Venezuela and who might 
well be satisfied with a "responsive" populist government. In other 
cases they are rhetorically militant Marxists but militants who fail to 
connect their long-term vision of societal reconstruction to short-term 
tactics. While the Venezuelan leftist union leaders may approximate 
anticapitalist, political unionists more than do the Mexican leaders of 
autonomous unions, it seems that Venezuelan union leaders, at most, 
occupy a midpoint on the continuum between ideal types. They are 
at least as they are conciliatory as they are anticapitalist and remain 
heavily oriented toward job unionism, whatever the veneer of political 
unionism that they might exhibit. The difference between Mexican 
and Venezuelan union leaders is only one of degree, not of kind. 
Given the restraint exhibited by union leaders in the two coun-
tries, a crucial factor in explaining the mobilizational incapacity of 
unions has to be related to the nature of the union leadership. Leaders 
such as those who were interviewed cannot be expected to mobilize 
workers effectively for political action. Unions are a natural constitu-
ency of leftist parties. If the union leadership fails to mobilize workers 
effectively, leftist parties will suffer. 
In democratic Venezuela, where bipartisanship is firmly en-
trenched and minor parties are well represented via the mechanisms 
of proportional representation, most union leaders express consid-
erable reticence about engaging in explicitly partisan activity. Even 
fewer indicate a belief that protests, demonstrations, or other forms 
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of demonstrative political action are useful. These leaders operate 
within a set of norms that constrain them to using less of the mobi-
lizational space than the system would seem to afford. 
Why do autonomous union leaders in Venezuela eschew mobi-
lizing workers for system-challenging political action? Several factors 
come to mind. At the local level, Venezuela's leftist union officials 
might see very little to be gained in turning out a strong vote for the 
left or in more militant forms of political action. The position of AD 
and COPEI as hegemonic parties will clearly not be threatened by local 
electoral activism. But strong efforts on behalf of the left may provoke 
disunity within the local union. Furthermore, the preservation of 
Venezuela's democratic system is a value for most of Venezuela's 
socialist union leaders. 45 Many of these leaders witnessed severe 
repression of the labor movement under Gen. Marcos Perez Jime-
nez. 46 Consequently, they use the available mobilizational space with 
restraint. 
In Mexico the political space for citizen-initiated political action is 
considerably more constrained than in Venezuela. As Susan Purcell 
has observed, the leaders of Mexico's authoritarian regime are always 
loathe to let citizens believe that they can set the agenda for public 
discussion. 47 Leaders of autonomous unions in Mexico are capable of 
analytical sophistication; they reflect consciously on just how far they 
can go. The limits of union autonomy preclude both overt system-
challenging action and explicit partisan activity. Indeed, to engage in 
opposition partisanship is to challenge the very nature of the regime. 
To challenge the nature of the Mexican regime is to invite repression. 
Yet left-wing partisanship, as the data have shown, can generate 
both participatory motivations and political participation itself. The 
apolitical autonomous union of Mexico is a less-than-efficient tool for 
political mobilization. Similarly, the muted partisanship of Venezue-
la's leftist union leaders can also impede the political mobilization of 
working-class Venezuelans. 
It is time to review why industrial workers in state-capitalist re-
gimes are prone to support hegemonic parties rather than leftist par-
ties. Lack of more widespread electoral support for the left cannot be 
explained by attitudinal or cognitive factors. There is nothing in the 
cognitive or attitudinal profile of workers in this sample that would 
suggest cultural or ideological constraints on electoral support for the 
left. To the contrary, a high aggregate level of political sophistication 
and discontent with the performance of incumbent parties would sug-
gest a ready pool of leftist supporters. 
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The nature of the union movement in these two countries does 
not account for the electoral strength of hegemonic parties. No evi-
dence was uncovered that incorporated unions strongly influence 
workers to vote for hegemonic parties. Nor did incorporated or au-
tonomous unions in either country deliver a sizable vote to leftist 
parties. In general, the most striking feature of unions in Mexico and 
Venezuela is their relative incapacity to deliver the vote to either he-
gemonic or opposition parties. The pervasive apolitical unionism 
found in both autonomous and incorporated unions at the local level 
serves as a control mechanism over working-class mobilization, pre-
venting unions from fully utilizing their political power. Certainly, 
apolitical unionism can be seen as a realistic adaptation to a political 
system where it is difficult for unions at the local level to influence 
national decision makers. 
The one case where a manifestation of political unionism at the 
local level was found is instructive for understandng the other cases 
of apolitical unionism. The one exception to apolitical unionism at the 
local level was found in the FAT union in the leather-goods factory in 
Leon where the union apparently had formed ties with the PAN. In 
contrast to Venezuela's partisan-penetrated unions, there appears to 
be only a single party that has penetrated this union. Thus, PANistas 
within the local union leadership need not fear partisan divisiveness 
that seems to inhibit local Venezuelan union leaders from more ag-
gressive political involvement. Furthermore, because of its small size 
and relative geographic isolation, this union may be able to get by 
with what larger unions cannot. The Mexican state would not likely 
tolerate electoral mobilization within large unions by opposition par-
ties. Even in the case of the FAT union, the ties between the union 
and opposition parties appear to have been kept covert and informal 
rather than open and formal. 
In sum, corporatist interest intermediation helps little to explain 
why workers support hegemonic parties. Restricted partisan com-
petition explains far better why workers tend to support hegemonic 
rather than leftist parties. The willingness of workers to deviate from 
their party loyalty depended in part on the opportunity of their pre-
ferred party to gain power. Thus, deviations from party loyalty oc-
curred less frequently among partisans of hegemonic parties than 
among partisans of opposition parties. Furthermore, deviations from 
opposition party loyalties were more likely to occur among Mexican 
workers than among Venezuelan workers as opposition parties in 
Mexico have less opportunity to win power. Additionally, deviant 
voting by opposition partisans was more likely to benefit hegemonic 
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Table 36. Determinants of Leftist Voting among Venezuelan and 
Mexican Workers 
Determinant 
Socioeconomic status 
Age 
Critical Consciousness 
Membership, autonomous union 
Psychological involvement in politics 
Performance evaluation 
Electoral system (semi-co!llpetitive vs. 
competitive) 
Multiple r 
r2 
Beta 
Coefficienta 
.10 
-.12 
.14 
.10 
.18 
-.18 
.24 
.47 
.22 
a All coefficients are statistically significant at the .01 level. N = 806. 
parties in Mexico than in Venezuela. All these findings can be ex-
plained by rational choice theory. Voters are prone to consider as 
options only parties that have a realistic chance of gaining power. 
Restricted partisan competition also helps to account for the na-
ture of the partisanship exhibited by these workers. The data sug-
gested a disengaged partisanship among PRI supporters in Mexico. 
This type of partisanship is characterized by relatively low interest in 
politics and a cognitive disassociation of incumbent performance from 
partisanship. Voting, therefore, takes on a perfunctory character for 
PRiistas. By contrast, hegemonic partisans in Venezuela tend to be 
more interested in politics than nonpartisans and to relate their par-
tisan loyalties to assessments of incumbent performance. 
Restricted partisan competition also helps to explain why oppo-
sition parties cannot readily capitalize on working-class political dis-
content. Workers do not consider as a viable option opposition parties 
that have little or no chance of capturing political power. Thus, dis-
contented Mexican workers are not prone to support any of the op-
position parties. Indeed, they are prone to sit out elections (chapter 
7). In the case of Venezuelan workers, the discontented are prone to 
vote for the "out" hegemonic party rather than for a leftist party. The 
former party is capable of capturing control of the national executive 
and legislative branches of government; the latter parties lack such 
capabilities. 
It follows that the degree of partisan competition will significantly 
influence whether industrial workers will likely support leftist parties. 
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Workers will look for other options if they do not believe that the left 
can win. The impact of the larger electoral system on working-class 
support for the left is graphically illustrated in table 36. The regression 
analysis from a pooled sample of Venezuelan and Mexican workers 
shows that the type of electoral system in which workers are located 
better predicts electoral support for the left than do attitudes, type of 
union affiliation, and individual characteristics. This table illustrates 
the major point developed in this chapter-namely, that perceptions 
of the opportunity structure provided by elections more than any 
other factor shape working-class voting behavior in these two state-
capitalist regimes. 
Chapter Nine 
Beyond Controlled 
Mobilization 
Chapter 1 explained how Latin American inclusionary regimes use 
social pacts to incorporate various social sectors. Incorporation came 
about through social pacts in which economic benefits and other pub-
lic goods were extended to various societal groups in exchange for 
their expected support of the existing state. The nature of the pact 
depended on the group's political power and control of investable 
capital. More privileged groups could negotiate more favorable bar-
gains than less privileged groups. 
Pact-constructed states, like Mexico and Venezuela, are designed 
to integrate all sectors of society into the state without disrupting 
economic development via a state-capitalist strategy. Private capital 
accumulation is protected by pacts with privileged groups. To para-
phrase Terry Karl, capitalists are guaranteed the right to make 
money .1 The support of less privileged groups is retained by granting 
access to limited public goods and services in ways that do not 
threaten capital accumulation. 
The underlying social pacts have served the interests of privileged 
groups in these societies far more than the lower classes. This study 
has questioned why less privileged groups in Mexico and Venezuela 
have not mobilized to seek a different, more equitable strategy of 
economic development. In fact, it has shown that lower-class political 
mobilization has posed little threat to underlying social pacts or to 
the prevailing economic-development strategy. In other words, lower-
class mobilization in these inclusionary regimes has not produced 
what Antonio Gramsci labeled a "hegemonic crisis" in which sub-
ordinate classes reject the terms of their incorporation into the existing 
political economy. 2 
On a theoretical level, patterns of controlled political mobilization 
were identified and contrasted with demobilization and patterns of 
autonomous mobilization (chapter 1). Then, this study analyzed the 
extent to which a sample of Mexican and Venezuelan industrial work-
ers exhibited patterns of controlled rather than autonomous political 
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mobilization. The analysis then focused on how working-class mo-
bilization is controlled in these two political systems. 
Data analysis, based on samples of industrial workers, revealed 
that some conventional explanations of how political control is main-
tained may be suspect. No evidence was found that these workers 
are crippled by a lack of political sophistication or by an authoritarian 
culture that would preclude them from self-directed political partici-
pation. For the most part, these workers appear to be capable of self-
directed political activism without guidance from political parties or 
interest associations with which they are affiliated. Nor was support 
found for the "labor aristocracy thesis" according to which the more 
privileged sector of the lower classes, namely industrial workers, re-
mains basically content with the status quo and, therefore, is unlikely 
to mobilize to bring about change. The data show that these workers 
generally believe their interests are ill-served by the existing state or 
by management and that they are dissatisfied with the performance 
of recent administrations. Surprisingly, little support was found for 
the explanation that attributes control to corporatist interest inter-
mediation. There is no convincing evidence from these data that in-
corporated unions, in contrast to autonomous unions, defuse 
participatory motivations and generate electoral support for hege-
monic parties. 
How might one account for the absence of stronger guidance 
within the incorporated unions used for this study? One factor is 
clearly the tendency of local union leaders to shun political activism, 
as discussed in chapter 8. Another factor might be related to the nature 
of the formal proletariat in these unions. The formal proletariat may 
not be as dependent on external guidance as the informal sector of 
the lower class. The relatively high political sophistication of the for-
mal sector (chapter 5), combined with a modicum of economic se-
curity, may increase the independence of these workers from 
organizational control. Similar observations have been made about 
organized labor in the United States. 3 Far greater organizational guid-
ance of political participation might have been found had the study 
employed a sample of peasants or urban workers in the informal 
service or manufacturing sector. Even if the findings are partially an 
artifact of the unions sampled, these findings still highlight the need 
for a more refined explanation of how incorporated unions shape 
working-class political behavior. Clearly, guided political participation 
is not the norm in all Venezuelan and Mexican incorporated unions. 
The possibility cannot be dismissed that incorporation of unions 
into hegemonic parties might provide an effective mechanism to con-
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trol the union leadership even if the rank-and-file are not so easily 
controlled. Indeed, the leadership of incorporated unions used for 
this study was uniformly accommodative and compliant, though the 
same was generally true for leaders of autonomous unions. 
The data do provide, however, reason to view the labor union 
movement as politically consequential. Both incorporated and au-
tonomous unions in Mexico tend to defuse participatory motivations 
among rank-and-file workers. Both types of unions in Venezuela fa-
cilitate voting. More significantly, the priorities of the union move-
ment in both countries minimize labor's political power. In all local 
unions examined for this study, higher priority was given to "job 
unionism" than to "political unionism." It cannot be determined if 
these priorities are a cause or a consequence of political powerless-
ness. Nevertheless, it can be asserted that existing priorities are related 
to organized labor's political weakness in these two countries. 
Restricted partisan competition better explains how political mo-
bilization is controlled than does union incorporation. Restricted party 
competition, as found in Mexico, clearly aids the hegemonic party in 
defusing political attentiveness and concientizaci6n among its working-
class supporters, while enhancing its capacity to guide electoral mo-
bilization and prevent short-term defections. Furthermore, leftist 
political parties in both countries cannot capitalize on working-class 
political discontent because of their competitive disadvantage with 
hegemonic parties. The left is not viewed as a viable alternative by 
workers in either country. This factor, rather than performance sat-
isfaction, corporatist interest intermediation, or a working-class po-
litical culture, best explains why industrial workers in Venezuela and 
Mexico generally vote for hegemonic parties. 
Restricted partisan competition by itself, however, fails to fully 
explain why industrial workers in these two countries do not devise 
strategies to create new electoral options. The study has suggested a 
rational utility explanation. Simply stated, if the left cannot win, why 
vote for it? As with demand protest or revolutionary activity, workers 
conclude that a system-challenging electoral strategy is no option, 
given the realities of the established electoral system. 
Adam Przeworski' s discussion of why some groups do not ac-
tively seek regime liberalization is useful for understanding why 
Venezuelan and Mexican workers are unlikely to opt for system-
challenging political activity. Basically, Przeworski' s argument is that 
the decision of a given group or actor to join a movement for liber-
alization depends not only on considerations of interests but also on 
calculations of likelihood of success. To determine likely success, the 
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individual (or group) calculates the likely number of other partici-
pants.4 As Przeworski explains: 
Let k be the number of actors necessary and sufficient to make a move toward 
liberalizations successful. The strategic situation is then as follows. If I move 
and fewer than (k-1) others join, then I am likely to suffer unpleasant con-
sequences. If I move and (k-1) others join, I will belong to a victorious move-
ment and can expect to be rewarded appropriately. If I do not move and fewer 
than k others do, I will remain on the side of power and benefit from it. 
Finally, if I do not move, but more than (k-1) others do, I will again find 
myself on the losing side. Note that the value of the outcome increases as 
the number of actors making a move approaches k, from both sides. 
Without making specific assumptions about the value of the particular 
outcomes, one cannot make any predictions about strategic behavior. But 
what is apparent is the importance of expectations of success. Neither position 
is safe under the circumstances: to make a precipitous move is as dangerous 
as not joining in a movement that is successful. What this analysis implies, 
therefore, is that interests may be quite stable throughout the process but 
that they will be a poor predictor of behavior when expectations of success 
shift rapidly. Consequently, group analysis may generate weak predictions 
when groups are identified only by their interests, and therefore particular 
strategic postures may be embraced at particular moments by the same 
groups. 5 
These considerations might apply to the case of industrial workers 
in Latin America. While workers may perceive their interests to 
be better served by leftist parties, they are not likely to support 
them unless they believe these parties can be successfully elected. 
Voting for hegemonic parties might be a "risk aversive" strategy for 
workers in electoral systems where competition is restricted. One does 
not jeopardize one's standing with those in and likely to remain in 
power. To support the left, on the other hand, is to be "on the losing 
side."6 
To understand why industrial workers in these countries and 
elsewhere in Latin America perceive success for the left as unlikely, 
one should compare their situation with that of industrial workers in 
Western European countries. In the latter countries, it is far easier 
than in Latin America to build a winning leftist multiclass coalition. 
In Sweden, for example, over 70 percent of the nonmanual employees 
were organized by 1970, principally in the Tjanstemannens Central-
organisation (Central Organization of Salaried Employees, or Teo). 
When salaried employees are added to the very high percentage of 
manual employees organized in the Landsorganisationen (Swedish 
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Federation of Trade Unions or Lo),7 the strength of the Swedish Social 
Democratic party/labor movement is considerable. In cases like Swe-
den and Norway, the basis of a dominant center-left political coalition 
is an organized formal industrial proletariat in league with an orga-
nized corps of middle-class service workers and intellectuals. 
In Latin America the class structure is greatly different than Swe-
den's. 8 The formal industrial proletariat, while substantial in countries 
like Venezuela and Mexico, does not even approach being a majority 
of the urban population, let alone of the total national population. 
Alejandro Portes estimates the formal proletariat as around 22 percent 
for Latin America as a whole. 9 There is also a sizable informal petty 
bourgeoisie (very small merchants or manufacturers, poorly capitalized, 
using simple technologies of manufacture or merchandising), esti-
mated at around 10 percent, and a much larger informal proletariat 
(self- or family-employed individuals or workers in the poorly capi-
talized small enterprises noted above). The latter constitutes some-
where between 30 percent and 60 percent of the population in Latin 
American countries. The well-paid service sector workers constitute 
what Portes denotes as the bureaucratic-technical class, which averages 
about 6 percent of the population in Latin America and rarely sur-
passes 10 percent. 
Consider the implications. In Northern European countries, such 
as Sweden and Norway, the formal proletariat and the middle class 
(which Portes calls the bureaucratic-technical class) can easily consti-
tute an electoral majority. Strong incentives exist to build an electoral 
coalition capable of sustaining power through an alliance of prole-
tarians and progressive middle-class elements. But in Latin America 
the numbers are just not there. Those social classes in Northern Eu-
rope that can comprise a "majority coalition" capable of dominating 
the political process through a political party/labor union alliance can-
not do so in Latin America. If one accepts Partes's estimates of class 
structures, the total of the formal proletariat and the whole of the 
middle classes (including both the bureaucratic-technical class and 
the informal bourgeoisie) would not on an average surpass 38 percent. 
Defections of certain middle class groups from progressive causes 
could be expected and would reduce the percentage. 10 
Hence, building a progressive alliance with any hope of attaining 
power and of transforming Latin American societies through electoral 
means, as has been attempted in Scandinavia and was attempted in 
Chile before 1973, would require a wider coalition. The organizational 
effort would have to extend into the informal proletariat and peasants. 
These groups comprise the most sizable segment of Latin American 
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populations. Yet formidable barriers exist to creating such a leftist 
coalition. 
The dispersion of these groups into multiple work sites with mul-
tiple employers is problematic. In small enterprises and in rural areas, 
paternalistic labor relations are the norm. Dispersion and the pre-
vailing paternalistic authority structures create problems for leftist 
organizers seeking to form horizontal class loyalties transcending the 
immediate workplace. Furthermore, leftist parties often lack the re-
sources to deal with the immediate problems of the poor. Such groups' 
grievances may have as much to do with urban housing, sanitation, 
or tenure as with classwide conditions. 11 
Another problem involves the nature of leftist party leadership 
in Venezuela, Mexico, and elsewhere in Latin America. The leader-
ship, as well as the mass base of these parties, has come overwhelm-
ingly from progressive elements of the middle and upper classes. 
Consequently, most members of these parties are not "well 
grounded" in the realities of life in impoverished communities. Fur-
thermore, these parties often engage in arcane ideological debates 
among themselves and are hurt by cognitive associations with totali-
tarianism, violence, the Soviet Union, and atheism. These factors help 
to create a popular lower-class image of the left as being irrelevant 
and even dangerous. 
The existing state also poses a barrier to expanding the base of 
support for Venezuelan and Mexican leftist parties. Leaders of au-
tonomous unions, peasant associations, and other possible target 
groups may be fully aware of limits to the possible. It is doubtful that 
leaders of hegemonic parties in either country would permit the radi-
cal shift in power resources implied by a left-labor-peasant alliance. 
The PRI has recently employed electoral fraud and intimidation to put 
down the challenge to its hegemony by the PAN in some northern 
states. 12 This example, as well as others discussed in chapter 4, shows 
that the PRI is not likely to acquiesce easily to strong challenges from 
the left. Similarly, leaders of Venezuelan hegemonic parties would be 
likely to see a broad-based leftist movement as a threat to the social 
pacts by which the Venezuelan state was constituted. Leaders of in-
terest associations linked to the lower classes, therefore, might see 
explicitly political strategies as self-defeating or as unrealistic, given 
the uneven distribution of power resources. For this reason they may 
well focus on more modest goals rather than seek to transform the 
existing sociopolitical order via political strategies. 
Both the Movement toward Socialism (MAS) in Venezuela and the 
Mexican Communist party have recently sought to expand their mass 
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base beyond middle-class intellectuals to include workers and peas-
ants.13 Their attempts have met with little success in either country, 
despite severe economic crises and unpopular austerity programs in 
the eighties. In Mexico the left lost ground to the PRI and to the PAN 
in every election since 1979,14 while the Venezuelan left has experi-
enced similar erosion of its strength throughout the eighties. 15 
These developments suggest that a left-labor-peasant alliance will 
not easily be forged in either country. The results of this study show 
why lower-class discontent is not likely to be converted into electoral 
support for the left. So long as the left is perceived as incapable of 
winning, it is likely to remain incapable of building a larger lower-
class support base. Consequently, the lower classes cannot utilize 
their most potent political resource-their size-to bring to power a 
government more responsive to their interests. 16 
A review of the consequences of controlled mobilization for eco-
nomic development in Venezuela and Mexico and a discussion of the 
potential of the union movement as a vanguard in forming a left-
labor-peasant alliance will conclude this study. 
In much of Latin America, economic growth has been sustained 
and dramatic throughout the twentieth century. As noted in chapter 
3, both Venezuela and Mexico have industrialized rapidly in the post-
World War II era.17 Yet four decades of industrial transformation have 
not produced dramatic changes in national distributions of income, 
which often remain essentially static. The possibility that the Latin 
American poor might have improved in absolute terms while re-
maining far behind in relative terms is a subject of continuing debate 
among scholars, but most scholars agree that Latin American income-
distribution profiles have not changed dramatically in the post-World 
War II era, except for countries undergoing revolutionary change. 18 
Attempts to diagnose the causes of distributional stasis have provoked 
even more disagreement. 19 That complicated empirical dispute cannot 
be resolved in this volume. Yet it is clear that labor movements must 
surely have profound consequences for the distribution of income in 
society and for the type of development to which society can aspire. 20 
The Venezuelan economist, Asdrubal Baptista, noted recently 
that "the distribution of income [in Venezuela] has not followed the 
usual tendency in other [European] countries and, more importantly, 
has moved in the opposite direction in recent years, exhibiting a de-
crease in salaries as a percentage of national income." This author 
concludes that "the internal market is very limited, and worse yet, 
its growth has been very slow in comparison with the demands im-
posed by the growth in productive activity in Venezuela. Internal 
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demand for national production, in view of the distribution of income, 
has been less than it should have been in order to promote an har-
monic and equilibrated development of the economy."21 
Similar observations are made by domestic economists in most of 
Latin America, including Mexico. While this study does not suggest 
that the condition of labor movements can explain all distortions of 
national development in Latin Amer. ican ~ate-capitalist regimes, labor 
union performance may well be related to distributional outcomes. 
Not only the amount of economic growt . experienced but also the 
type of development experienced, if genuipe development occurs at 
all, may well depend on the success of low-rpcome classes in pressing 
for improvements in economic distributions. Such improvements do 
not happen automatically.22 
Perhaps, it is unrealistic to expect organized labor ever to lead in 
the formation of a left-labor-peasant alliance that might lead to the 
reorientation of development policy. Yet this sector might better take 
the lead than other groups. Unfortunately, existing leftist parties are 
weak and highly fragmented and comprised of a leadership with few 
roots in the lower classes. Peasant organizations and the few orga-
nizations of informal sector workers would suffer from problems al-
ready mentioned, particularly geographic dispersion and existing 
paternalistic labor relations. In addition, rank-and-file members of 
such organizations might lack the political sophistication and eco-
nomic security to mobilize for autonomous political action indepen-
dent of ruling parties. 
The data analysis presented in this study suggests that existing 
levels of consciousness and clientelist controls might prove less than 
formidable barriers for mobilizing rank-and-file industrial workers. 
The prerequisite union leadership might prove a more formidable 
barrier. This is true because the union leadership must overcome such 
problems as internal fragmentation of the union movement and ideo-
logical diversity among union leaders, as well as be willing to accept 
the risks of "political unionism." Some union leaders have been will-
ing to lead insurgent movements seeking autonomy from official con-
trol. However, the purpose has more often been to achieve more 
effective "job unionism" than to promote "political unionism."23 Even 
if such a commitment were made, the task of forging a left-labor-
peasant alliance would remain formidable for reasons already dis-
cussed. 
It would be unrealistic to expect union leaders to accept the risks 
of forming a broad-based political alliance unless the state and privi-
leged groups were willing to tolerate such developments. Past history 
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in both countries suggests that privileged groups would resort to 
repression in such instances (chapter 4). More than one Latin Ameri-
can military coup has been justified to the middle and upper classes 
by invoking the specter of uncontrolled mass mobilization and alleged 
radicalism of labor leaders. 24 
Yet there are costs with imposing political control over working-
class political mobilization. These costs include (1) prolongation of 
economic policies that do not lead to national economic integration 
and (2) accumulation of social tensions that may make social peace 
difficult to sustain over the longer term. Failure to attain national 
economic integration may well mean that the society loses because 
the growth rate becomes less than what it could be and the growth 
that occurs will benefit fewer people than it could. 25 Moreover, there 
is always the possibility that accumulated social tensions will find 
outlets in crime and that social violence may erupt into political vio-
lence after years of apparent peace. 26 
This study has shown that labor's failure to play a more creative 
role in building a more socially just and democratic society in these 
two countries is not likely the fault of rank-and-file industrial workers. 
They remain politically silent because they cannot envision new al-
ternatives to hegemonic parties and existing social pacts. To create 
new alternatives would be a Herculean and, perhaps, an impossible 
task for Mexican and Venezuelan labor leaders. However, such a task 
might be perceived as more tenable by labor elites in the late eighties 
than at the time of inverviewing for this study in 1979 and 1980. 
Workers interviewed for this study were generally supportive of their 
unions. 27 However, the economic crisis of the eighties has likely weak-
ened the capacity of union leaders to build support among rank-and-
file workers by delivering material benefits and protecting real 
wages.28 Therefore, a political strategy centered on building a broad-
based progressive alliance could become attractive to union leaders 
in the future if economic stagnation continues. As this study has 
shown, rank-and-file industrial workers ought to be amenable to the 
creation of such a left-labor-peasant alliance, just as Western European 
workers favored the creation of leftist alternatives. 
Appendix A 
Data Base for Study of 
Venezuelan and Mexican Workers 
Dominant Partisan Number 
Sampling Geographic Type of Unions Tendency of of 
Criterion Location Sampled Union Leadership• Cases 
Venezuela 
(1) Non-Unionized, Non- Barquisimeto None (workers from Not Applicable 120 
Strategic Industries various small industries 
and shops) 
(2) Incorporated Unions, Barquisimeto Five unions representing Either AD(1) or 128 
Non-Strategic metal fabrication workers, COPEI(1) or 
Industries textile workers, graphic an AD/COPE! 
arts workers, dairy coalition(3) 
workers, and soft drink 
bottling workers, 
respectively 
(3) Incorporated Unions, Punto Fijo Four unions of petroleum COPEI(2) or URD(2) 99 
Strategic Industries workers 
(4) Autonomous Unions, A) La Miel Two unions, one MEP and the 72 
Non-Strategic representing a soft drink Venezuelan 
Industries B) Barquisimeto factory and another Communist Party 
representing plastics 
workers 
(5) Autonomous Unions, Punto Fijo Two unions of petroleum Left Coalition and 100 
Strategic Industries workers MEP 
Mexico 
(1) Non-Unionized, Non- Mexico City None (workers from Not Applicable 100 
Strategic Industries various small industries 
and shops) 
(2) Incorporated Unions, Ayotla, Puebla Union of textile workers Confederation of 100 
Non-Strategic Mexican Workers, 
Industries (CTM) PRI Affiliated 
(3) Incorporated Unions, Salamanca, Union of petroleum Confederation of 100 
Strategic Industries Guanajuato workers Mexican Workers 
(CTM) 
(4) Autonomous Unions, Leon, Union of leather goods Frente Autentico de 100 
Non-Strategic Guanajuato workers Trabajo (FAT) 
Industries 
(5) Autonomous Unions, Cuernavaca, Automobile workers' Unidad Obrera 100 
Strategic Industries Morelos union lndependente (UOI) 
•Determination of dominant partisan tendency of Venezuelan union leadership based 
on elite interviews with union leaders. AD Acci6n Democratica; COPEI Social Christian 
Party; MEP Movemiento Electoral del Pueblo; URD Union R~publicana Democratica. 
Source: Charles L. Davis, "Political Regimes and the Socioeconomic Resource Model of 
Political Mobilization: Some Venezuelan and Mexican Data," Journal of Politics 45, no. 2 
(May 1983): 444-45. 
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Appendix B 
Measurement and Scaling of 
Independent and Control Variables 
As a general introduction to our scaling decisions, it ought to be noted that 
the study sought to develop equivalent measures for the Venezuelan and 
Mexican samples. Usually, this implied the use of identical or analogous 
items, although sometimes functionally equivalent items were employed. De-
pendent variables are not presented because frequency distributions are pre-
sented in chapter 5 and factor scales are described in Appendix C. 
ISSUE-BASED MOTIVATIONS 
Evaluation of Government Performance, Mexico 
Respondents were asked to evaluate the performance of the then current 
president, Jose Lopez Portillo (1976-82) and his predessor, Luis Echeverria 
(1970-76) in the following areas: public transportation, police protection, hous-
ing for the poor, public education, jobs creation, and income redistribution. 
Respondents evaluated performance on a five-point scale. A varimax rotated 
factor analysis of all items revealed a three-dimensional solution. The three 
factors are labeled as follows: Evaluation of Urban Services, Evaluation of 
Public Education, and Evaluation of Economic Redistribution. The respective 
factor scales follow. 
Evaluation of Urban Services 
Police protection: 
Public transportation 
Housing for the poor: 
Eigenvalue 
Lopez Portillo 
Echeverria 
Lopez Portillo 
Echeverria 
Echeverria 
Percentage of variance explained by factor 
Evaluation of Public Education 
Lopez Portillo 
Echeverria 
Eigenvalue 
Percentage of variance explained by factor 
.73 
.65 
.57 
.54 
.36 
4.40 
36.6% 
.56 
.79 
1.33 
11.1% 
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Evaluation of Economic Redistribution 
Income redistribution: Lopez Portillo 
Jobs creation: Echeverria 
Income redistribution: Echeverria 
Eigenvalue 
Percentage of variance explained by factor 
Evaluation of Government Performance, Venezuela 
Appendix B 
.52 
.57 
.62 
1.17 
9.8% 
The same items were used in the Venezuelan survey instrument with the 
exception of the items for income redistribution. Thus, five items were used 
to assess how Venezuelan workers in the sample evaluated the performance 
of the then incumbent Luis Herrera Campins (1987-83) and his predecessor, 
Carlos Andres Perez (1973-78). A varimax rotated factor analysis revealed that 
Venezuelan workers are prone to organize their assessments of performance 
around discrete presidential administrations rather than around general policy 
areas as found to be the case for Mexican workers. The data analysis uses 
only the assessment scale of Andres Perez because Herrera Cam pins was still 
early into his administration at the time of interviewing. 
Evaluation of Performance of Andres Perez 
Public transportation 
Police protection 
Housing for the poor 
Public education 
Jobs creation 
Eigenvalue 
Percentage of variance explained by factor 
Critical Consciousness (concientizacion) 
Rotated Factor Loading 
.75 
.77 
.73 
.75 
.60 
4.52 
45.2% 
This factor scale was constructed from three independently derived factor 
scales: (1) class consciousness, (2) structure-blaming attitudes, and (3) class 
solidarity. A master scale was formed via factor analysis in both the Vene-
zuelan and Mexican samples. Class consciousness (or perceptions of labor-
management relations) is based on the following items: (1) whether workers 
receive appropriate salaries vis-a-vis work done; (2) whether workers; salaries 
are high or low; (3) extent to which owners and managers truly care about 
workers; (4) extent to which owners earn too much or too little; and (5) extent 
to which company profits benefit workers. Structure-blaming attitudes are 
inferred from two items and follow-up probes. One item dealt with whether 
the majority of Mexicans/Venezuelans received their fair share of the good 
things in life; a second item dealt with whether the individual received a fair 
share of the good things in life. In the follow-up probes, those who attributed 
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the existence of "unfairness" to social structures (such as, lack of educational 
opportunity, the power of the upper classes, political corruption that rein-
forces existing conditions) were assigned a higher value than those who in-
terpreted existing inequities as a result of personal deficiencies of the deprived 
(such as lack of effort and lack of training). Both groups received a higher 
score than those who perceived no inequities. Class solidarity was opera-
tionally measured as the product of three items, including (1) endorsement 
of local unions joining general strikes, (2) abstract endorsement of idea of 
general strikes, and (3) endorsement of interenterprise strikes. 
The varimax rotated factor scales for critical consciousness as formed from 
the three subscales follow. 
Critical Consciousness 
Rotated Factor Loading 
Mexico 
Class consciousness 
Class solidarity 
Structure-blame 
Eigenvalue 
Percentage of variance explained by factor 
Venezuela 
Class consciousness 
Class solidarity 
Structure-blame 
Eigenvalue 
Percentage of variance explained by factor 
ISSUE-NEUTRAL MOTIVATIONS 
Psychological Involvement in Politics 
.39 
.32 
.61 
1.37 
45.8% 
.32 
.53 
.47 
1.38 
46.1% 
For both samples a similar procedure was followed in constructing this scale. 
A political interest and political information scale were formed. Scores on 
these two scales were standardized and then summed. The political interest 
scale was formed from items that loaded on a separate factor dimension in 
the analysis of the structure of political participation as reported in table 8. 
To measure the political information available to the respondent, a wide array 
of items in which respondents were asked the more obvious (name of current 
president) to the more esoteric (major national export) was used. A selection 
of items was culled to form acceptable Guttman scales for both national sam-
ples (for Mexico, coefficient of reproducibility = .95, coefficient of scalability 
= .73; for Venezuela, coefficient of reproducibility = .92, coefficient of scala-
bility = .68). 
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RESOURCE VARIABLES 
Age 
The actual age in years as reported by the respondent during the interview 
was used to measure age. 
Socioeconomic Status 
A three-item factor scale was employed. The items used and the factor scores 
from a rotated varimax factor analysis are reported below. 
Socioeconomic Status 
Factor Loading 
Mexico 
Number of years of formal education 
Weekly family income 
Job skill level (unskilled, semiskilled, 
skilled) 
Eigenvalue 
Percentage of variance explained by factor 
Venezuela 
Number of years of formal education 
Weekly family income 
Job skill level (unskilled, semiskilled, skilled) 
Eigenvalue 
Percentage of variance explained by factor = 
MEASUREMENT OF EXTERNAL MOBILIZATION 
Strength of Institutional Affiliation 
.31 
.78 
.34 
1.42 
47.4% 
.36 
.67 
.70 
1.66 
55.3% 
To measure strength of institutional affiliation, researchers devised an ordi-
nally ranked typology similar to that used by Verba, Nie, and Kim in Par-
ticipation and Political Equality, 106-11. However, this study did not use their 
distinction between politicized and non politicized interest groups and focused 
entirely on membership in labor unions, the only type of politicized orga-
nization with which our respondents tended to be affiliated. Similar to Verba, 
Nie, and Kim, the typology here is formed by combining strength of party 
loyalty with union membership. The four categories in the institutional af-
filiation typology are defined as follows: 
(1) Nonpoliticals. These individuals have no political institutional affiliation. 
They are neither members of labor unions nor do they identify with political 
parties. 
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(2) Weakly affiliated. These individuals are either nonidentifiers with a party 
who are members of a union or else moderately weak party identifiers who 
are nonunion members. 
(3) Moderately affiliated. These individuals are either union members who are 
moderate/weak party identifiers or else nonunion members who strongly 
identify with a political party. 
(4) Strongly affiliated. These are union members who are strong party iden-
tifiers. 
Partisan Identification 
Dichotomized dummy variables were created to measure (1) identification 
with hegemonic parties and (2) identification with leftist parties. Hegemonic 
parties in Venezuela included COPEI and Acci6n Democnitica (AD). The he-
gemonic party in Mexico is the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). 
Identification with the following Mexican parties was treated as leftist sym-
pathy: the Popular Socialist Party (PPS), the Party of Mexican Workers (P""n), 
the Socialist Workers Party (PST), and the Mexican Communist Party (PCM). 
Venezuelan leftist parties included the Electoral Peoples' Movement (MEP), 
the Movement toward Socialism (MAS), the Revolutionary Leftist Movement 
(MIR), and the Venezuelan Communist Party (Pcu). 
Union Membership 
Dichotomized, dummy variables were created to measure (1) membership in 
autonomous unions and (2) membership in incorporated unions. The incor-
porated and autonomous unions used for this study are listed in Appendix 
A. 
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Appendix C 
Modes of Political Activity: 
A Varimax Factor Analysis 
Political Campaign Communal 
Interest Activity Voting Activity 
Venezuelan Workers 
Discuss politics at home .647 .340 .067 -.131 
Discuss politics at work .495 .407 .018 .062 
Read news in paper .754 .202 .105 .321 
Pay attention to news: 
TV or radio .716 .175 .111 .310 
Attend political meetings .297 .602 .059 .214 
Participate in campaign 
activities .159 .816 .071 .278 
Discuss politics in 
organizations .402 .681 .086 .140 
Generally vote .155 .057 .249 .129 
Generally vote in 
national elections .068 .040 .808 .043 
Vote in 1973 election -.008 -.051 .611 .086 
Vote in 1978 election -.039 -.019 .609 -.006 
Vote in 1979 election .128 .145 .415 .070 
Member: 
Parents' association .017 .089 .084 .391 
Cooperative .139 .101 .161 .456 
Neighborhood 
organization .102 .178 -.073 .243 
Eigenvalue 4.28 2.13 1.19 1.00 
Political Campaign Communal 
Voting Interest Activity Activity 
Mexican Workers 
Discuss politics at home .018 .482 .259 -.012 
Discuss politics at work .004 .562 .204 .000 
Read news in paper -.074 .865 .114 .154 
Pay attention to news: 
TV or radio -.032 .732 .164 .093 
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Political Campaign Communal 
Voting Interest Activity Activity 
Attend political meetings -.108 .324 .639 -.040 
Participate in campaign 
activities -.047 .232 .920 .005 
Discuss politics in 
organizations .042 .244 .704 .179 
Generally vote .846 .012 -.012 -.035 
Generally vote in 
national elections .768 -.016 -.045 -.018 
Vote in 1970 election .574 -.041 .009 .133 
Vote in 1976 election .722 -.045 -.058 .075 
Vote in 1979 election .695 .010 .002 -.056 
Member: 
Parents' Association .068 .105 .093 .614 
Cooperative -.018 .017 .003 .383 
Neighborhood 
Organization .035 .015 .000 .530 
Eigenvalue 3.59 3.04 1.52 1.24 
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of 1981 in Venezuela. 
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leaders of Ayotla Textile workers' union, Ayotla, Mexico, Feb. 24, 1981, 14. 
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from state and national control. 
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104-6. 
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39. The emergence of Solidarnosc in 1981 was not necessarily detrimental 
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uardo Troncosco, El desafio industrial de Venezuela (Buenos Aires: Editorial 
Pomaire, 1983), 51. 
18. Among nonrevolutionary states the distribution of income in Costa 
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